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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THE TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICY 
 
Globalization has promoted the transnational diffusion of public policies. Recognizing 
that policies of one country are shaped by policies of others, scholars have developed several 
theories to explain policy diffusion. Because empirical evidence for these theories is contested, 
this study evaluates the relative explanatory power of the major theories of policy diffusion for 
human trafficking policies. To test competing theoretical claims, this study uses quantitative 
methods on an original, cross-national data set to analyze how human trafficking policies 
diffused. The results reveal that for the diffusion of human trafficking policies coercion and 
constructivist theories have robust support, while support is less consistent for reputation 
theory and altogether lacking for competition theory. Surprisingly, the findings show that 
irresolute sanction threats were more effective than credible threats in promoting trafficking 
policy diffusion. In addition, the analysis reveals a complicated relationship between regional 
organizations and constructivist diffusion mechanisms. By showing the explanatory power of 
each theory and raising new questions and puzzles, the study offers a foundation for further 
theoretical development. This research also has practical implications for diplomats and 
policymakers who wish to promote the diffusion of good practices to counter human trafficking. 
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This dissertation makes an empirical contribution to the theoretical literature on policy 
diffusion in the international system. There is a theoretical debate among scholars about the 
explanatory value of various theories of policy diffusion. While this literature makes competing 
theoretical claims, the empirical evidence is contested or lacking. This study contributes to this 
literature by analyzing how trafficking in persons (TIP) policy is diffused across states in the 
international system by using an original, cross-national data set on TIP policy covering 195 
countries for the period from 1998 to 2018. This data set broadens TIP policy beyond 
criminalization to include capacity-building and victim protection policies and includes new 
indicators to better evaluate the relative merits of the various theories of policy diffusion. By 
empirically adjudicating the theoretical debate, this study reveals the explanatory value of the 
existing theories and the gaps that yet remain, laying the groundwork of further theoretical 
development in policy diffusion and related areas of study. 
Scholars of policy diffusion generally draw on one of five theories in their explanations: 
constructivism, learning, coercion, competition, or reputation. For TIP policy, scholarly attention 
has focused on two mechanisms: (1) scorecard diplomacy, connected to reputation theory, and 
(2) governmental concern over the diversion of trafficking as an indirect effect of neighbors' 
improved policies, connected to the constructivist and competition theories. TIP policy is a 
useful test case in the policy diffusion literature because it is perceived as a public good which 
has normative, economic, and security dimensions. These dimensions suggest that TIP policy is 
an ideal issue area for empirically testing the predictions of theories of transnational policy 
diffusion. 
Mechanisms associated with most of the theories of policy diffusion are potentially 
active given the multiple dimensions of TIP policy. The US publicly scores countries for their 
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performance in tackling TIP and sanctions poor performers—mechanisms associated with 
coercion and reputation. Countries may also be competing with their neighbors to become less 
attractive to criminal investment—a mechanism associated with competition. Ideas about TIP 
policy are also spread through a dense network of personal and institutional relationships 
nestled within and between international, inter-regional, regional, and domestic organizations—
a mechanism associated with constructivism. Learning is the one theory of policy diffusion that 
is least likely to be active for TIP because of the lack of transparent data necessary to evaluate 
policy success. But, even here, the mechanisms associated with learning overlap with the 
constructivism, so evidence in favor of these mechanisms can inform our understanding of its 
explanatory power when these conditions are active in other policy domains. 
 This dissertation can make an empirical its contribution to the theoretical literature 
because it introduces a novel data able to test extant theories of transnational policy diffusion 
with survival analysis. Unlike previous studies which have focused on criminalization, this data 
set allows for testing hypotheses on a broader range of TIP policies, including capacity-building 
and victim protection policies. The data set also includes better operationalizations of existing 
concepts, such as fear of trafficking diversion, and enables developing models for predicting US 
sanctioning and scoring decisions necessary to test theories of coercion and reputation. The 
data set also includes variables to account for mechanisms which may explain regional variation 
in TIP policy diffusion, a gap in the literature which has not been well explored. Together, these 
features enable the dissertation to offer the most comprehensive test of existing theories of 
policy diffusion on TIP policy to date. 
 Understanding TIP policy diffusion is not only important for the theoretical contribution 
it can make, but also to practitioners who wish to promote TIP policy. Having a firm, empirically-
grounded understanding for what encourages TIP policy diffusion is integral to the effort to 
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reduce the suffering caused by human trafficking. Because many other policies also have a 
normative dimension, understanding how TIP policies diffuse will be useful to advocates of 
other causes as well. For example, in human trafficking studies, scholars have contested the 
value of US sanctions for policy diffusion and have held that US preferences for law enforcement 
solutions may undermine victim protection. This study reveals the extent to which these 
criticisms are merited and informs advocacy strategies for promoting favored policies in the 
future. 
 This dissertation is therefore developed as follows: 
 Chapter 1 sets out the major theories of policy diffusion and explains how these have 
been applied to the diffusion of TIP policy. I evaluate the literature critically and discuss some 
open questions in the literature. I conclude this chapter by proposing the hypotheses to be 
tested in this study. 
 Chapter 2 describes the research design. I begin with a description of the data collection 
which resulted in the original data set I use in the study. I continue with an explanation of the 
research design. The testing of some hypotheses requires a two-step process where I first 
generate models that predict the US sanctioning decision or the US TIP report score. I explain 
how I develop these models and how the results are used in the principal analysis. I then explain 
the principal statistical analysis used in the dissertation to test the hypotheses by describing the 
dependent and independent variables, and the survival analysis model. 
 Chapter 3 tests coercion theory by examining whether the threat of US sanctions 
promotes the diffusion of TIP policy. This chapter begins with the results of the model used to 
predict sanctioning decisions and then continues with the models testing how the credibility of 
US sanctions influences TIP policy diffusion. 
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 Chapter 4 tests reputation theory by examining whether US scorecard diplomacy 
beyond the threat of sanctions promotes the diffusion of TIP policy. This chapter begins with the 
results of the model used to explain TIP scored and then continues with the models testing how 
reputational or other non-coercive pressure from US diplomacy influences TIP policy diffusion. 
 Chapter 5 tests constructivist theory by examining whether regional policy density 
(which operationalizes the extent to which the policy has become taken-for-granted) promotes 
policy diffusion and exploring the relationship between this policy normalization and regional 
organizations. The models examine the extent to which policy normalization can be explained by 
the influence of regional policy communities. 
 Chapter 6 tests competition theory by examining whether countries compete to become 
less attractive to transnational criminal networks by implementing TIP policy. The models use a 
new indicator for measuring the fear of transnational trafficking to offer a better test of this 
hypothesis than is found in the extant literature. 
 Chapter 7 summarizes the findings for each hypothesis, suggests some directions for 





CHAPTER ONE: THEORY 
WHAT IS TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS POLICY? 
 After the end of the Cold War, law enforcement agencies began seeing an increase in 
cases in which people had been compelled or tricked into situations in which they were 
exploited, often across borders. Media exposés and diplomatic attention conceptualized this 
"trafficking in persons" (TIP) as a kind of forced labor, even a modern variant of slavery. Stories 
of sex trafficking had a special power in capturing the attention of concerned publics in the 
United States and elsewhere. In the late 1990s, advocates framed TIP as both a problem of 
crime and of protecting marginalized people and encouraged governments to act to end this 
"new slavery" (for this history, see Bales 1999; DeStefano 2008). 
 Policies for combatting trafficking in persons have since seen rapid global acceptance. In 
2021, the international TIP regime is deep and complex, but in 2000 it had only two key 
components: The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons Especially Women and Children (2000; hereafter "the Protocol") and the US Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). Both the Protocol and the TVPA, as well 
as subsequent global, regional, and bilateral transnational policy efforts, emphasized three 
policy sectors necessary to combat human trafficking: prosecution of traffickers, protection of 
victims, and prevention, or the 3Ps. 
 TIP policy is not a single policy but a suite of policies. Among its articles, the Protocol 
requires ratifying states to (1) criminalize sex and labor trafficking as defined by the Protocol, (2) 
"consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery 
of victims," (3) consider adopting measures allowing transnational victims to remain in the 
receiving state, (4) repatriate transnational victims with due regard for their safety, (5) establish 
"comprehensive policies" to prevent TIP and protect victims from revictimization, (6) alleviate 
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factors that make people vulnerable to trafficking, (7) exchange information with one another, 
(8) train law enforcement, immigration, and other officials, (9) strengthen border controls to 
prevent and detect TIP, and (10) ensure integrity of travel documents. Examples of specific TIP 
policies within the United States include laws requiring posting trafficking hotline numbers in 
public restrooms, ensuring underage victims are not prosecuted for prostitution offenses, and 
permitting victims to vacate certain offenses acquired while being trafficked. 
 A careful reader of the Protocol will note that the requirements are stronger for law 
enforcement policies than for victim services policies where parties are only required to 
"consider" implementing measures. While some in the advocacy community have been critical 
of the prioritization of law enforcement strategies, the advantage of drawing on multiple frames 
is that it motivates diverse actors to act against TIP. Some scholars have found that law 
enforcement frames are more effective in motivating states to cooperate against TIP than 
human rights frames (Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons 2015; Simmons and Lloyd 2010), yet 
Schönhöfer (2014) showed that law-and-order parties are at least as likely to promote victim-
centered TIP policies as social democratic parties. Implementation of TIP policies can bring 
together law enforcement and victim service personnel in ways that promote victim-centered 
policing and prosecution, though Foot (2016) noted that tensions often exist between these 
different sectors. In some cases, the law enforcement frame may reinforce other state 
objectives that undermine victims' welfare. For example, Perry (2016) found that, in response to 
US pressure "to produce trafficking arrests and prosecutions," Thailand created a "highly 
punitive law-enforcement-based approach that ended up harming the same people it purported 
to be helping" (212-213). 
 Competing state priorities in neighboring policy domains may undermine TIP policy. For 
example, a state's efforts to control migration by requiring employer-sponsored visas for 
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seasonal labor may create a power dynamic that allows employers to exploit their seasonal 
labor force in ways that would qualify as TIP. The Canadian Council for Refugees (2016) has 
complained of well-documented exploitation of migrant workers under Canada's Temporary 
Foreign Worker Program, including cases that ought to be considered TIP. Advocacy groups in 
the United States are concerned that stronger immigration enforcement, often in the name of 
preventing human trafficking, reduces foreign victims' incentives to cooperate with law 
enforcement, and that some victims have been deported while awaiting visas which would have 
entitled them to legally stay in the country (Dahlstrom 2018; US DoS 2019; Villarreal 2018). 
Thus, not only might insincere states use TIP policy in ways contrary to the intentions of the 
Protocol, even a sincere state's efforts to promote victim welfare may be undermined by 
competing policy goals. 
 Notwithstanding these real criticisms, the international TIP regime strongly encourages 
state cooperation with civil society organizations. For example, US diplomacy actively seeks out 
the opinion of advocacy organizations which monitor state performance and their concerns 
often become part of the US State Department's recommendations for TIP policy improvement. 
TIP policy best practices include nurturing partnerships between law enforcement and victim 
services to improve victim-centered policing. By promoting the role of civil society in TIP policy, 
the Protocol and US diplomacy seek to improve the visibility and accountability of state conduct 
in the implementation of TIP policy. This accountability then creates opportunities for states to 
correct harmful policies and improve helpful ones. 
 The diversity in TIP policies offers opportunities to test different theoretical approaches 
to policy diffusion, as different aspects of TIP policy appeal to different frames, have different 
costs and benefits, and empower different actors. Yet, all these policies fall under the umbrella 
of TIP policy and share an international regime dedicated to promoting them in order to reduce 
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or eliminate TIP. I turn now to the various theories of policy diffusion and consider how these 
have been applied specifically in the literature on TIP. 
THEORIES OF POLICY DIFFUSION 
 In 2007, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett described four theories for understanding policy 
diffusion: constructivism, learning, coercion, and competition. In addition to these, scholars 
have also developed a theory based on reputation. In this section, I describe these five theories 
and how they have been applied to TIP policy diffusion. Then, I describe open questions in the 
literature and how these theories may help in answering them. 
Constructivist Theory 
 Constructivism posits that shared meanings about the social world, not materialism, 
drive international politics. According to Wendt (1999), the basic idea of constructivism is that 
"structures of human association" including "the identities and interests of purposive actors" are 
"determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces" (1). Thus, constructivism 
focuses on how ideas influence behavior. 
 Constructivism is an important school in international relations. In his 1992 essay 
"Anarchy Is What States Make of It," Wendt challenged rationalist assumptions that treat "the 
identities and interests of agents as exogenously given" (391). For Wendt and other 
constructivists, how actors form identities and interests are important research questions. Even 
the "logic" of self-help in anarchy is socially constructed, not an inherent feature. 
 Similarly, for constructivists, transnational policy diffusion is not simply a matter of 
rational interest but of ideas about what kinds of policies are best. A global consensus forms 
around certain policy goals and the means to achieve them, and the result is transnational policy 
diffusion. Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) suggested several constructivist mechanisms by 
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which policy innovations spread, including (1) follow-the-leader, (2) expert theorization, (3) 
network connections, and (4) tipping points which promote a "taken-for-granted" attitude. 
 Under follow-the-leader, countries mimic the policy of a country that appears to be 
doing well. This mechanism is more relevant to domains where success can be clearly defined, 
which is not generally the case with TIP policy since the opaque, criminal nature of trafficking 
makes it difficult to measure success against it. 
 Expert theorization is a more promising mechanism for TIP policy. Here, experts develop 
theoretically derived policy solutions to achieve certain policy goals. Policies are more likely to 
diffuse as expert agreement increases, though policy diffusion may be limited to actors that 
share appropriate similarities. In contrast to learning (discussed below), it is not necessary that 
these theories be supported by evidence—what is important is that experts find them credible. 
Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) argued that countries agreeing to policies they are unable 
to put into practice offers evidence of the power of ideas in policy diffusion. 
 Constructivists also hold that social networks play a role in diffusing ideas. These 
networks may be based on geographic proximity (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997), cultural 
similarities (Rose 1993), or structural equivalence (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006). One 
area of research is differentiating which social networks matter for the diffusion of ideas. 
 Finally, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) noted "that once new policies reach a 
certain threshold of adoption, others will come to take the policy for granted as necessary" 
(454), citing the expansion of mass education as an example (Meyer, Ramirez, Rubinson, and 
Boli-Bennett 1977; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992). Although the level of adoption that 
achieves this "tipping point" is left undefined, the perception of the necessity of adoption it 
creates promotes policy diffusion among laggards. 
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Constructivist theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion 
 The constructivist theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion is seen in the work of 
Simmons, Lloyd, and colleagues, which emphasizes the importance of "frames" for the diffusion 
of TIP policy (Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons 2015; Simmons and Lloyd 2010; Simmons, Lloyd, 
and Stewart 2018). Frames enable people to organize and interpret events—to give them 
meaning—and they motivate and guide action by labeling problems and proposing solutions 
(Snow et al. 1986). In the literature on TIP policy diffusion, these scholars used the concept of 
frames to connect ideas about incentives to policy decisions. 
 In 2015, Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons argued that policymakers chose to emphasize a 
transnational crime frame for human trafficking rather than victim protection or human rights 
frames, because the crime frame enables states to assert their authority. Their analysis of UN 
TIP resolutions found that crime language was associated with more sponsors and supporters. In 
2018, Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart argued that the crime frame continued to matter, but here 
they held it was fear of the negative effects of transnational crime—especially the diversion of 
trafficking from neighbors with better enforcement policies—that motivated criminalization of 
TIP. In both studies, ideas about TIP encouraged policy diffusion.  
Problems with constructivist theory 
 The constructivist theory is helpful in directing attention to how ideas influence 
interests and incentives, but the challenge is untangling ideas from incentives. The work of 
Simmons, Lloyd, and colleagues creatively addressed the alignment between ideas and 
incentives. But which comes first? Perhaps a change in ideas leads to changing preferences, or 
perhaps a change in incentives leads to a change in ideas. The importance of material incentives 
cannot be dismissed.  
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 While theorization and framing are important for constructivists, significant overlap 
exists with learning theory, to which I turn next. New theorization recommending policy 
innovations may be directly connected with learning, but, even if not, ideas are likely to spread 
using the same mechanisms. For example, both theorization and learning diffuse through social 
networks, and follow-the-leader or tipping points may apply as much to learning as to 
theorization. Indeed, it is difficult to operationalize measures that distinguish between learning 
and theorization. 
Learning Theory 
 Both constructivism and learning are theories that emphasize changing ideas. Despite 
this similarity, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) held that learning is a distinct theory 
because ideas change as evidence changes, unlike constructivism where ideas change because 
theories change. Even so, overlap exists between the two approaches: learning depends on the 
visibility of both policy successes and failures, and, as noted in the discussion of constructivism 
above, theorization is often based upon encounters with evidence. 
 Various mechanisms promote policy diffusion through learning. One key mechanism is 
the example of the policy experiences of other countries. As these experiences are seen to be 
successful and appropriate for another context, policy diffuses across borders. The more 
consistent the evidence in favor of policy success, the more likely or more quickly policy will 
diffuse. One will note, however, that this mechanism appears indistinguishable from the follow-
the-leader mechanism discussed under constructivism above. 
 As with constructivism, social networks are important for policy diffusion, as experts and 
policymakers learn lessons from their personal networks. For example, Honig and Weaver 
(2019) found that circulation of staff among aid organizations encouraged learning and fostered 
best practices. Other scholars have found international organizations to be effective loci of 
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policy diffusion (Eising 2002; Kahler 1992; Quirk 1994). Not only are international organizations 
at the center of global policy-focused social networks, but they can also promote policy diffusion 
as agents themselves or through the sharing of information among policy elites. 
Learning theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion 
 Scholars of TIP policy diffusion have sought to consider the relevance of learning. Cho, 
Dreher, and Neumayer (2011) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) tried to control for the 
influence of learning in their statistical analyses of TIP policy diffusion, though the 
operationalization of their variables is problematic. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer operationalized 
learning (or emulation) with similarity in UN voting patterns and a variable for "civilization," 
while Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart used regional press articles, criminalization among trading 
partners, and criminalization among countries at a similar developmental level, civilizational 
grouping, or legal family. The problem with the operationalization of learning in this way is that 
all these variables could be measuring other concepts. Moreover, these variables do not capture 
well the mechanisms noted above for policy diffusion by learning, such as observation of 
neighbor's policy successes or interaction among policy elites in international institutions. Table 
1-1 summarizes the key measurements and findings in the literature related to learning. 
Table 1-1. Learning in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion 
Study Indicator Operationalization Finding 









and Stewart 2018 
Learning or 
emulation 
Criminalization of other countries weighted by total 
trade 
Regional press articles 
Proportion of countries criminalizing within a given 
country's developmental level 
Proportion of countries criminalizing within a 
country's civilizational grouping 
Proportion of countries criminalizing within a 









Problems with learning theory 
 Learning is difficult to operationalize. Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) criticized 
scholars for failing to differentiate between learning and "mindless emulation" and for taking 
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diffusion of policies as evidence of learning without showing that evidence supported the 
policy's efficacy (462). To some extent, we can see this problem with the operationalization of 
learning in Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018), though, to be fair, their primary interest was in 
showing the robustness of the main variable of interest rather than demonstrating that learning 
promoted the diffusion of TIP policy. The social networks by which learning is said to diffuse may 
also diffuse ideas developed from theorization—that is, many of the operative mechanisms of 
learning are the same as those for constructivism. 
 Kelley (2017) argued that socialization through learning was an important consequence 
of the change in incentives brought about by reputational pressure (53-55). Because she 
believed learning is an effect of changing incentives, she did not try to operationalize it in her 
statistical studies. This highlights the problem of determining causality: does learning change 
incentives or do incentives encourage learning? Both are plausible patterns, and indeed both 
patterns could be happening simultaneously. 
Coercion Theory 
 In coercion theory, powerful actors create material incentives and disincentives—
typically economic—for policy adoption among less powerful actors. Powerful actors can include 
not only powerful states, but intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund which can impose conditions in return for loans. Not all material 
incentives need be negative—carrots and sticks are both used, but positive inducements, like 
loans or aid, are dependent upon changes in policy. 
 Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) described the primary diffusion mechanism as 
"conditionality"—setting requirements for aid, loans, or other material benefits. Conditionality 
can occur directly from powerful countries or indirectly through intergovernmental 
organizations. Scholars debate how coercive conditionality is—for example, countries may 
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accept conditions because they want them (Vreeland 2003) or the conditions may not be 
credibly enforced (Cordella and Dell'Arriccia 2002). Conditionality is especially common for 
encouraging diffusion of economic policies, but it has also been used to promote democracy and 
human rights. For example, Hafner-Burton (2005) showed that preferential trade agreements 
promote improve human rights performance when those agreements have specific standards on 
which material benefits conditionally depend. 
Dobbin, Simmons, Garrett (2007) also described two other mechanisms under the 
coercion: policy leadership and hegemonic ideas. Policy leadership involves solving coordination 
problems through the unilateral action of a powerful actor. While global coordination on TIP 
policy is presented as a collective action problem, it is not a classic coordination problem which 
one powerful actor can solve. Hegemony refers to Gramsci's understanding of cultural 
hegemony by which the ruling group perpetuates its rule by setting social norms and meeting 
people's psychological needs for meaning. While this line of research asks important questions 
about who benefits from policy diffusion, including TIP policy diffusion, for the purposes of this 
study it is operationally indistinguishable from constructivism, conditionality, or reputation. 
Either ideas change incentives, through the mechanisms described above, or powerful actors 
promote their interests by changing incentives—either material incentives through 
conditionality, or social incentives through reputation mechanisms (discussed below). As such, I 
focus on conditionality as the primary coercive mechanism relevant to the diffusion of TIP 
policy. 
Coercion theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion 
 US leadership in promoting the diffusion of TIP policy through its scorecard diplomacy 
with its threat of sanctions has led scholars to give coercive mechanisms some attention. 
Outside of the US TVPA, which makes some aid and loan support conditional on a state's efforts 
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to improve TIP policy, conditionality is not found in trade or loan agreements. No scholar has 
tested whether US sanctions or threat of sanctions has promoted TIP policy diffusion, but they 
have given attention to material conditions that may make countries vulnerable to US (or 
occasionally European) pressure. In her work on scorecard diplomacy, Kelley (2017) did not find 
much evidence that material vulnerability to US pressure mattered for TIP policy diffusion. 
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) found more support for vulnerability to US pressure than 
Kelley, but their measure for US pressure—receiving a low score in the TIP report—may be 
measuring reputational pressure (discussed below) rather than threat of sanctions. A summary 
of the results relating to coercion are found in table 1-2. 
Table 1-2. Coercion in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion 
Study Indicator Operationalization Finding 
Kelley 2017 Vulnerability to US 
material pressure 
US aid (logged) 
US aid as share of GDP (logged) 
US aid as share of total aid (logged) 
US trade as share of GDP (logged) 
US military aid (logged) 
US FDI (logged) 









and Steward 2018 
Coercion Trade dependence on US or EU 
US aid dependence 
Use of IMF credits 





Problems with coercion theory 
 As Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) pointed out, when considering coercion, "it is 
necessary to identify the coercive actors" (457). In relation to TIP policy, this is a straightforward 
task, as there is only one actor applying conditionality for aid (or loans) in TIP policy 
performance: The United States. Scholars have tried to measure how vulnerable other states are 
to this conditionality, but many of the ways they have operationalized this vulnerability could 
also be measuring other mechanisms. Findings are also inconclusive. 
As yet, no scholar has analyzed the influence of sanctions or the threat of sanctions on 
TIP policy diffusion. The challenge with analyzing the influence of sanctions is the selection 
effect: sanctions are more likely to be used when they are less likely to be successful (Nooruddin 
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2002). Thus, actual sanctioning is not likely to be effective in promoting desired policies, but the 
threat of sanctions may be effective in circumstances where that threat is credible. Despite 
these challenges, key actors and material incentives are clear, and in this study, I directly test 
the relevance of the threat of sanctions for TIP policy diffusion. 
Competition Theory 
 According to Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007), the key propositions for the 
economic competition theory are that (1) governments compete for "a fixed quantity of trade or 
investment," (2) governments "know who their competitors are," (3) governments can "connect 
policy choices to competitive advantages," and (4) governments focus on policies which have a 
short-term effects, like tax breaks, as these are most likely to influence investors' decisions 
(458). Competition is the mechanism: policy diffusion occurs as governments adopt policies to 
forestall potential advantages gained by competitors through their own policy choices. 
 One potential outcome of the policy diffusion through competition is convergence. An 
example is the adoption of the gold standard, where adoption was speeded by the share of 
trade with other countries that had adopted the standard (Meissner 2002). Many critics of 
globalization argue that competition pressure encourages a "race to the bottom" as 
governments decrease environmental regulations or labor protections to encourage foreign 
investment. But diffusion scholars have found policy divergence even where such pressures are 
said to exist, and they have explained differential environmental policy outcomes as contingent 
on such contexts as sensitivity to competition pressure (Porter 1999), industrial characteristics 
(Zheng and Shi 2017), or the jurisdiction's fiscal strength (Van Der Kamp, Lorentzen, and 
Mattingly 2017). Nor does economic competition necessarily result in policy diffusion at all—
Bearce (2007) showed that, contrary to some scholar's expectations, there has not been 
convergence on monetary policy in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD); rather, countries have frequently chosen to pursue policy autonomy, 
contingent on their domestic politics. 
Competition theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion 
 In the literature on TIP policy diffusion, economic competition is reversed. Here, 
scholars have assumed that countries are trying to compete in becoming unattractive to 
investment by transnational criminal trafficking organizations. The other propositions apply: 
countries know who their competitors are, connect their own and neighbor's policy choices to 
competitive advantages, and focus on short-term effects. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2011) 
were the first to propose that fear of trafficking diversion (which they called "externalities") 
motivated TIP policy diffusion for law enforcement policies, but not for victim protection 
policies. They held that as policy responses to TIP escalate in one country, transnational 
traffickers will be incentivized to switch to less-risky transit routes or destinations. 
Consequently, countries vulnerable to these potential indirect effects of their neighbor's 
improved policy responses ought to ratchet up their own law enforcement policies to avoid the 
negative effects of increased trafficking flows. They found that a country's prosecution policies 
improved when their neighbors or bilateral trade partners had enacted better prosecution 
policies. 
 Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) connected issue framing with perceptions of the 
direct and indirect effects of trafficking and neighbors' policy choices. They argued that framing 
transnational trafficking as a crime required a law enforcement solution and contributed to the 
frame's rapid global diffusion. The law enforcement frame (among several alternative TIP 
frames) emphasized the negative effects of trafficking, both the direct threat of trafficking to 
governance, but also the indirect effects resulting from the policy choices of neighbors. They 
used density of road connections as a proxy measure for vulnerability to trafficking diversion 
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from neighbors which criminalized trafficking and found that these connections were associated 
with ratification of the Protocol and domestic criminalization, especially for transit countries. 
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued that the criminalization of neighbors 
weighted by the density of road networks was indeed a proxy for the vulnerability of a state to 
diversion of trafficking flows from neighbors' improved policy efforts. Conceptually, this is 
because human trafficking involves the movement of people (rather than ideas, goods, or 
money), and that means it predominately follows roads. Their proxy variable remained robust 
when including control variables such as criminalization among trading partners, number of 
regional news articles, or criminalization among a country's reference groups, such as 
"civilizational" group, "legal family" or developmental level. Furthermore, Simmons, Lloyd, and 
Stewart predicted that vulnerability to trafficking diversion would matter for prosecution policy 
but not for protection policy; their findings indicate their proxy is positively associated with 
both, though the relationship is more substantive with prosecution policies. They also tested 
their road density variable with diffusion of money laundering laws and found no connection, as 
they predicted, since money laundering does not require roads. Table 1-3 summarizes the 
results in the literature on TIP policy diffusion related to competition.  
Table 1-3. Competition in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion 
Study Indicator Operationalization Finding 


















Problems with competition theory 
 Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) criticized studies of competition theory in policy 
diffusion for failing to measure the pressure exerted by competitors by relying instead on proxy 
measures such as trade openness, as well as failing to consider alternative approaches. While 
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advocates for fear of trafficking diversion as a motivator for TIP policy diffusion do consider 
other diffusion mechanisms, their operationalization of the concept is problematic. But the 
greatest problem with this approach is that it is counter-intuitive because it requires that 
policymakers generally believe, contrary to common intuition, that the threat posed to their 
country is greater from neighbors who are doing more against traffickers. Simmons and Lloyd 
(2010) argued that in policy domains of prostitution and drug trafficking, crime is diverted by 
increased enforcement (Gros 2003; Keenan 2006). But to make the claim that policymakers are 
influenced by these concerns for human trafficking, they must also show that policymakers are 
generally aware of them. They have not done this. As I know of little discussion of TIP 
displacement in the advocacy or policy communities, I am skeptical that fear of it is motivating 
policymakers around the world. 
 Moreover, the variable chosen to operationalize fear of trafficking diversion—the 
number of road connections to neighbors which have criminalized trafficking—may be 
measuring other diffusion mechanisms. Constructivist and learning theory hold that ideas 
diffuse through transnational connections, which roads may be measuring. Moreover, 
reputation theory predicts that better performing neighbors encourage under-performing 
neighbors to improve their policies. Counts of road connections cannot tell us which mechanism 
is at play.  
 Finally, we lack clear evidence for diversion of trafficking flows via roads. When diverted 
trafficking exists, it often involves more complicated travel routes than can be proxied by 
variables relating to number of roads. The US TIP reports include some perceived or likely cases 
of trafficking diversion, including: 
• Bangladeshis transiting Nepal to obtain Nepalese visas for employment in the Gulf 
(US DoS 2011, 82); 
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• Labor migrants from Benin using airports in Togo, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria to avoid 
antitrafficking screening in Benin (US DoS 2019, 99); 
• Malagasy migrants and trafficking victims travelling through the Comoros or 
Mauritius on their way to the Middle East to avoid Madagascar's increased 
protective restrictions for emigrants (US DoS 2011, 241, 254; US DoS 2014, 137); 
• Increasing use of the airport in Conakry, Guinea to transport victims from Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone to Kuwait and Qatar (US DoS 2018, 207); 
• Diverting Asian trafficking victims through Lesotho to more easily reach South Africa 
(US DoS 2008, 273); 
• Diversion of South Korean trafficking victims headed to the United States from 
Canada to Mexico due to increased security at Canadian airports and along the US-
Canadian border (US DoS 2006, 87); 
• Increasing numbers of Mongolian trafficking victims in Turkey due to visa-free travel 
opportunities for Mongolians in Turkey (US DoS 2011, 261); 
• Increasing use of Portugal as a route for African trafficking victims into the Schengen 
area (US DoS 2019, 387); 
• Traffickers shifting routes from Libya to Morocco (US DoS 2018, 394); and 
• Increasing use of Sri Lanka as a transit point for trafficking and smuggling of Nepalis 
(US DoS 2017, 11, 371). 
 These examples illustrate the complexity of trafficking diversion. In many cases, 
trafficking routes include legs via air, and the policies which traffickers are trying to 
circumnavigate or take advantage of are border control and migration policies, not trafficking 
criminalization. These examples suggest that one of the primary motivators for traffickers 
changing routes is the change in the ease of entry and exit in the countries along the routes. 
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Consider again the key propositions of competition theory: First, countries may be 
competing to become unattractive to a fixed amount of trafficking criminal investment, but it is 
not clear that it is fixed. Indeed, the US TIP reports are filled with discussions of increased 
trafficking that suggest the total investment is not limited, and that some TIP is opportunistically 
driven by civil strife (e.g., in Syria) and harmful government policies (e.g., in Eritrea) that create 
populations of vulnerable refugees or migrants. Second, do governments know who their 
competitors are? While this seems plausible in some scenarios (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya 
are all plausibly competitors against trafficking of African migrants to Europe), it is not clear that 
Nepal and Sri Lanka would see themselves as competitors against trafficking of victims to the 
Middle East—at least not until they observed changes on the ground. Third, countries likely do 
connect policy choices to competitive advantages against TIP, but these policies frequently seem 
to be border control and visa requirement policies, not trafficking criminalization. Fourth, the 
examples show that countries do seem to engage in short-term policy actions to discourage 
traffickers, but, again, these short-term policies are not criminalization, but border security and 
managing migrant flows—policies the purposes of which include more than discouraging 
trafficking. Thus, while we have some evidence that countries engage in policies to discourage 
transnational trafficking, we have grounds to question the fit of competition theory both in 
terms of the policies under consideration (i.e., criminalization), and in terms of the variables 
used to proxy the fear of trafficking (i.e., number of roads to better-performing neighbors).  
Reputation Theory 
 Like coercion and competition theory, the final approach to policy diffusion focuses on 
changing incentives, but unlike them, these incentives are reputational and not necessarily 
directly observable or material. Başer (2020) defined reputation as "beliefs held by the 
international audience about an unknown underlying characteristic pertaining to that state" (2). 
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Concern for reputation can be extended to other actors—including individuals who engage in 
policymaking, and other audiences, including domestic publics and social networks. Kelley 
(2017) held that reputations matter as both instruments to other ends and as ends in 
themselves. In addition to material repercussions that can come from reputations, good 
reputations are worth pursuing for such difficult-to-measure concepts as a sense of belonging or 
moral worth. 
 Concern over reputation in international relations has been linked to resolving 
commitment problems that exist for both conflict and cooperation. For example, scholars have 
long sought to explain how states communicate the credibility of their alliances by investing in 
costly signals, thereby improving their reputation as alliance-keepers (Horowitz, Poast, and Stam 
2017; Johnson and Joiner 2021; Mattes 2012; Morrow 1994). Scholars have also used 
reputational incentives to help explain behavior which seems inconsistent with material 
interests (Simmons 2000; Zartner and Ramos 2011). Başer (2020) argued that, because state 
preferences can change, reputational uncertainty always exists and reputational incentives are 
therefore greater for actors with poor or uncertain reputations, while states with good 
reputations are more likely to take advantage of their reputations. 
 Kelley and Simmons (2019) argued that reputational mechanisms assert themselves 
through (1) comparative global performance indicators, (2) elite networks, (3) domestic politics, 
and (4) transnational pressure—which can overlap with economic competition as reputations 
signal credibility to investors, donors, and other actors. Global performance indicators (GPIs) are 
increasingly common in international politics. GPIs are regular, public assessments of states (or 
other actors) that permit comparative performance. As such, they can activate reputational 
concerns, though their influence depends on the authority of the assessor, amount of consensus 
regarding the evaluations, and local values. Elite social networks can promote conformity to 
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social norms. Elites want to maintain their reputations among their own social peers. For 
example, Honig and Weaver (2019) found that the Aid Transparency Index motivated elites 
within donor organizations to improve their performance so that they could maintain status 
among their professional colleagues in other organizations. Domestic politics can also 
incentivize elites to improve their country's reputation when those domestic publics care about 
it. Domestic actors, such as civil society organizations or local businesses, may use negative 
external evaluations of their countries performance to promote their own agendas for policies 
that align with those advocated in GPIs. Transnational pressures are frequently those we expect 
in economic competition theory—external actors who make decisions based on the reputations 
of states. Here, reputation has a direct though diffuse connection to material incentives. The 
difference is that economic competition is primarily focused on short-term incentives, while 
building reputation need not be. 
Reputation theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion 
 Kelley's (2017) Scorecard Diplomacy offers the most thorough theoretical and 
evidentiary defense of reputation as crucial for TIP policy diffusion. According to Kelley, the 
United States participates in the growing trend for influencing states' reputations through the 
use of "scorecard diplomacy," a method by which actors rank and compare countries with each 
other, motivating countries to respond to improve their reputations, especially within their 
"peer" group. The TVPA required the US State Department to evaluate and rank each country's 
TIP policy performance and thereby exercise its influence to shape the reputation of states to 
motivate action on TIP. 
 Kelley (2017) argued that concern over reputation does not deny the relevance of hard 
power, material incentives, or the normative environment. Indeed, states may desire to 
maintain a positive reputation to access material goods, and the efficacy of reputational 
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mechanisms depend on the normative environment. She acknowledged that the US use of 
scorecard diplomacy is enhanced by its "status and strength" (15). Power is not irrelevant, but, 
following Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), "power is not reducible to coercive capacities" (289). 
For Kelley, the story is about the mechanism by which an actor like the US uses its power to get 
desired results, and for Kelley, that mechanism is scorecard diplomacy. 
 Kelley (2017) argued that the efficacy of the TIP scorecard diplomacy depends not only 
on sustaining diplomatic engagement, but also on (1) each government's sensitivity to 
reputational pressure, (2) its exposure of its policy shortfalls, and (3) its capacity to prioritize TIP 
policy over other concerns. Sensitivity to reputational pressure depends on practical stakes—
how will having a poor reputation for TIP policy matter for governments and their people for 
achieving their goals? This sensitivity can include such direct material concerns as loss of US aid 
or loss of tourism revenue. It may also include social or normative concerns, especially if 
complying with the social goals of TIP policy matters to the people (e.g., on normative grounds) 
and whether the people's opinion of their government's TIP performance has costs for the 
government. Exposure to reputational concerns has to do with the extent to which the 
government's behavior is publicly observed. Exposure depends on the availability and clarity of 
information about government performance, the credibility of the scorecard evaluation, and the 
role of the domestic media and civil society in holding the government accountable. The 
government's capacity to prioritize TIP policy over other issues competing for the government's 
attention matters for all stages of the policy process but is especially important for policy 
implementation since implementing many TIP policies is complex and costly. Kelley contended 
that the efficacy of reputational pressure depends on these domestic characteristics, as well as 
the sustained pressure from the US and other external actors. For Kelley, reputation acts like a 
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catalyst to activate government and public attention to TIP policy. Variation in these domestic 
characteristics then helps explain variation in TIP policy efforts. 
 Kelley (2017) tested her theory with several methods, including statistical analysis, 
document analysis of State Department cables, survey analysis, case studies and elite 
interviews. She found substantial statistical evidence to support her theory that reputational 
concerns mattered for domestic criminalization. Inclusion in the TIP reports, as well as receiving 
low scores, tended to spur criminalization. A summary of Kelley's findings related to reputation 
are shown in table 1-4. 
Table 1-4. Reputation in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion 
Study Indicator Operationalization Finding 
Kelley 2017 Scorecard 
pressure 
(reputation) 
Presence in US TIP report 
US TIP report score of tier 2 watch list or tier 3 




Problems with reputation theory 
 One key problem with reputation is that it is difficult to measure: How much is 
reputation worth to an actor? How much reputation is gained or lost by any action? Given the 
difficulty in measuring the value of reputation, the danger is that it can become a catch-all 
category that explains everything we want to explain. Moreover, reputational concerns can 
coexist with the other theories. Not only can ideas shape concern over reputation, but concern 
over reputation may inspire learning or adoption of new ideas. Furthermore, having a good 
reputation can lead to material benefits, so that reputation may also overlap with coercion and 
competition theory. Finally, what makes for a good reputation domestically may not coincide 
with what makes for a good reputation internationally. Başer (2020) argued that reputation 
building strategies ought to matter most to actors with poor reputations, but his theory does 
not consider the existence of two-level games (Putnam 1988), where a government's domestic 
reputation may be improved by actions that harm its international reputation.  
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Open Questions in the Literature on TIP Policy Diffusion 
 Given the foregoing discussion of the different theories to understanding policy 
diffusion, three questions stand out: (1) what is the explanatory value of each theory for 
promoting TIP policy diffusion? (2) should we expect to see differential diffusion of TIP policy 
based on policy domain (whether it is law enforcement, capacity building, or victim services)? 
and (3) why do we see regional differentiation in TIP policy diffusion? 
The explanatory value of each theory 
 Dobbins, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) argued that to understand the relative 
explanatory value of each theory of policy diffusion in statistical studies, it is necessary to 
control for the other theories. To some extent, scholars of TIP policy diffusion have tried to do 
this. However, in many cases, the variables which they used to represent the influence of other 
theories could have multiple meanings. To take one example, Simmons, Lloyd, and Garrett's 
(2018) used the variable "proportion of countries criminalizing within a country's civilizational 
grouping" to proxy for learning, but it could signify various theoretical mechanisms, including 
reputational pressure and constructivist "tipping points." Moreover, the variable does not 
necessarily include any requirement that countries are learning from evidence that 
criminalization helps solve the problems countries wish to solve with it. The extant literature on 
TIP policy diffusion therefore lacks tests of competing theories using the best available 
measures. 
 As exemplified above, learning is especially difficult to proxy with variables for TIP 
policy. This is, in part, due to the lack of empirical evidence for the success of any policy under 
consideration. Of course, numbers of prosecutions increase after criminalization, but the 
number of prosecutions does not measure the extent to which TIP is increasing or decreasing in 
society more broadly. Some countries can also measure the number of victims assisted, but, 
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again, this number does not say much about the prevalence of victims in a country. Therefore, 
TIP is more like policies to reduce violence against women where data is opaque than it is like 
policies with more transparent lines of cause and effect, such as currency controls. A good proxy 
variable to test learning theory for TIP policy is beyond the reach of this dissertation. 
 This dissertation empirically evaluates the explanatory power of each theory of policy 
diffusion, except for learning, by generating and testing unique theoretical predictions while 
controlling for the other theories. While the nature of TIP policy makes learning currently 
untestable, the other four theories have plausible explanatory value, and adjudicating the 
relative merits of each theory is useful for both grounding further theoretical development as 
well as policy making. 
Differential diffusion based on policy type 
 One advantage of this dissertation over other studies of TIP policy diffusion is that I test 
the theories on different types of TIP policies. Previous studies have focused on criminalization, 
but this study uses six TIP policies related to law enforcement, capacity-building, and victim 
protection. Should we expect differential diffusion based on these policy types? 
 Existing work has argued that we should see differential diffusion by policy type. 
Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons (2014) found that crime language in UN General Assembly 
resolutions related to TIP produced more sponsors and diverse supporters than rights language. 
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) found that linking TIP to transnational crime promoted 
criminalization among neighbors vulnerable to trafficking flows. The emphasis on law 
enforcement in US and global TIP policy has long been recognized and criticized (Chuang 2014; 
Gallagher 2001; Todres 2011). That law enforcement frames promote diffusion of 
criminalization can be explained from constructivist theory—that is, that certain ideas are more 
appealing to certain actors. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) connected constructivism to 
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competition—if countries became convinced that transnational TIP was a threat, then they 
would be more likely to compete with neighbors to become less attractive to transnational 
criminal networks. They did not have the same expectation for victim service policies, but their 
study design found evidence that the number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 
did improve an ordinal measure for generalized protection policy.  
 Since 2011, criminalization has been the most widespread TIP policy, but prior to 2010, 
intersectoral coordinating bodies diffused more rapidly (see figure 2-1 in the next chapter). 
Constructivists can explain the appeal of criminalization but have not considered the appeal of 
intersectoral coordinating bodies. Indeed, prior to this dissertation, the data had not been 
available to compare the prevalence of various TIP policies. Given the lack of data, and the 
problem of using variables that could operationalize multiple diffusion mechanisms, the 
empirical findings of the literature are unsettled.  
How might each theory explain differentiation in diffusion by policy type? As coercion in 
TIP policy has only one coercive actor—the US and its sanctioning mechanism—differentiation 
in policy diffusion might occur because the US considers some policies as more important for 
meeting its minimum standards. The reputation theory of Kelley (2017) could explain the 
differentiation of diffusion by policy by appealing to variations in US diplomatic attention toward 
each policy, the work of other international organizations that generate reputational pressure, 
or in each government's sensitivity, exposure, or capacity to address each policy. The 
reputational mechanisms themselves, however, ought to produce diffusion if the inputs are the 
same. Learning theory could explain differentiation by pointing to variations in evidence for 
policy effectiveness by policy domain. As noted above, however, we do not have this evidence. 
Constructivist theory could explain differentiation by arguing that ideas which appeal to 
powerful actors are more likely to diffuse. 
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 For most of these theories, these are simply questions of empirical data. Whether the 
US prefers some policies to others is not a theoretical question, but an empirical one. Similarly, 
which ideas are more appealing to decision-makers is an empirical question. The theoretical 
mechanisms of coercion, reputation, or constructivism ought to work if activated by the 
appropriate inputs, but whether these inputs are active is currently unknown. The only theory 
which offers a clear prediction is competition. Competing with neighbors to become less 
attractive to criminal networks should favor law enforcement policies but not impact victim 
protection policies. 
 This study's contribution to the question of differentiation by policy type is primarily 
inductive. Except for competition theory, we do not have a priori expectations about the inputs 
necessary to explain differentiation among policy type. Nonetheless, this dissertation can help 
uncover data useful for developing post facto explanations, improving existing theories, and 
informing policymakers. As such, in each chapter, I will note what the models reveal about 
differential diffusion by policy type. A summary of how each theory could explain differentiation 
in diffusion by policy type is shown in table 1-5. 
Table 1-5. How the Theories Explain Differentiation in Diffusion by Policy Type 
Theory Explanation for differentiation by policy type 
Coercion Coercive mechanisms ought to work for all policy types. 
Differentiation among policy type depends on US preferences. 
Reputation Reputation mechanisms ought to work for all policy types. 
Differentiation among policy type depends on the preferences of 
the US as reflected in the scoring mechanism, on the availability of 
other reputational mechanisms (such as regional cooperation), or 
on the variations in domestic sensitivity, exposure, or capacity in 
each policy domain. 
Constructivist Constructivist mechanisms ought to work for all policy types. 
Differentiation among policy type depends upon the appeal of the 
relevant frame for decision-makers. 
Learning Learning mechanisms ought to work for all policy types but are not 
available in the case of TIP because evidential learning is limited for 
all domains. 
Competition Competition mechanisms ought to work for law enforcement 
policies but not victim protection policies. 
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Explaining regional variation in policy diffusion 
 The final unanswered question from the literature developed in this study is how to 
explain regional differentiation in TIP policy diffusion. Kelley (2017) noted the existence of 
"regional patterns," but did not try to explain them. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2011) and 
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) included a variable for "civilization" in their models, and 
suggested that this might operationalize learning, but did not give it any sustained theoretical 
attention. Yet, we know that regions vary in their extent of regional cooperation, both on TIP 
and more generally. Interstate organizations like the European Union, African Union, and 
Organization of American States engage in TIP policy coordination. What do the various theories 
expect for the influence of these regional organizations? 
 Coercion theory could explain regional variation in TIP policy diffusion by pointing to 
regional variation in coercive mechanisms in regional organizations. Regional organizations do 
provide aid to weaker partners, but no regional organization sanctions countries over its TIP 
policies. If any coercion is taking place (e.g., threats to withhold aid), it is not public. Coercive 
mechanisms cannot be ruled out, but neither can they be tested.  
 Learning theory proposes that policy diffuses through institutional and personal 
network connections, and so variation in regional performance could be explained by variation 
in the extent of these networks. However, learning also requires that actors learn from their 
experience. Unfortunately, measuring the success of TIP policy is challenging, and it is unlikely 
that TIP policy diffuses because some policies are evidentially more successful than others at 
reducing TIP or the prevalence of victims. 
 Like learning theory, constructivist theory proposes that changing ideas leads to changes 
in behavior and that policy diffuses through institutional and personal network connections. 
However, for the constructivist, changing ideas are more likely to come from theorization, a 
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situation which is operative for TIP. Constructivists also hold that the more an idea becomes 
taken-for-granted, the more rapidly it diffuses. Thus, variation in the extent of regional 
institutional and personal network connections, such as those found in regional organizations, 
could explain regional variation in TIP policy diffusion. 
 Competition theory proposes that countries are in competition to discourage trafficking 
networks, so that they respond to their neighbor's or partner's policy choices. Regional 
organizations may help coordinate minimum standards; however, the driver of policy diffusion is 
the policy choices of other countries. No clear expectations emerge for the role of regional 
organizations as independent actors, and moreover, the competition approach, as currently 
described in the literature, is not able to predict regional variation in the diffusion of TIP 
protection policies, as these have no relationship with deterring traffickers. 
 Finally, reputation theory, as currently described in the literature on TIP policy diffusion, 
holds that reputational pressure from scorecard diplomacy and elite networks promote policy 
diffusion. While a few regional organizations provide external evaluations of members' TIP 
policy performance, none generate scorecards like the US TIP report. Regional organizations do 
vary on the extent they create elite networks, but this mechanism produces the same 
expectations as it does for the constructivism. The reputation and constructivist theories are not 
incompatible—both may be valid ways of explaining empirical phenomena, but this dissertation 
seeks to differentiate among the theories to the extent possible. How each theory could explain 
regional differentiation of policy diffusion is shown in table 1-6. 
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Table 1-6. How the Theories Explain Differentiation in Diffusion by Region 
Theory Explanation for differentiation by region 
Coercion Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by the 
presence of regional coercive mechanisms, but these seem absent 
for TIP policy. 
Reputation Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by 
regional variation in the extent of interconnectedness of elite 
networks and the extent regional cooperation on TIP offers 
opportunities for improving reputations. 
Constructivist Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by 
regional variation in the extent of interconnectedness of elite 
networks and by the extent to which the policy has become 
"taken-for-granted" in the region (e.g., reached a tipping point). 
Learning Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by 
regional variation in the extent of interconnectedness of elite 
networks. 
Competition Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by 
variation in the extent to which neighbors' policy choices create 
negative externalities (but only for criminalization). 
 The constructivist theory uniquely claims the importance of a policy idea becoming 
normalized for promoting policy diffusion, but to test for the influence of shared ideas, I also 
need to control for other mechanisms. Thus, this study takes into account the role of regional 
policy communities. By controlling for how much regional variation in TIP policy diffusion can be 
explained by regional policy communities, I can reveal how much policy normalization helps 
explain regional diffusion as well as gaps in the literature that need further theoretical 
development.  
A Summary of the Theories of Policy Diffusion 
 In table 1-7, I have summarized the various theories of policy diffusion discussed in this 
chapter, the mechanisms by which they operate, and the predictions they have for TIP policy. 




Table 1-7 Summary of the Theories of Policy Diffusion and Predictions for TIP Policy 








 Changing ideas leads to changes in behavior 
Identities and interests of actors are determined 
by shared ideas rather than material forces 






Scorecard diplomacy, regional 
organizations, neighbors, and 
civil society cooperation on TIP 
will promote diffusion 
Differentiation by policy type will 
occur as the attractiveness of 
frames varies for decision-
makers 
Regional differentiation will occur 
as the extent of institutional 
and personal networks vary 
Tipping points 
Diffusion quickens after a "tipping 
point" is reached 
Regional differentiation will occur 
as the extent to which a policy 







Changing ideas leads to changes in behavior 
Actors learn from experience (evidence) 
Network connections 
 
Scorecard diplomacy, regional 
organizations, neighbors, and 
civil society cooperation on TIP 
will promote diffusion for 








Powerful actors incentivize policy diffusion 
through material incentives 
Conditionality through 
sanctions  
Credible threat of sanctions will 
promote diffusion. 
Differentiation by policy type will 
depend on US preferences. 
Regional differentiation will occur 
if regional organizations have 









Governments compete for a fixed quantity of 
trade or investment 
Governments know who their competitors are 
Governments connect policy choices to 
competitive advantages 
Governments focus on policies which have short-
term effects 
Competition to avoid 
traffickers  
 (Cho, Dreher, and 
Neumayer 2011; 
Simmons, Lloyd, and 
Stewart 2018) 
Perceptions of increased or 
diverted transnational 
trafficking will promote 










 Good reputations are desired for their own sake as 
well as in the pursuit of material advantages 
 
Reputations can help solve collective action 
problems 
 
Scorecard diplomacy  
 (Kelley 2017; Kelley 
and Simmons 2019) 
Global scorecards will promote 
diffusion for all policies for 
which members can expect 
improved scores relative to 
their neighbors 
Differentiation by policy type will 




 (Kelley and 
Simmons 2019) 
Scorecard diplomacy, regional 
organizations, neighbors, and 
civil society cooperation on TIP 
will promote diffusion 
Regional differentiation will occur 
as the extent to which 
institutional and personal 
networks vary by region. 
Domestic politics 
 (Başer 2020; Kelley 
2017; Kelley and 
Simmons 2019) 
Greater government 
accountability will promote 
diffusion  
Civil society cooperation on TIP 
will promote diffusion 
 Policy diffusion may occur either through changing ideas and changing incentives (or 
both), and so no test will be able to discern which comes first. Mechanisms associated with 
competition or reputation depend on actors believing certain ideas about the world, and these 
mechanisms can also encourage actors to change their ideas. That said, some of the predictions 
are unique and untested. Coercion theory has never been tested in relation to sanctions, and 
this gap in the literature needs to be filled. The reputation theory of Kelley (2017) predicts that 
the states are motivated to improve their scores relative to their peers and that the reputational 
influence of scorecard diplomacy will be most effective for those policies which improve scores. 
Scholars have proposed that fear of trafficking diversion has driven policy diffusion, and this can 
be tested by explicitly seeing if perceived increases in transnational trafficking or diversion of 
trafficking flows has any influence on diffusion. Moreover, predictions about the influence of 
global scorecards, regional organizations, and neighborly influence have never been tested 
together. Next, I turn to the specific hypotheses I test in this study. 
Table 1-7 Summary of the Theories to Policy Diffusion and Predictions for TIP Policy, cont. 




 The primary aim of this dissertation is to adjudicate the theoretical debate by evaluating 
the explanatory power of the theories of policy diffusion for TIP policy. Testing the hypotheses 
described here will also reveal data about variation in policy diffusion by policy type and by 
region which needs to be considered for further theoretical development. Given the nature of 
TIP, learning theory cannot be tested as we do not yet know whether specific policies reduce the 
prevalence of trafficking or its victims, though the theory's networking mechanisms are shared 
with constructivism. 
Untested Hypotheses Unique to Coercion Theory 
 As I have discussed above, the main tool of coercion—sanctions—which is readily 
identifiable in the case of TIP has never been tested. 
 Hypothesis 1. Credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. 
Untested Hypotheses Unique to Reputation Theory 
 Kelley (2017) argued and found that US scorecard diplomacy promoted TIP policy 
diffusion. One finding in her research, which she called "groundbreaking," showed that 
countries were concerned with the relative standing of their scores with reference to their peer 
group, especially neighbors (128-130). Although the method for scoring countries is opaque, I 
can statistically determine characteristics of the reports which are likely to improve scores. This 
gives us a unique opportunity to test reputation against constructivism (though the two are not 
necessarily at odds), should the results of the investigation show that states implement policies 
that are likely to improve scores. Thus, 
 Hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score promotes TIP 
policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores. 
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 More ambiguously, scorecard diplomacy may encourage policy diffusion, not because 
countries are concerned with their relative performance, but because they are concerned about 
their reputation vis-à-vis the United States, because policymakers and diplomats are concerned 
about their personal reputations, or because US diplomacy increases the visibility and 
attractiveness of certain policy ideas. While these mechanisms overlap with constructivist 
mechanisms, we can nonetheless predict that non-coercive mechanisms matter for TIP policy 
diffusion. Thus, 
 Hypothesis 3. Non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote TIP policy 
diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores. 
Untested Hypotheses Unique to Constructivist Theory 
 Constructivists sometimes talk about "tipping points" as ideas become taken-for-
granted, spurring their diffusion. While this discussion is vague about what a tipping point might 
be, I can test whether a taken-for-granted attitude toward TIP policy influences diffusion. Thus, 
 Hypothesis 4. TIP policy diffusion increases as the regional density of countries which 
have the policy increases. 
Untested Hypotheses Unique to Competition Theory 
 Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) have been keen to connect constructivism with 
competition by arguing that the fear of trafficking diversion from better-performing neighbors is 
motivating policy diffusion. As I noted in the discussion above, their operationalizations of this 
concept could also be measuring other mechanisms, such as reputational pressure to improve 
performance from better-performing neighbors. But, if the fear of negative consequences 
motivates policy diffusion, then reports of increased transnational trafficking or trafficking 
diversion should certainly do so. This motivation should apply to law enforcement policy and 
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possibly prevention or capacity policies, but not victim protection policy, as the latter does not 
disrupt criminal trafficking networks. Thus, 
 Hypothesis 5. Reports of increased transnational trafficking or diversion of trafficking 




CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN 
OVERVIEW 
 I propose that evaluate the hypotheses presented in chapter 1 in a global statistical 
study of TIP policy diffusion using survival analysis, along the lines of those performed by Kelley 
(2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018). This study is different from these previous 
studies, however, in that (1) I am testing the explanatory value of each of the theories using 
variables that better capture their unique aspects, (2) I use dependent variables that capture 
more than criminalization so I can compare differences in diffusion among different types of TIP 
policy, (3) I test hypotheses using variables measuring the influence of both the region and 
neighbors, whereas previous studies have only included one and not the other, and (4) I use 
explanatory variables that better capture "fear of trafficking diversion" than those used 
previously. 
 This chapter is organized as follows: First, I begin the chapter with a description of the 
data collection. Next, I explain how I model the US sanctioning decision and TIP scoring so the 
results can inform the principal analysis in testing hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. I conclude the chapter 
with an explanation of the research design for the principal survival analysis used to test the 
hypotheses by discussing the dependent variables, explanatory variables, and model 
specifications. 
DATA COLLECTION 
 Prior to this study, no extant data set existed useful for survival analysis of TIP policy 
beyond criminalization. Kelley (2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) collected data for 
their survival analyses, but their dependent variable is limited to criminalization. Cho, Dreher, 
and Neumayer (2011) introduced a "3P index" which uses reports from the US State 
Department, the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), and 
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the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to develop an ordinal assessment for 
prosecution, protection, and prevention policies, but this data is not useful for survival analysis 
and is limited in time from 2000 to 2015. The Global Slavery Index, produced by the NGO Walk 
Free, is another dataset which offers a qualitative assessment of TIP prevalence and policy 
responses, but like the 3P index, its data is not useful for survival analysis. To test hypotheses on 
other TIP policies beyond criminalization, I needed to collect data about the timing of other 
policy events. In the process of collecting this data, I was also able to collect additional data 
useful as explanatory variables for TIP policy diffusion, as well as for determining how the US TIP 
scores are generated and which countries were sanctioned. 
 Data collection involved two main components: (1) identification of country-specific 
policy and trafficking characteristics and (2) identification of regional organizations and 
characteristics of their efforts against TIP. Both components relied on the content analysis 
described below. 
Trafficking Policy 
 To identify each country's TIP policies and trafficking characteristics, I primarily relied on 
the US TIP reports, the 2009 UNODC's Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, and regional 
reports from GRETA and the Organization of American States (OAS). The US TIP reports and the 
2009 UNODC report are the only qualitative assessments of trafficking characteristics and 
policies that are global in scope. The GRETA country monitoring reports provided excellent data 
for Europe. (The US TIP reports also relied on GRETA reports when available.) The OAS had a 
2018 Progress Report that provided useful information for the Americas. I collected country data 
for the time period 1998 through 2018. 
The data for the dependent variables is dichotomous: when a TIP policy event occurred 
in a given year, I marked that event as occurring. In a few cases, countries had more than one 
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legal revision in a single year, but as the variable is dichotomous, these multiple revisions to the 
law are not included in the data. The US TIP reports come out mid-year (usually June) for a 
period from April 1 through March 31, but I made my best efforts to locate the exact year of an 
event; if it was not clear, I used the year prior to the year in which the report was published. 
 I collected data for the following dependent variables: full criminalization, revisions to 
the TIP legal regime, institutionalization of intersectoral coordinating bodies, initiation of 
National Action Plans, formalization of operational National Referral Mechanisms, 
implementation of reflection periods for TIP victims, and the creation of national rapporteurs. 
As very few countries had national rapporteurs by 2018, statistical models are plagued by 
collinearity, and so I do not include their establishment in this study. Even though the data 
available in the four main sources was extensive, I found that I frequently had to locate 
additional sources to track down dates for the TIP policy events, especially for the earlier years, 
as data in the US TIP and GRETA reports became more comprehensive as time passed. A full list 
of sources used in content analysis is found in Appendix A.  
 Any revision to the TIP legal regime includes criminalization, but also any previous or 
subsequent law related to TIP, either directly or in a neighboring policy domain (such as worker 
rights) that is motivated, in part, by its effect on TIP. By collecting data on revisions to the law, I 
capture more of the policy cycle than criminalization alone. After TIP is first criminalized, 
implementation and evaluation of the law lead to new "problems" in need of legal solutions 
and, thus, revisions in the law. These changes in the law occur in the context of international 
discussion of best practices and policies, and so represent another outcome of transnational 
policy diffusion. 
 Effective TIP policy, as currently understood, is made possible by cross-sectoral 
coordination. To name one example, successful prosecution often depends on cooperation of 
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victims, and this cooperation depends on victim protection services which help build trust 
between victims and law enforcement. To meet these needs, governments have created inter-
sectoral coordinating bodies to ensure that diverse agencies support rather than undermine 
anti-trafficking work. By establishing these bodies, governments improve their capacity to 
implement TIP policies; their diffusion is therefore of interest. Cross-sectoral TIP 
institutionalization is important for all domains of TIP policy. The US TIP reports usually 
discussed these bodies under "Prevention," but their work is not limited to activities which 
typically fall under that category (such as awareness raising campaigns or training), but also to 
coordinating victim services and law enforcement as well. 
 National Action Plans (NAPs) are another policy response that has become widespread. 
Frequently developed by the inter-sectoral coordinating bodies, these plans are generally 
comprehensive and require specific actions by various agencies and organizations. Most have 
specific, measurable goals, and a clear timeline by which the goals ought to be accomplished. 
Many are evaluated, revised, and renewed. Along with the first institutionalization of 
intersectoral coordinating bodies, NAPs offer an opportunity to test hypotheses for capacity-
building activities that include all dimensions of TIP policy. I only include NAPs that are focused 
on TIP. Some countries had action plans serving broader social goals, such as women's welfare, 
that included anti-trafficking efforts, but I did not include these in the data. 
 Data collection included two victim protection policies: National Referral Mechanisms 
(NRMs) and reflection periods. NRMs are specific victim protection frameworks that establish 
procedures and responsibilities for identifying victims and referring them to services. Reflection 
periods give victims time to begin their recovery before deciding whether to cooperate with law 
enforcement. During these periods, foreign victims are granted legal residence. Together the 
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diffusion of NRMs and reflection periods allow us to test hypotheses for victim protection 
policies.  
 Figure 2-1 shows the total number of countries with extant criminalization, inter-
sectoral coordinating bodies, NAPs, NRMs, and reflection periods over time, as well as the 
number of countries which revised their TIP legal regime in a given year. 
Figure 2-1. TIP Policy Change over Time. 
 
 I also collected data on other TIP policy events that I used in some models, especially for 
predicting sanctions or TIP scores. These include whether a country had any TIP prosecutions or 
convictions in a given year, whether a country cooperated with civil society on TIP or whether it 
was hostile to civil society actors working on TIP, and whether there were reports that the 
government sponsored child-soldiers or engaged in abuses of TIP victims' physical integrity 
rights. I also recorded US or GRETA perceptions of problems in the implementation of migration 
or sex trade policy that further harmed victims of TIP. Even high-performing countries often 
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Department frequently criticized the US implementation of its own migration policy as 
endangering victims of TIP.  
 No data collection effort can avoid the reality that data is more transparent and 
available in some regions and countries than others. While I gave my best efforts to locate dates 
for each TIP policy in every country, I recognize that the availability of data may bias data 
toward certain findings. Perhaps countries with more developed and transparent legal and 
institutional systems are more likely to implement the sorts of transnational policy solutions I 
am including in this study. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the data is biased either in favor or 
against findings because it potentially undercounts TIP policy events where data is less 
transparent. Moreover, I control for development level in all models as well as adjusting 
standard errors to account for possible intragroup correlation by region. We should be cautious 
of condemning countries which fail to implement these policies as it is possible that countries 
with less developed legal and institutional frameworks are better served by different sorts of 
policy solutions than those being considered here. 
Scorecard Diplomacy and Trafficking Characteristics 
 The same research described above also enabled me to collect data about the US TIP 
reports and each country's trafficking characteristics. 
 I recorded the US TIP report score for each country. The US TIP reports also make 
recommendations to encourage governments to prioritize policies and actions. I recorded 
whether the US TIP report included a recommendation for full criminalization, for any legal 
revision (inclusive of criminalization), regarding institutionalization of an intersectoral 




 Advocates of competition have argued that trafficking "externalities"—or the fear of 
them—influence the diffusion of trafficking policy. For a measure of these transnational 
trafficking "externalities," I recorded data from the US TIP reports on perceptions of trafficking 
diversion or increases in transnational trafficking within a country. In general, the reports made 
more references to "increases" in transnational trafficking than to diverted flows, though cases 
of trafficking diversion were noted. Examples of some of these cases are found in the discussion 
of competition in chapter 1. 
 Drawing mainly on the US TIP reports, but also on reports from GRETA and UNODC, I 
also recorded perceptions of whether a country was a source, destination, or transit country for 
transnational trafficking, and whether it was perceived to have a significant domestic trafficking 
problem. 
I also collected data on the presence of child sex tourism in a country. The US TIP 
reports frequently mention child sex tourism, but they were not entirely consistent. I 
supplemented data in the TIP reports with reports of child sex tourism in the media, in 
scholarship, and in NGO reports.  
Finally, I collected data on the US sanctioning decisions for tier 3 countries by reading 
the Presidential memorandums which waived TIP sanctions. For each sanctioning decision, I 
recorded whether a country had sanctions waived, partially waived, or experienced the full 
extent of TIP sanctions.  
The International TIP Regime Complex 
The international TIP regime complex includes both global and regional dimensions. For 
the global dimensions, I recorded data on Protocol accession and visits to countries by the UN 
Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur for TIP.  
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This dissertation is particularly interested in the role of regional policy communities in 
promoting TIP policy diffusion. I collected data from the regional organizations regarding their 
membership, efforts to combat TIP, level of institutionalized coordination, and whether their 
members submit to critical, external reviews of TIP policy. I noted that years in which 
coordination on TIP policy began for each organization.  
The US TIP reports include a list of regional organizations working on TIP issues, but I 
discovered that this list was incomplete. I supplemented this list by noting the linkages between 
regional organizations in sponsoring conferences or other TIP policy activities. Data from the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) was helpful in charting some of the 
interrelationships between regional organizations. Bilateral agreements—of which there are 
many—are not included, as data on these is spotty. 
For data on institutionalized coordination, I noted whether the regional organization 
had a permanent institutional coordinating body for TIP policy, as well as when this body was 
formed. Only three regional organizations have ongoing external evaluation of members—the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe's (COE) 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (through GRETA), and the European 
Union. Of these, the GRETA evaluations are the most public and extensive. 
A list of all sources used to support data collection for the regional regime complexes 
can be found in Appendix A. 
MODELING SANCTIONING DECISIONS AND TIP SCORING 
 Two of my hypotheses require a two-step modeling process. To test hypothesis 1, I first 
need to generate a variable on sanction credibility by modeling the US sanctioning decision. To 
test hypotheses 2 and 3, I first need to know what policies improve TIP scores. This section 
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presents the research design on for generating the models to provide the information necessary 
to evaluate these hypotheses. 
Credible Sanctions 
 The TVPA requires that the US sanction countries which are failing to make significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards, that is, countries scored 
"tier 3." These targeted sanctions are limited to nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign 
assistance. The law also mandates US opposition to the use of funds from development banks 
and the IMF, excepting those used for humanitarian or trade-related assistance. The President 
may waive these sanctions if doing so would harm vulnerable populations or otherwise be in the 
national interest of the United States. In actual practice, the US does not sanction all tier 3 
countries, and those that the US does sanction are frequently targets of other US sanctions.  
 The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 added a "tier 2 watch 
list" category, the criteria of which—a country experiences a significant increase in trafficking or 
fails to provide evidence of efforts to combat trafficking but makes promises of future efforts—
are clearly a warning that the country is in danger of being scored at tier 3 (and become 
sanctionable) unless it makes good on its promises to improve its performance. Thus, being 
placed on the tier 2 watch list means that a country risks being sanctioned in the future unless it 
takes some action on TIP. But given that the US President often waives at least some of the 
sanctions, how credible is this sanction threat? 
Table 2-1. Tier 3 Sanction Frequency 2003-18 
 Frequency Percent 
Sanctions waived 153 53% 
Partial waiver 81 28% 
Sanctioned 55 19% 
Total 289 100% 
 Which countries were sanctioned? The data I collected revealed 289 sanctioning 
decisions from 2003 to 2018. Table 2-1 shows the frequency of waivers, partial waivers, and 
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sanctions. The twenty countries that have ever been fully sanctioned for poor TIP performance 
are: Bolivia, Burundi, China, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cuba, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Iran, Laos, Madagascar, Mauritania, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia, 
South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela. However, twelve of these were only sanctioned in 2018 when 
the Trump Administration began to aggressively use sanctions to encourage improvement in TIP 
performance (see Trump 2018). At one time or another forty countries have been ranked at tier 
3 and never had sanctions applied. These are: Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federated 
States of Micronesia, The Gambia, Georgia, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Moldova, Niger, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan. Figure 2-2 shows the number of tier 3 
countries which had waivers, partial waivers, or sanctions over time. 
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From this data, I develop a model for determining the likelihood a country which is 
ranked tier 3 is sanctioned or has sanctions waived. Then from this model, I create a "sanction 
credibility" variable for countries for all countries scored at tier 2 watch list or tier 3 that I use as 
an explanatory variable for testing hypothesis 1 regarding the efficacy of threatening sanctions 
for improving TIP performance. 
Modeling sanctions 
As discussed above, the data I collected on the sanctioning decision was ordinal, but I 
found that ordered logistic regression models violated the proportional odds assumptions. Thus, 
from the ordinal data, I created a dichotomous variable indicating whether a country had 
sanctions waived or experienced any sanctions (full or partial), as this variable measures the 
application of some coercion on a target country. 
The explanatory variables I use fall into three categories: (1) the country's general 
relationship with the US, (2) the country's TIP performance, and (3) other domestic 
considerations, both in the US and in the potential target country. For the country's relationship 
with the US, I considered using variables for the UN voting ideal point distance, the existence of 
other US sanctions, US military aid, and the ratios of both the country's total trade with the US 
and that of the US's total trade with the potential target. 
 I considered using the UN ideal point distance in the model for predicting sanctions, 
however, I found that inclusion of the UN ideal point distance did not improve the explanatory 
power of my best model, nor was it statistically significant if I included a variable for other US 
sanctions. Thus, I did not include it in the final model. For US military aid, I found that a 
dichotomous variable for whether a country had received any US military aid added more 
explanatory power than a variable based on the per capita value of that aid. I included the 
existence of other sanctions (dichotomous), and the trade ratio variables, as indicated. 
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However, tests of whether the logistic regression was properly specified led me to a nonlinear 
specification of the variable for total trade with the US. 
 For the country's trafficking policy, I included variables for hostility to civil society 
working on TIP, whether the country had any trafficking prosecutions, whether the government 
used child soldiers, whether the government violated trafficking victims' physical integrity rights, 
whether the US TIP report indicated the existence of government complicity with trafficking, 
and whether the country was not a member of any regional organization combatting TIP. 
Variables for cooperation with civil society, child sex tourism, or problematic migration or sex 
trade policies did not seem to play a role in whether a country was sanctioned, as these 
variables were not statistically significant when included in models.  
 For other domestic considerations, I included a measure of government accountability 
from V-Dem, a dichotomous variable to indicate whether a country was upper-middle or high 
income, and a variable for Pompeo's term as Secretary of State. Under Pompeo, the Trump 
administration used sanctions much more aggressively, in part responding to some pressure 
from domestic interests for more robust action against TIP. Figure 2-2, above, shows that US 
sanctions increased in 2018 under his tenure. A list of all variables used in the sanctioning 
decision model are shown in table 2-2. 
 I use logistic regression analysis with a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard 




Table 2-2. Sanctioning Decision Model Variables 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean SD Med. Min Max 
Sanctioned for TIP (dependent variable) 289 136 0.47   0 1 
Subject to other sanctions 289 125 0.43   0 1 
Recipient of US military aid in any amount 289 133 0.46   0 1 
Ratio of total trade with US 289  0.070 0.112 0.027 0 0.66 
Ratio of US total trade with country 289  0.003 0.016 0.000 0 0.16 
Government hostility to CSOs working on TIP  289 64 0.22   0 1 
Trafficking prosecutions, current year 289 81 0.28   0 1 
Government sponsored child soldiers 289 70 0.24   0 1 
Human rights violations of victims 289 74 0.26   0 1 
Government complicity with TIP 289 221 0.76   0 1 
Not a member of any regional organization 
combatting TIP 289 70 0.24   0 1 
Government accountability 280  -0.325 0.780 -0.256 -1.95 1.78 
Upper middle- or high-income country 289 114 0.39   0 1 
Pompeo, Secretary of State 289 21 0.07   0 1 
Sanction credibility and cost 
 The resulting model permits me to estimate sanction credibility from zero to one and 
allows the prediction of sanction credibility beyond the sample of tier 3 countries to those on 
the tier 2 watch list. The sanction credibility variable is then used in the principal survival 
analysis, with appropriate control variables, to test the hypothesis about the efficacy of US 
sanctions in promoting TIP policy diffusion. 
 If sanction credibility can be measured, what about sanction cost? US TIP sanctions, if 
implemented, do not restrict trade, but only certain forms of US aid and, potentially, IMF 
credits. But even these costs are widespread globally: Of the 1,184 cases in which a country was 
scored tier 2 watch list or tier 3 in either the current or previous year, only in six cases did that 
country not receive any US aid or IMF credits. Thus, including a measure for sanction cost does 
not tell us much, and I do not include it in the analysis. Hypothesis 1 is tested in chapter 3. 
TIP Scores 
  Hypothesis 2, unique to reputation theory, proposes that the reputational pressure 
associated with US scorecard diplomacy promotes TIP diffusion for those policies which are 
most likely to improve TIP scores. If implementation of victim protection or capacity-building 
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policies should improve a country's score, then the country will be more likely to implement 
these policies if it is truly motivated by the desire to improve its reputation. Other scholars—and 
critics of the TIP reports—have argued that US scorecard diplomacy promotes law enforcement 
policies, as the reputation scholar Kelley (2017) found, but not victim protection policies. If 
victim protection policies improve scores and if the TIP scores promote the diffusion of these 
policies, then I would have strong support in favor of reputation. To test this hypothesis, I must 
first learn what actions improve or lower TIP scores. 
 A country which is present in the TIP report may receive a score of tier 1, tier 2, tier 2 
watch list (introduced in the 2004 report), tier 3, or be reported as a "special case." Tier 1 
countries are those deemed to "fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking," while tier 2 countries do not meet those standards but are "making significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards." Tier 2 watch list countries 
are those that are making "significant efforts" but either the extent of trafficking is significantly 
increasing, the country is failing to provide evidence of increasing efforts, or the determination 
of "significant efforts" is based on credible promises of future action. It is widely understood 
that tier 2 watch countries are in danger of slipping to tier 3. Indeed, the 2008 amendment to 
the TVPA set a limit of two to the number of consecutive years that a country could receive the 
tier 2 watch list ranking before being automatically downgraded to tier 3. Tier 3 countries are 
those that "do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards and are not making significant 
efforts to do so." As discussed above, tier 3 countries risk sanctions. Special cases are those 
where the US lacks information to make a judgment or where the government lacks capacity to 
engage in anti-trafficking efforts. The incidence of TIP scores over time are shown in figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-3. TIP Scores over Time 
 
Modeling TIP scores 
 How are countries scored? While the US State Department states the measures by 
which it evaluates countries, it does not provide a clear scoring mechanism—a source of some 
criticism of the reports (US GAO 2006). Moreover, the standards of evaluation have changed 
over the years. In 2001, the evaluation standards focused on law enforcement: criminalization, 
stringent punishment, vigorous prosecution, victim assistance in prosecutions, and cooperation 
with other governments in investigating and prosecuting trafficking (US DoS 2001, 5-6). In 2018, 
law enforcement was still included in the assessment, but victim protection received 
significantly more attention. For example, the State Department evaluated countries for 
proactive victim identification, cooperation with civil society in protecting victims, provision of 
victim services, and legal assistance for victims (US DoS 2018, 39). 
 Despite the opacity and changing evaluation criteria, I can nonetheless estimate the 
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for ordered logistic regression models showed likely violations of the proportional hazard 
assumptions. To estimate the influence of variables, I use a generalized ordered regression 
model which allows me to relax the proportional hazard assumption for variables which violate 
it. The model also uses a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard errors for possible 
intragroup correlation by year. Observations are country-year. 
 From the data that I collected, I include in the model TIP policy actions, specifically, 
whether criminalization, institutionalization, NAPs, NRMs, reflection periods and rapporteurs 
are extant, whether a revision to the legal regime was made in the previous year, and whether 
trafficking prosecutions or convictions are made in the current year. I also include variables for 
whether a country was perceived to be a source country, was a emigrant-sending or immigrant-
receiving member of an inter-regional organization coordinating migration, sponsored child 
soldiers, had reports of child sex tourism, was perceived to have migration or sex trade policies 
which were problematic for TIP victims, had reports of government complicity in TIP, 
cooperated with civil society on TIP or had reports of government hostility to civil society actors 
working against TIP, had a visit from the UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur for 
trafficking, or had an existing inter-sectoral institution cease to function. The US State 
Department states that it takes government capacity into account when scoring countries, so I 
also include country characteristics such as development level and democratic accountability. I 
also control for whether a country is a recipient of US military aid, the UN ideal voting point 
distance, and scoring during the Trump administration which was more likely to be worse than 




Table 2-3. TIP Scoring Model Variables 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean SD Med. Min Max 
US TIP tier score (ordinal dependent variable) 2780  Mode: Tier 2 0 3 
Criminalization extant 4066 1825 0.45   0 1 
Change in TIP legal regime, previous year 3871 703 0.18   0 1 
Intersectoral coordinating body extant 3945 1877 0.48   0 1 
National Action Plan extant 4085 1162 0.28   0 1 
National Referral Mechanism extant 3959 523 0.13   0 1 
Reflection Period extant 3942 455 0.12   0 1 
National Rapporteur extant 3927 128 0.03   0 1 
Trafficking prosecutions, current year 2890 1981 0.69   0 1 
Trafficking convictions, current year 2874 1752 0.61   0 1 
Source country for transnational trafficking 3186 2132 0.67   0 1 
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional 
organization coordinating migration policy 
4095 775 0.27   0 1 
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 
organization coordinating migration policy 
4095 1122 0.19   0 1 
Government-sponsored child soldiers 4095 166 0.04   0 1 
Child sex tourism 3712 798 0.21   0 1 
Problematic sex trade policy 3071 560 0.18   0 1 
Problematic migration policy 3096 907 0.29   0 1 
Government complicity with TIP 3080 1588 0.52   0 1 
Government cooperation with CSOs on TIP 3099 2369 0.76   0 1 
Government hostility to CSOs on TIP 3069 152 0.05   0 1 
Visit from the UN Special Rapporteur for Human 
Trafficking 
4095 27 0.01   0 1 
De-institutionalization event, current year 3080 162 0.05   0 1 
UN voting ideal point distance from US, centered on 
mean 3974  0.000 0.871 0.249 -2.79 2.02 
Recipient of US military aid in any amount 4095 2822 0.69   0 1 
Government accountability 3640  0.676 0.876 0.821 -1.95 2.06 
Trump administration 4095 390 0.10   0 1 
World Bank income classification (ordinal) 4039  Mode: Lower-Middle 0 3 
 The resulting model tells us what government actions influence scores. Of course, 
policymakers may not make decisions based on what scientific models determine is statistically 
significant. Nonetheless, the model will help us determine whether and what acts do influence 
scores, and this will help us refine hypothesis 2 regarding the influence of reputation on 
promoting TIP policy diffusion. Results are discussed in chapter 4. 
TESTING HYPOTHESES 
 This section explains the survival analysis used for testing the hypotheses throughout 




The Dependent Variables 
 Previous studies by Kelley (2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) used 
domestic criminalization of all forms of trafficking for their dependent variable. I expand on this 
analysis by adding five other dependent variables: any revision to the TIP legal regime, first 
institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body, initiation of a National Action Plan, 
formal adoption of an operational National Referral Mechanism (NRM), and establishment of a 
reflection period for victims. Together, these variables offer a more nuanced look at TIP policy 
diffusion than criminalization alone by allowing us to examine if TIP policy diffusion is different 
for law enforcement, capacity-building, and victim protection policies. A summary of the data I 
collected on the dependent variables is shown in table 2-4. 
Table 2-4. Dependent Variables for Testing Hypotheses 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean Min Max 
Criminalization  2393 171 0.07 0 1 
Change to the TIP legal regime  4063 736 0.18 0 1 
Institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body 3938 294 0.07 0 1 
National Action Plan initiation  4085 421 0.10 0 1 
Formalization of an operational National Referral Mechanism  3934 93 0.02 0 1 
Establishment of a reflection period  3475 44 0.01 0 1 
Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables come both from my own data collection, described above, 
and data from other sources noted below. I discuss these variables here by grouping them as 
variables relating to trafficking policy, US scorecard diplomacy, regional policy communities, 
neighborly influence, trade and migration partners, trafficking and migration characteristics, 
other domestic characteristics, and policy normalization. A description of all variables can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Trafficking policy 
 Data regarding a country's trafficking policy is included in some models as control 
variables. This data includes whether the TIP policies used as dependent variables are extant, 
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whether the government violates the physical integrity rights of trafficking victims or uses child 
soldiers, and whether the country's migration or sex trade policies are perceived as further 
harming trafficking victims. 
 A key control variable for many policies is the existence of other policies. For example, 
National Action Plans and NRMs are often created by the country's intersectoral coordinating 
body, thus, whether a country has such a body may influence whether it initiates a NAP or 
formalizes an NRM.  
 As described above, I collected data on the incidences of governments violating the 
physical integrity rights of TIP victims, and more specifically, on governments' use of child 
soldiers (which involved violation of physical integrity rights). Other violations of physical 
integrity rights included such activities as forced labor camps, police kidnaping victims and 
forcing them into prostitution, or government officials raping TIP victims. These variables may 
indicate that a country does not have a sincere interest in promoting TIP policy. 
 The models for explaining TIP scores include data I collected on perceptions of problems 
in the implementation of migration or sex trade policy that further harmed victims of TIP.  
 All these variables are dichotomous. Summary data is found in table 2-5. 
Table 2-5. Trafficking Policy Variables 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean Min Max 
Criminalization extant 4066 1825 0.45 0 1 
Institutionalization extant 3945 1877 0.48 0 1 
NAP extant 4085 1162 0.28 0 1 
NRM extant 3959 523 0.13 0 1 
Reflection period extant 3942 455 0.12 0 1 
Human rights violated 3069 161 0.05 0 1 
Government sponsored child soldiers 4095 166 0.04 0 1 
Migration policy problematic 3096 907 0.29 0 1 
Sex trade policy problematic 3071 560 0.18 0 1 
US scorecard diplomacy 
 To test hypotheses related to reputation and US scorecard diplomacy, I collected data 
on the status of the country in the US TIP reports. Similar to Kelley (2017), I collected data on 
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whether a country was scored in the report and whether it received a low score (tier 2 watch list 
or tier 3). Kelley (2017) found that countries were concerned about their ranking in the US TIP 
reports relative to their neighbors and peers (128-139). To measure this reputational pressure, I 
created a variable indicating whether a neighboring country had received a higher score. This 
measure correlates strongly but not perfectly (0.73) with receiving a low score, since the lower 
the score the more likely a neighbor will have a better score. 
 I also created a variable as to whether the US made a specific recommendation for a 
country to fully criminalize, to make any change to its TIP legal regime, to create or reinstate an 
intersectoral coordinating body, or to initiate or improve a National Referral Mechanism. 
 For all these variables, I measured whether they applied to the current or previous year. 
Because the US TIP reports come out mid-year, a country may not have time to act on them in 
the remainder of the calendar year in which the report was published. All variables are 
dichotomous. Summary data is shown in table 2-6. 
 Table 2-6. US Scorecard Diplomacy Variables 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean Min Max 
Scored in US TIP report 3900 2801 0.72 0 1 
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3 score in TIP report 3900 1190 0.31 0 1 
Neighbor had better score in TIP report 3900 1439 0.37 0 1 
Full criminalization recommendation 3900 645 0.17 0 1 
Legal revision recommendation 3900 1168 0.30 0 1 
Recommendation regarding institutionalization 3900 204 0.05 0 1 
Recommendation regarding NRM 3900 934 0.24 0 1 
Regional policy communities 
 This dissertation is particularly interested the role of regional organizations in promoting 
TIP policy diffusion since these are necessary as controls for the hypotheses, especially 
hypothesis 4. Previous studies have only included a variable denoting accession to the UN 
Palermo Protocol on TIP—a critical component of the international regime—and generalized 
variables for region or neighbors. I collected data from the regional organizations regarding their 
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membership, efforts to combat TIP, level of institutionalized coordination, and whether their 
members submit to external reviews of TIP policy.  
 In addition to accession to the Protocol, I generated variables for memberships in the 
eighteen regional organizations combatting trafficking and the seven inter-regional 
organizations which coordinate migration policy. I counted membership in regional 
organizations from the time these organizations began coordinating on TIP policy, except for the 
inter-regional organizations coordinating migration where I counted membership from 
establishment of the organization. I did not use these variables directly in the models, but rather 
this data was then used to generate the variables which follow. 
 To account for ways in which regional organizations may reinforce each other, I created 
variables for counts of memberships in (1) regional organizations combating TIP, (2) those 
organizations with institutionalized coordinating mechanisms, and (3) those organizations with 
external policy evaluation. These counts did not include memberships in inter-regional 
organizations coordinating migration policy, as these organizations may have a different 
influence on TIP policy diffusion. To account for the influence of the inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration policy, I created dichotomous variables whether a country was an 
emigrant-sending or immigrant-receiving member of such organizations. Data on whether a 
country had net immigration or emigration came from the UN Population Division. I used a ratio 
of 1.05:1 to determine if a country was an immigrant-receiving or emigrant-sending country. 
Summary data is show in table 2-7. 
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Table 2-7. Generalized Membership Information in Regional Organizations 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean SD Med. Min Max 
Count of memberships in regional organizations 
combating TIP, excluding those focused on migration 4095  1.26 1.16 1 0 6 
Count of memberships in regional organizations 
combating TIP with institutionalized coordination, 
excluding those focused on migration 
4095  0.70 1.00 0 0 4 
Count of memberships in regional organizations 
combating TIP with external policy evaluation, 
excluding those focused on migration 
4095  0.28 0.75 0 0 3 
Emigrant-sending member of an inter-regional 
organization coordinating migration policy 4095 1122 0.27   0 1 
Immigrant-receiving member of an inter-regional 
organization coordinating migration policy 4095 775 0.19   0 1 
 Rather than using specific regional organizations as an explanatory variable in my 
models, I generated variables for regional TIP policy communities. Differentiating among regime 
complexes rather than specific regional organizations not only permits more parsimonious 
models but can capture any overlapping, reinforcing, or diminishing effect of membership in 
multiple regional organizations. I defined eight TIP regional policy communities: Africa, 
Americas, Europe, the Middle East, North America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the former 
Soviet Union. I defined these policy communities as shown in the table 2-8. Membership in a 
regional policy community is also dependent on the initiation of TIP coordination.  
Table 2-8. Regional Policy Community Definitions 
Regime complex Definition 
Africa Any member of the African Union, EAC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD or SADC 
Americas Any member of OAS 
Europe Any member or aspirant of OSCE or the European Union in Europe (COW codes between 
200-399) 
Middle East Any member of LAS 
North America Any member of OSCE in North America  
Southeast Asia Any member of ASEAN 
South Asia Any member of SAARC 
Former USSR Any member of CIS 
 I also created a categorical variable for primary regional policy community useful for 
testing interactions. Because membership in policy communities overlaps in three cases—
Europe and the former USSR, Africa and the Middle East, and the Americas and North America—
I had to choose which of these complexes is dominant for those countries which are members of 
both. For the American case, I eliminated the North American region as a distinct category and 
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included its two members in the American region as TIP coordination began there prior to OAS 
action. For the other countries in two regional communities, I prioritized their membership by 
ratio of trade, assigning them to the regional complex with which they conducted the most 
trade, excepting Russia which I assigned to the former USSR policy community. Because of this 
decision, the categorical variable has seven regional policy communities in addition to the base 
value (not being a member of any regional policy community). Use of this variable streamlines 
statistical models that include interactions with regional policy community membership. 
Summary data is shown in table 2-9.  
Table 2-9. Regional Policy Community Variables 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean Min Max 
Member of African RPC 4095 777 0.19 0 1 
Member of American RPC 4095 495 0.12 0 1 
Member of European RPC 4095 959 0.23 0 1 
Member of Middle East RPC 4095 272 0.07 0 1 
Member of North American RPC 4095 40 0.01 0 1 
Member of Southeast Asian RPC 4095 150 0.04 0 1 
Member of South Asian RPC 4095 159 0.04 0 1 
Member of Former USSR RPC 4095 129 0.03 0 1 
Primary RPC (categorical) 4095 Mode: None 0 7 
 Some models use the regional density of the policy under consideration to control for 
both the influence of regional policy communities and tipping points. Discussion of these 
variables is found under "policy normalization," below. 
Neighborly influence 
 Most theories of policy diffusion suggest mechanisms associated with neighborly 
interconnectedness may influence diffusion. As discussed in chapter one, Simmons, Lloyd, and 
Stewart (2018) used counts of roads between neighbors as a proxy for fear that neighbors' 
improving policies would divert trafficking into the country. In chapter 1, I criticized the use of 
this variable as an inadequate operationalization for fear of trafficking diversion. I propose a 
better alternative below. Because neighborly interconnectedness may also measure neighborly 
pressure—including pressure on weaker neighbors to improve their policy or the interchange of 
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peoples and ideas upon which constructivism and learning are dependent—it is nonetheless 
important to control for this influence. This is especially important for testing the influence of 
regional policy communities, as it is possible that it is neighborly influence that matters. To date, 
no study has included variables for both neighborly and regional influence. 
 To operationalize this potential neighborly influence, I generated three variables: (1) 
counts of roads to countries which have extant the policy under consideration, (2) the ratio of 
roads to these countries, and (3) the counts of roads weighted by the difference in UN voting 
ideal points. Where data was missing as to whether a policy was extant, I counted it as not 
extant, under the assumption that if the presence of policy is not widely known, then it will have 
little influence on diffusion. I counted roads between countries using Google Maps in 2019 (for 
more details of how I made these counts see Appendix B, note 2). These road connections are 
constant—they do not vary over time because historical data was not available. However, I 
propose that these roads nonetheless measure connectedness between neighbors, as roads 
built in the time frame of this study nonetheless measure underlying connectedness between 
countries. That is, roads are built to meet demands for greater connectedness. 
 It may be that not all roads should carry equal weight, especially where relations are 
hostile between neighbors. To measure the warmth of relations between countries, I also 
generated a variable where I multiplied the number of roads by the log of the UN voting ideal 
point difference developed by Voeten et alii (2009) centered on the median, and then reversed 
the sign so that warmer relations were positive. I used the log of the ideal point difference 
because the most hostile voting differences tended to involve Israel and its neighbors, while 
clearly hostile relation between Russia and Ukraine or North and South Korea are closer to the 
median. The log function reduces the influence of the extremes while still differentiating among 
relations of those closer to the median. Summary data is shown in table 2-10. 
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Table 2-10. Neighborly Connectedness Variables. 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Med. Min Max 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 4095 10.2 18.0 3 0 144 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant institutionalization 4095 10.5 16.8 5 0 143 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NAPs 4095 6.2 11.9 1 0 122 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NRMs 4095 3.2 8.5 0 0 83 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant reflection periods 4095 3.5 12.2 0 0 138 
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 4095 0.44 0.42 0.36 0 1.00 
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant institutionalization 4095 0.47 0.39 0.48 0 1.00 
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant NAPs 4095 0.28 0.34 0.08 0 1.00 
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant NRMs 4095 0.14 0.25 0 0 1.00 
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant reflection periods 4095 0.09 0.22 0 0 1.00 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 
weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at 
the median 
3974 7.0 17.2 0.5 -79.8 170.9 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant institutionalization 
weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at 
the median 
3974 7.7 16.5 1.7 -78.5 151.4 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NAPs weighted by log 
of UN voting ideal point distance centered at the median 
3974 4.9 11.7 0 -50.5 133.7 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NRMs weighted by log 
of UN voting ideal point distance centered at the median 
3974 2.2 7.8 0 -44.6 88.1 
Count of roads to neighbors with extant reflection periods 
weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at 
the median 
3974 2.9 11.8 0 -76.2 150.5 
Trade and migration partners 
 Trade and migration partners may be alternative measures of connectedness between 
countries, and so I control for their influence in some models. Transnational trafficking tends to 
follow general patterns of migration. Therefore, I generated variables measuring the ratio of 
total value of trade (imports and exports) and shared migration stock (emigrants and 
immigrants) with countries in which the relevant policy was extant. Where data was missing as 
to whether a policy was extant, I counted it as not extant, under the assumption that if the 
presence of policy is not widely known, then it will have little influence on diffusion. When data 
for shared migration stock was not available, I used the most recent data available. Summary 
data is shown in table 2-11. 
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Table 2-11. Trade and Migration Partner Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Med Min Max 
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant criminalization 3715 0.52 0.30 0.56 0 1.00 
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant 
institutionalization 3715 0.62 0.26 0.70 0 1.00 
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant NAP 3715 0.35 0.27 0.34 0 0.99 
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant NRM 3715 0.20 0.23 0.10 0 0.96 
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant reflection 
period 3715 0.16 0.16 0.11 0 0.84 
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant 
criminalization 3860 0.57 0.37 0.64 0 1.00 
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant 
institutionalization 3860 0.59 0.33 0.65 0 1.00 
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant 
NAP 3860 0.32 0.30 0.25 0 1.00 
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant 
NRM 3860 0.20 0.26 0.06 0 0.98 
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant 
reflection period 3860 0.15 0.21 0.05 0 0.95 
Trafficking and migration characteristics 
Advocates of competition theory have argued that trafficking "externalities"—or the 
fear of them—influence the diffusion of trafficking policy. As transnational trafficking follows 
migration patterns, a country's migration characteristics may also motivate trafficking policy. 
Thus, I have included variables related to these concerns. 
 As described in the section on data collection above, I collected data on perceptions 
increased or diverted transnational trafficking, whether a country is considered a source country 
for transnational trafficking, whether it had a significant domestic trafficking problem, and 
whether child sex tourism occurred. I include the variable for significant domestic trafficking in 
all models as a standard control variable. Summary data for these variables is presented in table 
2-12. 
Table 2-12. Trafficking Characteristic Variables 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean Min Max 
Reported increased or diverted transnational trafficking, current or 
previous year 3900 536 0.14 0 1 
Perceived source/origin country for transnational trafficking 3186 2132 0.67 0 1 
Perceived significant domestic trafficking 3150 2374 0.75 0 1 
Reports of child sex tourism 3712 798 0.21 0 1 
64 
 
Other domestic considerations 
 Domestic characteristics may motivate trafficking policy independently or in conjunction 
with transnational diffusion mechanisms. I include measures for government cooperation with 
civil society on TIP, government accountability, freedom of expression, government corruption, 
civil society participation, women's political empowerment, women's participation in civil 
society, level of development, major war extant, and population. These variables may impact 
the trafficking environment, a government's sensitivity to transnational influences, or 
government capacity to initiate and implement TIP policies. 
 For government cooperation with or hostility toward civil society on TIP, I collected data 
as described in the section on data collection above. From Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
(Coppedge et al. 2020), I use its accountability index (to what extent is the ideal of government 
accountability achieved?), public sector corruption index (to what extent do public sector 
employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements?), 
legislative corrupt activities (do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial 
gain?), women's political empowerment index (how politically empowered are women?), 
women's participation in civil society (are women prevented from participating in civil society 
organizations?), and the freedom of expression index (to what extent does the government 
respect press and media freedom, the freedom to discuss political matters at home and in the 
public sphere, and the freedom of academic and cultural expression?). From the World Bank, I 
use GDP per capita (in thousands), or more commonly, the World Bank income classification 
(low to high income), and the natural log of total population. From UCDP Prio, I use data for 
whether a country experienced a major war (more than 1,000 battle deaths) in a given year. 
Summary data is shown in table 2-13.  
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Table 2-13. Domestic Variables 
Variable Obs. Freq. Mean SD Med. Min Max 
CSO cooperation on TIP 3099 2369 0.76   0 1 
Government hostility to CSO work on TIP 3069 152 0.05   0 1 
Accountability index (V-Dem: v2x_accountability) 3640  0.67 0.88 0.82 -1.95 2.06 
Political corruption index (V-Dem: v2x_corr) 3630  0.53 0.31 0.60 0.01 0.97 
Public sector corruption index (V-Dem: v2x_pubcorr) 3637  0.51 0.31 0.58 0.01 0.98 
Legislative corrupt activities (V-Dem: v2lgcrrpt) 3521  -0.19 1.39 -0.55 -3.38 3.50 
Civil society women's participation (V-Dem: 
v2csgender) 3640  1.16 0.89 1.34 -3.01 2.52 
Women's political empowerment index (V-Dem: 
v2x_gender) 3601  0.72 0.19 0.77 0.05 0.98 
Freedom of expression index (V-Dem: v2x_freexp) 3640  0.68 0.28 0.77 0.02 0.99 
GDP per capita (in thousands) 3615  17.96 19.8 10.53 0.59 115.42 
World Bank income classification (0= low income) 4039  Mode: Lower-Middle 0 3 
Total population, natural log 3836  15.48 2.15 15.78 9.14 21.05 
Major war (1000+ battle deaths) 4095 155 0.04   0 1 
 To maintain consistency, I use a standard set of domestic control variables in all models 
(excepting some robustness checks where specific control variables are substituted). First, as 
noted above, I include reports of significant domestic trafficking in all models. Second, scholars 
have argued that corruption is an important cause of TIP and an influence on government policy 
(Avdeyeva 2012; Jonsson 2018; Van Dijk and Mierlo 2011; Zhang and Pineda 2008), and so I 
control for legislative corruption in the models for criminalization and any change to the TIP 
legal regime, and public sector corruption in the models for the other four policies. Third, 
Bartilow (2010) found that the ratio of women in the legislature encouraged criminalization and 
his finding has been duplicated widely, so I include women's political empowerment in all 
models. Fourth, studies have also shown the importance of democratic governance for 
compliance with international law in general (Koh 1997) and motivating action against TIP 
specifically (Avdeyeva 2012). Das et alii (2013) argued that freedom of the press was important 
in mediating international and domestic pressure for action on TIP while Kelley (2017) argued 
that government transparency exposed governments to reputational pressure. To account for 
all these concepts, I include the measure for government accountability in all models. Fifth, I 
consider that governments which violate the physical integrity of TIP victims may be insincere in 
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their efforts against TIP. Thus, I include reports of these rights violations in all models, except 
those for reflection periods where the variable is negatively collinear with the dependent 
variable. Sixth, constructivism holds that ideas are shared and spread through social networks, 
which may include connections between civil society and government actors. Moreover, Perry 
(2016) found that for US pressure to be successful, it needed to be combined with pressure from 
civil society and Kelley (2017) argued that civil society engagement increased government 
sensitivity to reputational pressure. Thus, in all models, I include cooperation with civil society 
on TIP. Finally, as a general measure for government capacity, I include the World Bank income 
classification in all models, except for reflection periods where I use GDP per capita.  
Policy normalization 
 Finally, to test constructivist theory, I use the regional density of the dependent variable 
under consideration. If constructivists are correct, then as the density of TIP policy increases, the 
more it is "taken-for-granted" and likely to be emulated, though models may need to account 
for non-linear effects. I use measures for the regional density of the policy rather than the global 
density because studies have shown influence of regional patterns of compliance with 
international legal commitments (Simmons 2000) and the nature of TIP is likely to promote a 
regional or neighborly horizon for most countries rather than a global horizon. Defining 
"regions" is itself an exercise in judgment. I used two measures of regions, both available from 
V-Dem: one that divides the world into nineteen geographic regions, and one that divides the 
world into ten cultural-political regions. I use geographic regions in most models, but test 
robustness of results with the cultural-political regions. If data was not available regarding 
whether a policy was extant, I assumed that it was not, on the assumption that if a country's 
policies are not widely known, then it is not likely to have much influence on its neighbors. 
Summary data is shown in table 2-14. 
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Table 2-14. Policy Normalization Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Med. Min Max 
Regional (geographic) density of criminalization 4095 0.45  0.37 0.44 0 1.00 
Regional (geographic) density of institutionalization 4095 0.46 0.32 0.50 0 1.00 
Regional (geographic) density of NAPs 4095 0.28 0.28 0.22 0 1.00 
Regional (geographic) density of NRMs 4095 0.13 0.13 0.00 0 0.87 
Regional (geographic) density of reflection periods 4095 0.11 0.11 0.00 0 0.80 
Regional (cultural) density of criminalization 4095 0.45 0.36 0.43 0 1.00 
Regional (cultural) density of institutionalization 4095 0.46 0.31 0.50 0 1.00 
Regional (cultural) density of NAPs 4095 0.28 0.27 0.22 0 0.91 
Regional (cultural) density of NRMs 4095 0.13 0.13 0.00 0 0.70 
Regional (cultural) density of reflection periods 4095 0.11 0.21 0.00 0 0.75 
Model Specification 
 Like the other leading works in the literature (Kelley 2017; Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 
2018), I use event history models which focus on the length of time until events occur. In these 
models, the explanatory variables influence the risk of the event's occurrence. Specifically, I 
employ a Cox proportional hazard model, a semi-parametric model that has the advantage of 
making no assumptions about the underlying shape of the baseline hazard rate (e.g., whether it 
is increasing or decreasing with time), though the baseline hazard is assumed to be the same for 
all cases.  
 In event history models, we calculate the "hazard function" which tells us the probability 
that the event occurs during a given interval, conditional on the subject having survived to the 
beginning of that interval. The Cox proportional hazards regression model (Cox 1972) asserts 
that the hazard rate for the jth subject in the data is: 
h(t|xj) = h0(t)exp(xjβx) 
where the regression coefficients βx are estimated from the data (Cleves et al. 2010, 129). The 
covariates are easily interpreted for how they change the probability of event occurrence within 
the given time interval. 
Cases in which the event never occurs will be "right-censored" meaning that the event is 
unobserved during the time period under study. The Palermo Protocol was established in 2000 
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and very few TIP policy events occur prior to that time. Therefore, the time frame I use for 
models is that from 1998 to 2018. In most models, events can occur only once, and so cases are 
removed the sample; however, for legal revisions and NAPS, events can occur multiple times, 
and so these cases are kept in the sample. Note that the sample sizes are larger for the models 
where cases are kept in the sample than for those for which events can occur only once. Sample 
sizes are also larger when policy adoption tended to occur later in time; thus, the sample sizes 
for first institutionalization are the smallest because this was one of the first policies adopted.  
Cox proportional hazard models assume that ratio of hazards for any two subjects is 
constant and proportional over time. In some models, the influence of variables has time-
variant hazard ratios. For example, I might find that the influence of explanatory variable decays 
over time. Under such circumstances, I evaluate hypotheses with the time-varying hazard ratio. 
In all models, I use a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard errors for possible 
intra-group correlation by region. Different regions of the world have different patterns of 
transnational and domestic trafficking, legal regimes, civil society relations, etc. Thus, it is 
possible that observations are partly dependent upon each other for reasons that are difficult to 
quantify, justifying the standard error adjustment. The primary models account for intragroup 
correlation in nineteen geographical regions while the robustness checks include an alternative 
political-cultural definition of region. 
Observations are country-year for the period 1998 to 2018. 
Plan for Testing Hypotheses 
 In the next chapter, I examine coercion theory by testing hypothesis 1 which holds that 
credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. As described in chapter 1, 
other scholars have used variables which proxy vulnerability to US (or sometimes European) 
pressure. Rather than using these proxy variables, I test the threat of sanctions directly by 
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developing a model predicting the credibility of sanctions for all tier 2 watch list and tier 3 
countries and then including this sanction credibility variable in the model while controlling for 
the imposition of sanctions and reputational concerns. 
 In chapter 4, I proceed to test the hypotheses derived from reputation theory for the 
influence of scorecard diplomacy. These are: 
• Hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score promotes TIP 
policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores, and  
• Hypothesis 3. Non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote TIP policy 
diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores. 
 In chapter 5, I test the constructivist hypothesis that TIP policy diffusion increases as the 
regional policy density of the policy increases. To single out this "taken-for-granted" effect, I 
control for the influence of regional policy communities as another likely mechanism for 
explaining regional variation in policy diffusion. 
 The focus of chapter 6 is the hypothesis developed from competition theory that 
reports of increased transnational trafficking or diversion of trafficking flows promote diffusion 
of TIP policies which disrupt trafficking networks. 
In the final chapter, I will discuss how well each hypotheses fared, what this tells us 
about the explanatory value of each theory of policy diffusion, and what we have learned about 
differentiation by policy type and region. I will reflect on how theoretical explanations for policy 
diffusion may be improved and make recommendations for further research. Finally, I will 
consider what the findings suggest for diplomats, policymakers, and practitioners. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SANCTIONS 
OVERVIEW 
 Some scholars have criticized the TVPA for its sanctioning mechanism, especially in its 
practical implementation (Berman 2006; Chuang 2006; Feve and Finzel 2001; Kapstein 2006; US 
GAO 2006). More generally, Peksen (2009) found that economic sanctions led to greater human 
rights abuses, arguing that sanctions were counter-productive (see also Pape 1997; 1998). Yet 
other scholars have found conditionality to be effective in promoting desired norms (Cleveland 
2001; Hafner-Burton 2005). As discussed in chapter 1, scholars of TIP diffusion have recognized 
that coercion in the form of sanctions may promote policy diffusion, but, to date, the variables 
used to operationalize this concept have been related to the supposed vulnerability to US 
sanctions. The efficacy of targeted US sanctions for promoting TIP policy has not been tested. 
This chapter seeks to address this imbalance in the literature by testing hypothesis 1: credible 
threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. 
SANCTIONS AND SELECTION BIAS 
 Nooruddin (2002) and Drezner (2003) showed that selection bias is a problem which 
haunts studies of sanctioning efficacy. It is not enough to know when sanctions were used; I 
must also know when sanctions were considered but not used. The threat of sanctions may be 
enough to promote the desired change. Sanctions are more likely to be imposed where they are 
least likely to succeed. So, I have a selection bias problem: I am more likely to observe 
sanctioning failures than successes because sanctions are imposed in the most difficult cases. In 
the case of TIP, the category of "tier 2 watch list" gives us a special opportunity to evaluate the 
threat of sanctions. The reauthorization of the TVPA added the tier 2 watch list category in 2003. 
As discussed in chapter two, this category implies a clear warning that the country may fall into 
tier 3 and be sanctioned. However, as discussed in chapter one, it is also possible that receiving 
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a low score is motivating policy diffusion because it harms a country's reputation, so I also 
control for this alternative explanation. 
 In addition to the tier 2 watch list, I also know which tier 3 sanctionable countries were, 
in fact, sanctioned. This allows me to create a statistical model explaining the sanction decision 
and thereby reveal how likely a sanctionable country was to be sanctioned. This model can then 
be used to predict the credibility of sanctions for tier 2 watch list countries as well. Game 
theoretic models suggest that the threat of sanctions is more likely to succeed when costs are 
high for the target and low for the sender, but for that threat to be succeed, it must be 
credible—some of the same dynamics which work to make the threat more costly to the target 
also make it more costly to the sender, and thus less credible. The sanctions available under the 
TVPA are targeted sanctions; they are not meant to be very costly to the United States. Trade 
support and humanitarian aid are not sanctioned. In evaluating sanctions costs for both the 
sender and target, scholars have focused on trade interdependence, strategic interests, and 
domestic institutions (Drezner 1999; Jeong and Peksen 2019; Lektzian and Souva 2007; McLean 
and Whang 2010; Nooruddin 2002, Peksen 2019). Drawing on this literature, in the next section, 
I discuss the model of sanction decision-making. 
WHO IS SANCTIONED? 
The Model 
 To develop the sanctioning decision model, I use the variables and model described in 
chapter 2. As a reminder, for this model, I use a dichotomous dependent variable for whether a 
tier 3 country incurred partial or full sanctions under the TVPA. Explanatory variables fall into 
three categories: (1) the country's general relationship with the US, (2) the country's TIP 
performance, and (3) other domestic considerations, both in the US and in the potential target 
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country. I use a logistic regression model with a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard 
errors to allow for intragroup correlation by year. Observations are country-year.  
Results and Discussion 
 The results of the model developed above are shown in table 3-1. In the table, odds 
ratios greater than one indicate that a country is more likely to be sanctioned. The model has 
good explanatory value, correctly predicting 251 of 289 (87%) of the cases. Of the fifteen cases 
(5%) where the prediction was that sanctions would be waived, only in four cases did countries 
receive full sanctions (Russia in 2014, Madagascar in 2011 and 2012, and Comoros in 2018). In 
another fourteen cases (5%), the model predicts sanctioning, but sanctions were waived. 
Belarus from 2015-2018 represents four of these cases. Nine cases (3%) had missing data and 
could not be predicted by the model. 
Table 3-1. Sanctioning Decision Model 
Variable Coefficient Odds ratio z P>|z| 
Already subject to other US sanctions 2.948 19.07 3.83 0.000 
US military aid -3.213 0.04 -6.33 0.000 
Ratio of target's trade with US 41.202 7.83x1017 6.92 0.000 
Ratio of target's trade with US2 -56.402 3.20x10-25 -6.61 0.000 
Ratio of US trade with target -23.836 4.45x10-10 -2.98 0.003 
Hostility to CSOs working on TIP 0.780 2.18 1.51 0.131 
Trafficking prosecution(s) -0.919 0.40 -1.54 0.124 
Government sponsored child soldiers -1.913 0.15 -1.82 0.069 
Human rights violations of victims 2.669 14.42 4.17 0.000 
Government complicity in TIP 2.662 14.32 3.59 0.000 
Not a member of any regional org combatting TIP 2.176 8.81 2.93 0.003 
Government accountability -1.651 0.19 -3.64 0.000 
Upper-middle- or high-income country -1.051 0.35 -1.72 0.085 
Pompeo 5.198 180.90 7.64 0.000 
Constant (baseline) -4.687 0.01 -3.79 0.000 
Observations 280    
Adjusted r2 0.64    
Logistic regression. Standard errors are adjusted for possible intragroup correlation by year.  
 If the potential target is already the target of other US sanctions, then it is more likely it 
will also be sanctioned for TIP. This finding is not surprising. The sanctions literature has long 
found that sanctions are more likely to be imposed where they are less likely to be effective. If 
the target already has other sanctions imposed, it is not likely that TIP sanctions will be effective 
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either and, given the existing strain in relations between the countries, less costly for the US to 
decide to impose additional targeted sanctions. 
 If the country receives US military aid, it is less likely to be sanctioned. This result is also 
expected as the existence of US military aid implies strategic interests that may be jeopardized 
by a deterioration in the bilateral relationship; that is, sanctions represent a higher cost to the 
US. 
 While TIP sanctions are not trade-related, the trading relationship between the US and 
the target helps explain the sanctioning decision. I find that as the ratio of the target's trade 
with the US to its total trade increases, it is more likely to be sanctioned, until that ratio 
surpasses about 0.4, after which it falls (only a few cases exist where the trade ratio is greater 
than this threshold). The more the target depends on the US economy, the more vulnerable it is 
to sanctions, and thus the more likely the threat of sanctions will be effective. The greater the 
ratio of US trade with the target is to US total trade, the less likely the US is to impose sanctions. 
Again, this accords with game theoretic models that the more costly sanctions are for the 
sending state, the less likely sanctions will be imposed. While TIP sanctions do not affect trade, 
the trading relationship appears to signal something about the underlying value of the bilateral 
relationship. 
 The implementation of TIP policy in the target country also helps explain the imposition 
of sanctions. While some of these variables are not statistically significant at the conventional 
levels used in social science, it is nonetheless likely that diplomats are attuned to possible 
relationships in which social scientists may lack statistical confidence. Most of these variables—
hostility to CSOs, trafficking prosecutions, use of child soldiers, violating victims' physical 
integrity rights, and government complicity in TIP—relate to the country's costs of compliance 
with US demands for improving TIP policy. Egregious abuse of TIP victims and government 
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complicity in TIP help explain the US decision to sanction. Of interest is that government-
sponsored child soldiers may reduce the likelihood of sanctions being imposed (though 
significant only at p=.069), suggesting that it is the other human rights abuses—e.g., enslaving 
portions of the population—which motivate US officials to sanction.  
 Democracies are less likely to be sanctioned, and it is possible that wealthier countries 
are also less likely to be sanctioned though this result fails to meet conventional levels of 
confidence. As noted in chapter one, under Secretary of State Pompeo, the Trump 
administration became much more likely to sanction tier 3 countries for domestic political 
reasons, a consideration which is evident in the results. 
 In summary, the sanctioning decision model conforms to the theoretical expectations of 
the sanctions literature and provides a reasonable method to calculate the credibility of the 
sanction threat beyond the sample of tier 3 countries. 
DOES THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS PROMOTE DIFFUSION OF TIP POLICY? 
 Having generated a variable which measures the credibility of the threat of sanctions, I 
turn to modeling the influence of the threat of sanctions on TIP policy diffusion to test 
hypothesis 3. To create a useful test of the hypothesis, I need to account for sanction credibility, 
develop a model to overcome selection bias, and include a measure for reputation as an 
alternative explanation for policy diffusion.  
Sanction Credibility 
 Sanction credibility, as a measure between zero and one, does not consistently have a 
linear function for explaining policy diffusion. To capture these non-linear effects, I generated an 
ordinal variable, generally dividing credibility into quartiles, but with an additional category for 
the most credible sanctions above 0.95. The summary data is shown in table 3-2. As is evident 
from the table, even when sanctions are threatened, credibility is generally low: out of 1,131 
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cases in which sanction credibility in the current or previous year was greater than zero, 758 
(67%), have a credibility of less than 0.25. The second most common category with 111 cases 
(10%) are those with the highest sanction credibility (greater than 0.95).  
Table 3-2. Sanction Credibility, Ordinal Variable 
Sanction credibility, highest 
of current or previous year Frequency Percent 
Credibility = 0 2,922 72.09 
Credibility >0 <0.25 758 18.70 
Credibility >=0.25 <0.50 104 2.57 
Credibility >=0.50 <0.75 73 1.80 
Credibility >=0.75 <0.95 85 2.10 
Credibility >=0.95 111 2.74 
Total 4,053 100.00 
Total sanctioning threats 1,131 27.91 
Overcoming Selection Bias 
 As discussed above, testing the efficacy of sanctions is complicated by selection bias. 
The cases in which sanctions are imposed are likely to be the most difficult cases. I take the 
sanctions credibility formula discussed above and apply it to countries on the tier 2 watch list in 
addition to those ranked tier 3. Tier 2 watch list countries are not sanctionable, but are being 
warned that without action on TIP, they may become sanctionable. By including both a measure 
for those countries on which sanctions were imposed and sanction credibility on the entire 
sample, I can determine if the credible threat of sanctions influences TIP policy diffusions.  
Reputation or Coercion? 
 In the next chapter, I will examine the influence of reputation more closely, but here I 
control for reputational pressure in the models. Kelley (2017) found that targets of US scorecard 
diplomacy were concerned about how their TIP tier ranks compared to their neighbors. So, to 
operationalize the impact of reputation, I include a dichotomous measure for whether a country 
had a neighbor which received a higher score. Thus, the measure includes countries which are 
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not sanctionable (i.e., tier 2) but had neighbors with better scores. If reputation matters, then 
these countries should also be motivated to improve their performance against TIP. 
Other Variables of Interest 
 Regional and neighborly dynamics will be explored in more depth in a later chapter, but 
in these models, I include the regional density of the policy under consideration (or 
criminalization for any change to the TIP legal regime), except in the case of reflection periods 
where I use the variable for the European policy community (which is where reflection periods 
are most common). I also include the variable for neighborly interconnectedness used by 
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018): road counts to neighbors in which the policy is extant. 
Other domestic control variables include accession to the Protocol, implementation of certain 
TIP policies, measures for corruption, women's political empowerment, government 
accountability, significant domestic trafficking, reported violations of the physical integrity rights 
of victims, cooperation with civil society on TIP, and an ordinal variable for the World Bank 
income classification with the default set to upper income countries (except for reflection 
periods where I use GDP per capita). 
THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND THE LAW 
Table 3-3 presents the findings of the Cox proportional hazards model testing the 
influence of the threat of sanctions on time to criminalization and time to any revision in the TIP 
legal regime. The model uses an ordinal representation for the credibility of sanctions and 
controls for the imposition of sanctions, reputational influence (as measured by a neighbor 
having a better score), a specific US recommendation to criminalize or implement a change in 
the law, regional density of criminalization, connectedness to neighbors where criminalization is 
extant, Protocol accession, and domestic characteristics. The model for legal revisions is similar 
to that for criminalization, except that each country can revise their legal code more than once, 
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so observations are not removed from the sample. I have also added a variable for an extant 
intersectoral coordinating body ("institutionalization") as such bodies may be a source for 
recommending changes to the legal regime. 
Table 3-3. Threat of Sanctions and the Law 
 Criminalization Any Legal Revision 
Variables 
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z| 
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 























Sanctioned, current or previous year Collinear (-) 0.545 
0.165 























Institutionalization extant  
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0.279 



























World Bank income classification (base = high income)   













Subjects 165 171 
Observations 1,347 2,829 
Number of failures 146 648 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are 




 The results of these models offer evidence that threat of sanctions does matter for TIP 
criminalization, but, contrary to expectations, low threat credibility motivates policy change. 
Those countries which had a low but non-zero chance of having sanctions imposed were, on 
average, twice as likely to criminalize as those countries which faced no threat of sanctions. 
Other levels of sanctions credibility, however, did not have statistically significant results. The 
results for legal revisions were similar though not as substantial and not statistically significant 
at conventional thresholds. For criminalization, the variable for sanctioned countries was 
negatively collinear with the dependent variable indicating that the no or almost no cases exist 
where sanctioned countries criminalized in response to sanctions. The evidence suggests that 
the threat of sanctions had the most impact for countries which were least likely to be 
sanctioned. 
 Are countries with low sanctions credibility being motivated by threat of sanctions or 
are other factors in play? The control variable for reputational pressure—those countries that 
have a neighbor with a better score—is positive but not statistically significant. I will investigate 
reputational pressure in more depth in the next chapter, but here, controlling for it adds 
evidence that it is the threat of sanctions which is encouraging criminalization, not concern over 
the country's relative low score in comparison with its neighbors. 
THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND INCREASING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
 I turn now to evaluating if sanctions promote institutional capacity against TIP by 
examining their influence on the first instituting of an intersectoral coordinating body 
("institutionalization") and initiating National Action Plans (NAPs). These activities are cross-
sectoral: they can improve law enforcement, support victim protection, and engage in 
prevention activities, such as raising awareness. The models follow the same pattern as those 
used for criminalization and revisions to the TIP legal regime. However, I included extant 
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criminalization in the model for first institutionalization, as countries which have criminalized 
are more likely to create intersectoral coordinating bodies (sometimes these bodies are created 
by law with criminalization). As NAPs are typically set for a specific time period, countries could 
have repeated NAP initiation events. As the results show, NAPs are far more likely to be initiated 
if they are already extant—that is, they are likely to be renewed. To account for this, I included 
both extant NAPs and extant institutionalization in this model and interacted the terms. Results 
are shown in table 3-4. 
 The results offer qualified support of hypothesis 1. Those countries with low but non-
zero threats of sanctions are more likely to create intersectoral coordinating bodies and initiate 
NAPs than those countries which face no threat of sanctions. For countries with higher 
credibility for threat of sanctions, the results are more mixed. The results offer support that 
countries facing very credible threats of sanctions are more likely to initiate NAPs, when 
controlling for those countries which have sanctions imposed. For institutionalization, being 
sanctioned or credibly threatened with sanctions, does not have a statistically significant impact 
on TIP policy diffusion. Reputation, as measured by having a neighbor with a better score, does 
not seem to be a viable alternative explanation in these models. As such, it appears that some 
countries are responding to the threat of sanctions by instituting intersectoral coordinating 
bodies or initiating NAPs. However, the credibility of that threat does not follow expectations. 
While countries facing a highly credible sanctions threat are more likely to initiate NAPs than 
countries under no threat of sanctions, countries facing low threats are also likely to do so, and 
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Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 























Sanctioned, current or previous year 0.476 
0.623 
Collinear (-) 





US recommended policy action 0.897 
0.710 
 












Institutionalization extant  3.376 
***0.000 
National Action Plan extant  25.367 
***0.000 
 Institutionalization X NAP extant  
0.279 
***0.000 



























World Bank income classification (base = high income) 













Subjects 166 172 
Observations 1,002 2,899 
Number of failures 153 396 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors 
are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** 
p<.05, * p<.10. 
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THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND VICTIM PROTECTION POLICY 
The victim protection policies analyzed here—National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs) 
and reflection periods—are less widespread than criminalization, intersectoral coordinating 
bodies, and NAPs. As such, I adjusted the models for reflection periods somewhat to minimize 
collinearity problems. For reflection periods, I combined all categories of sanctions credibility 
above 0.25 into one category. I dropped several other variables from the model as well, 
including those for significant domestic trafficking, human rights abuses, and cooperation with 
CSOs on TIP, and I substituted GDP per capita for the World Bank income classification. To 
control for regional influence, I used the variable for NRM regional density for evaluating time to 
NRMs, but this variable had a time-variant decay function which I incorporated into the model. 
For reflection periods, I used membership in the European policy community and interacted it 
with low sanction credibility. Results are shown in table 3-5. 
 The results for NRMs do not support hypothesis 1. Neither threat of sanctions nor 
imposing sanctions encourage the diffusion of NRMs. While a Schoenfeld residual test of 
proportional-hazards assumptions does not reveal any red flags, a graphical examination of 
time-variant hazard ratios for sanction imposition does show that it is positive and statistically 
significant before decaying to a statistically significant and negative relationship. This is likely 
due to one case—Bolivia in 2018—in which a sanctioned country formalized its victim referral 
protocol in the same year in which it was sanctioned. (In 2019, Bolivia was rewarded with a 
promotion to tier 2 watch list, and in 2020 to tier 2.) Thus, while I do not find statistical evidence 
to support the efficacy of the threat of sanctions in promoting NRMs, it is possible that in the 
singular case of Bolivia in 2018 imposition of sanctions generated urgency for its adoption of a 




Table 3-5. Threat of Sanctions and Victim Protection Policy 
 NRMs Reflection Periods 
Variables 
Hazard ratio 
P > |z| 
Hazard ratio 
P > |z| 
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 




 Middling ( 0.25 – 0.50 ) 0.394 
0.143 
Collinear (-) 
 High ( 0.50 – 0.75 ) 
0.648 
0.524 
 Very high ( 0.75 – 0.95 ) 
0.341 
0.277 
 Highest ( > 0.95 ) 0.584 
0.554 
Sanctioned, current or previous year 0.866 
0.874 
Collinear (-) 





US recommended policy action 1.514 
*0.071 
 




European Regional Policy Community  
7.591 
***0.000 
 X Low sanction credibility  
8.748 
*0.081 




National Action Plan extant 
3.008 
***0.000  













 X Government accountability 0.706 
*0.072 
 
Significant domestic trafficking 1.420 
0.140 
 
Human rights violations of victims 
0.926 
0.921  
Cooperation with civil society on TIP 
1.605 
*0.063  
GDP per capita (in thousands)  1.012 
**0.024 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)   
 Low income 0.526 
0.266 
 
 Lower middle income 
1.229 
0.663  
 Upper middle income 0.994 
0.987 
 
Subjects 171 160 
Observations 2,463 2,777 
Number of failures 87 42 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for 
possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This interaction 
models a decay in the variable's influence over time. 
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 The results for reflection periods offer conditional and qualified support of hypothesis 1. 
Generally, the credible threat of sanctions is not associated with decreasing time to policy 
initiation. No case exists of a country with a sanction credibility over 0.25 having implemented a 
reflection period in the time frame of this study, but six cases exist in which countries with a 
non-zero but small threat of sanctions did implement reflection periods. Five of these six cases 
are in the European policy community. An interaction between a low threat of sanctions and 
membership in the European regional policy community shows a magnifying effect, but this 
interaction is outside standard levels of significance at p=0.081. However, an examination of the 
time-variant hazard ratio for this interaction, shown in figure 3-1, reveals that the interaction is 
statistically significant until year 7 after treatment. The finding suggests that the US threat of 
sanctions reinforces the work of the European regional policy community. In Europe, GRETA has 
pushed the signatories of the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings to 
implement reflection periods, as is evident in the results which show that members of the 
European regional policy community are more likely to implement reflection periods. 
Figure 3-1. Sanction Threats: Time Variant Hazard Ratio for Reflection Periods 
 
 Note that while the influence of the European regional policy community is consistently 
supportive of the diffusion of reflection periods, threat of US sanctions is not. Outside of Europe, 
the threat of sanctions does nothing to promote reflection periods; it is only in Europe that it 
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credibility is relatively low that countries respond with policy adjustment. As with the other 
policies, the measure for reputational pressure is not statistically significant, suggesting that it is 
the sanction threat rather than a more general concern over reputation that is motivating policy 
change. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 I tested the robustness of these results by applying five tests: (1) adjusting the standard 
errors by ten political-cultural regions rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) dropping the 
US policy recommendation variable from the four models that included it, (3) substituting all 
regional policy communities in the model for regional density of the policy under investigation, 
(4) substituting control variables for women's participation in civil society and freedom of 
expression for women's political power and government accountability, respectively, and (5) 
adding control variables for major war and total population (natural log) to the models. Tables 
showing the results for these robustness checks can be found in Appendix C. 
 The results for the sanction credibility variables of interest are robust to all these tests. 
Dropping the US policy recommendation did not have a substantial influence on the results, 
suggesting that it is measuring something other than threat of sanctions. Regional policy 
communities will be explored in more detail in chapter 5, but here I find that including all of 
them does not change the results for sanction credibility. The variables for the presence of a 
major war and total population are not statistically significant, except for the NAPs where total 
population is found to have a negative influence and for reflection periods where major war is 
negatively collinear with the dependent variable. 
DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy 
diffusion. I developed a measure for sanctions credibility by examining which countries ranked 
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at tier 3 were sanctioned and then applied the formula to countries on the tier 2 watch list as 
well. By including this measure of sanction credibility along with a measure for sanctions 
imposition and for reputation, I evaluated whether the threat of sanctions encourages policy 
diffusion. The findings offer qualified support for this hypothesis. A summary of the findings is 
shown in table 3-6. 
Table 3-6. Hypothesis 1 Results 
Policy Findings 
Criminalization Supported for countries with low threat credibility.  
Any legal revision Not supported. 
Institutionalization Supported for countries with low threat credibility. 
National Action Plan Supported for countries with low and high threat 
credibility. 
National Referral Mechanism Not supported. 
Reflection period Conditionally supported for members of the European 
regional policy community with low threat credibility. 
 Support for hypothesis 1 is qualified because, while the threat of sanctions does 
promote policy diffusion, the credibility of that threat does not follow expectations. Qualified 
support for hypothesis 1 was strongest for criminalization, institutionalization, and initiation of 
NAPs. In each of these cases, countries which faced a threat of sanctions that was small, but 
non-zero, were more likely to implement these policies than countries which did not face any 
threat of sanctions, when controlling for both the imposition of sanctions and the influence of 
reputational concerns. For initiation of NAPs, statistical evidence shows that countries which 
faced more credible threats were also more likely implement the policy than countries not 
under threat of sanctions. 
 The finding that low threat credibility is associated with policy adjustment presents a 
puzzle because it runs contrary to other findings and theoretical predictions in the sanctioning 
literature. Peterson (2013) found that sanctioning targets were more likely to yield when the US 
threats were more credible. He concluded that "even in cases where the target prefers backing 
down to enduring sanctions, all else equal, it will only acquiesce if it believes the sender's threat 
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is credible" (674). In the case of TIP, however, I find that, in general, the less credible threats of 
sanctions are more effective in promoting desired policy change.  
 Why? Since the sanctioning decision is made, in part, based on actual TIP performance, 
more credible threats also mean higher costs to the target. Similarly, countries already 
embroiled in conflict with the US, as measured by existing sanctions, are more likely to also be 
sanctioned for TIP. The sanctioning literature notes that sanctioning threats are less likely to be 
effective under conditions of rivalry, again, because they represent high costs for the target. In 
the context of these high costs, we do find that countries respond to more credible threats of 
sanctions by developing National Action Plans, a relatively low-cost policy option. High threat 
credibility thus measures difficult cases where the cost of compliance is high, even when 
controlling for imposition of sanctions. 
 The puzzle is why states respond to low threat credibility with policy adjustment. In 
these cases, it seems likely that they do not believe the US wants to sanction them, and, indeed, 
they have examples of the US waiving sanctions which reinforces the low credibility of the 
sanctions threat. According to Peterson (2013), the target ought not to acquiesce since policy 
adjustment has some cost and the US is not likely to impose sanctions. Moreover, I have 
controlled for the influence of reputational concerns about scoring, generalized US 
recommendations, and other domestic characteristics which influence domestic motivations for 
implementing TIP policy.  
 Several possibilities deserver further investigation. One possibility is that target risk 
tolerance is influenced either by inaccurate risk assessments or a desire to reduce even a small 
risk to zero, especially if the costs are low. Meanwhile, targets under a more credible threat may 
not believe that any action will avoid sanctions. Another possibility is that in the domain of TIP 
policy, countries wish to avoid the costs associated with the threat of sanctions, either to their 
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reputation with the US specifically or in the international community more broadly. This concern 
for reputation would be something that measures for underperforming scorecards does not 
capture. Finally, the threat of sanctions may aid certain actors within a country to achieve their 
goals for TIP policy promotion by providing them a justification for speedy policy action. 
 Support for hypothesis 1 is also uneven. I do not have evidence that the threat of 
sanctions promotes revisions to the TIP legal regime beyond criminalization nor the adoption of 
a National Referral Mechanism. For reflection periods, the influence of the threat of sanctions is 
conditional on the targets being members of the European regional policy community. Outside 
of Europe, threat of sanctions has no influence on diffusion of reflection periods. The likely 
explanation for the variation in the influence of the sanction threat by policy type is that US 
diplomacy does not seriously threaten sanctions for failure to have these victim protection 
policies. For the purposes of US diplomacy, it is possible for countries to be making significant 
progress toward meeting minimum standards without revisions to their legal codes, NRMs or 
reflection periods (outside of Europe). These policies are not "minimum standards," and it 
seems likely that the US is not using the threat of sanctions to promote them. Another factor 
influencing differentiation by policy type could be the cost of the policy. I found that countries 
with credible threat of sanctions did respond by implementing NAPs, quite likely because these 
are a rather low-cost and rapid policy option. In the case of TIP, countries under threat of 
sanctions have a range of policy options from which they may choose to satisfy US preferences, 
and it seems that for countries facing the most credible threats, a low-cost option is selected. 
 I did not have an expectation that the US threat of sanctions would explain regional 
differentiation in TIP policy diffusion. However, the results for reflection periods suggest that 
the threat of US sanctions interacts with existing European efforts to promote policy diffusion. 
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One possibility for the conditionality of this finding is that it reflects some regional 
differentiation in US expectations for reflection periods. 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter advances the literature in several important ways. I have directly tested 
whether the threat of sanctions promotes TIP policy diffusion, and I have found support that it 
does. In so doing, I find support for the idea that the threat of sanctions can be used to promote 
norm-based policies, as Cleveland (2001) argued. Second, because I controlled for reputational 
concerns, the test has also revealed that the influence of reputation may not be as powerful as 
Kelley (2017) believed. At least part of the influence of scorecard diplomacy may come from the 
threat of sanctions, though reputation will receive more attention in the next chapter. Third, I 
have found that the threat of sanctions does not necessarily act most effectively on those 
countries facing the most credible threat, but rather on those facing low, but uncertain threats, 
a finding that is something of a puzzle for the literature on sanctions.  
 These results have practical implications. First, despite many criticisms of the US 
sanctioning regime, it does seem that threats of sanctions have been useful in encouraging 
some TIP policies. Second, the effect is uneven, so that the threat of sanctions tends to favor 
policies which improve legal and institutional capacity—criminalization, institutionalization, and 
NAPs—rather than victim protection policies like NRMs and reflection periods. Third, diplomats 
may wish to consider the value of uncertainty in its use of sanctions. In 2018, the Trump 
administration began to aggressively use sanctions to encourage implementation of TIP policies. 
The evidence here does not suggest that higher credibility for the threat of sanctions is what is 
motivating policy change; indeed, it is not clear that this tactic will promote policy diffusion, as 
near-certainty of sanctions may ultimately discourage action.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: REPUTATION AND SCORECARD DIPLOMACY 
OVERVIEW 
 In this chapter I set out to test the hypotheses related to reputation theory and US 
scorecard diplomacy. Hypothesis 2 is the stronger test as it holds that reputational pressure 
from neighbors having a better score in the US TIP reports will promote policy diffusion for 
those policies which are most likely to improve scores. Kelley (2017) found that concerns over 
neighbors' scores characterized conversations between US diplomats and their counterparts in 
discussions about TIP (128-130). Hypothesis 3 holds that non-coercive aspects of US scorecard 
diplomacy promote policy diffusion for policies which are most likely to improve scores. Here, 
these non-coercive aspects are (1) being scored in the TIP report and (2) specific US 
recommendations for policy action. This is not as strong a test as hypothesis 2 because these 
non-coercive aspects may also represent mechanisms associated with constructivism by 
generating a taken-for-granted quality of certain policy recommendations. However, if countries 
respond to the US TIP reports by focusing on those policy actions which improve scores, I can 
reasonably attribute diffusion to concern over reputation.  
 Testing these hypotheses is a two-step process. First, I need to see which policies 
improve scores. Then, I can test if the reputational pressure inherent in scorecard diplomacy is 
motivating action on TIP. Thus, in this chapter I first show the results of a model for what shapes 
the scores in the US TIP reports, and then I turn to testing the hypotheses on US scorecard 
diplomacy and reputation. 
GENERATING US TIP REPORT SCORES 
The Model 
 A discussion of the issues surrounding the modeling of TIP scores is found in chapter 2. 
As described there, I use a generalized ordered logistic model that relaxes the proportional 
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hazards assumptions for those variables which violate it. For some variables, it was not 
necessary to relax the assumption, permitting a more parsimonious model. The model uses a 
clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors for possible intra-group correlation 
by year. Observations are country-year. 
Results and Discussion 
 The results for determining US TIP report scores are shown in table 4-1. The pseudo r2 
statistic for this model is 0.35, indicating that considerable variance in the scores is yet 
unexplained. As noted in chapter 2, a more determinative model is unlikely given the opacity of 
the scoring mechanism and the likelihood that it changed over time. Nonetheless, the model 
does clearly indicate specific policies which are likely to improve TIP scores. While implementing 
these policies will not altogether reduce uncertainty over the scoring, it seems reasonable that 
diplomats wishing to improve their scores would recognize the implementation of such policies 
as potentially useful. In interpreting the results, the higher value of the independent variable 
produces the indicated odds ratio for increasing the value of the dependent variable which is a 
worse score. Thus, those odds ratios less than 1 indicate variables which improve TIP scores, 




Table 4-1. Generating US TIP Scores 
 Tier 3 v.  
tier 2 watch list, tier 2, tier 1 
Tier 3, tier 2 watch list v.  
tier 2, tier 1 
Tier 3, tier 2 watch list, tier 2 
v. tier 1 
 Odds ratio P>|z| Odds ratio P>|z| Odds ratio P>|z| 
Criminalization extant 1.233 0.176 0.872 0.359 0.578 ***0.001 
Legal revision, previous year 0.947 0.605 0.947 0.605 0.947 0.605 
Institutionalization extant 1.574 ***0.000 1.574 ***0.000 1.574 ***0.000 
NAP extant 0.481 ***0.000 0.994 0.954 1.038 0.830 
NRM extant 0.582 ***0.000 0.582 ***0.000 0.582 ***0.000 
Reflection period extant 0.237 0.225 0.390 ***0.000 0.787 0.182 
National rapporteur extant 6.04x10-7 ***0.000 0.120 **0.010 0.151 ***0.000 
Trafficking prosecution, 
current year 0.420 ***0.000 0.722 **0.033 0.541 **0.018 
Trafficking conviction, current 
year 0.503 ***0.000 0.503 ***0.000 0.503 ***0.000 
Source country 1.283 ***0.000 1.283 ***0.000 1.283 ***0.008 
Inter-regional migration org:       
 Immigrant-receiving member 0.879 0.388 0.879 0.388 0.879 0.388 
 Emigrant-sending member 0.503 ***0.002 0.551 ***0.000 1.092 0.552 
Government sponsored child 
soldiers 
2.980 ***0.000 4.551 ***0.000 677,080.1 ***0.000 
Child sex tourism reported 0.861 0.313 1.290 **0.018 1.839 ***0.003 
Sex trade policy problematic 1.007 0.971 1.007 0.968 1.846 ***0.004 
Migration policy problematic 1.238 *0.055 1.238 *0.055 1.238 *0.055 
Government complicity in TIP 2.331 ***0.000 2.331 ***0.000 2.331 ***0.000 
Cooperation with CSOs on TIP 0.517 ***0.000 0.517 ***0.000 0.517 ***0.000 
Hostility to CSOs on TIP 1.897 ***0.000 1.897 ***0.000 1.897 ***0.000 
Visit from UN HCR TIP 
rapporteur 3.24x10
-7 ***0.000 0.720 0.639 1.280 0.600 
De-institutionalization event 1.521 **0.019 1.521 **0.019 1.521 **0.019 
UN ideal point distance, 
centered 
1.204 0.385 1.055 0.637 1.750 ***0.000 
US military aid recipient 0.361 ***0.000 0.632 ***0.002 2.582 ***0.000 
Government accountability 0.385 ***0.000 0.458 ***0.000 0.265 ***0.000 
Trump administration 1.322 ***0.000 1.322 ***0.000 1.322 ***0.000 
World Bank income class       
 Low income 0.949 0.874 1.011 0.970 3.800 ***0.000 
 Lower middle income 1.258 0.270 1.258 0.270 1.258 0.270 
 Upper middle income 1.778 ***0.000 1.778 ***0.000 1.778 ***0.000 
Constant 0.413 ***0.002 1.458 0.316 28.928 ***0.000 
Number of observations 2,423      
Pseudo r2 0.3519      
Generalized ordered logistic model. Odds ratios greater than 1 signify a greater likelihood for lower scores, while odds ratios less 
than 1 signify a greater likelihood for better scores. Standard errors are adjusted for possible intragroup correlation by year. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
 What policies matter? Superficially, criminalization is only statistically significant in 
increasing the likelihood of being scored at tier 1 over the other categories, but it does not 
differentiate among the other groupings. However, trafficking prosecutions and convictions are 
consistently helpful in improving scores across the continuum. As criminalization makes criminal 
prosecutions more likely, it is safe to say that a country which has criminalized—and uses its 
criminal laws to prosecute and convict traffickers—is likely to improve its scores. The same 
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cannot be said for any legal revision in the previous year. Revising the TIP legal code in the 
previous year does not seem to have any bearing on TIP scores. 
 I find little evidence that the policies which increase TIP capacity—institutionalization 
and active National Action Plans—improve TIP scores. Indeed, having an extant intersectoral 
coordinating body is associated with lower scores. It is not clear why this would be the case, 
especially given the evidence from chapter 3 that the threat of sanctions promotes these 
policies. Perhaps, these bodies increase data transparency and reveal more damning portraits of 
trafficking and government inaction. Or perhaps institutional capacity has been overlooked or 
under-emphasized in US diplomacy. Table 2-7 suggests as much: US TIP report 
recommendations regarding institutionalization are far rarer than those for criminalization, legal 
revisions, or NRMs. I do find evidence that countries with extant NAPs are far less likely to be 
scored at tier 3, though NAPs do not seem to be related to improving scores at other tier ranks.  
 I find evidence that victim protection policies improve TIP scores. This evidence is 
especially strong for NRMs which are consistently associated with improving scores at all tiers. 
Reflection periods are only statistically significant in reducing the likelihood that countries are 
scored as tier 2 watch list or tier 3.  
Given these findings, I can refine hypotheses 2 and 3. Initiating NAPs or reflection 
periods has the most impact for countries which receive low scores—these countries are 
threatened with sanctions, thus countries which implement these policies may be responding to 
the desire to avoid sanctions rather than improve their scores and, thereby, their reputations. 
Indeed, I found in chapter 3 that the threat of sanctions did motivate NAP initiation. Thus, it is 
with NRMs that the power of reputation ought to be most strongly seen. NRMs consistently 
improve scores. If a country wants to improve its tier rank and its reputation, it should 
implement a functional NRM. Moreover, constructivists have argued that states favor law 
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enforcement policies, so a finding that countries initiate NRMs in response to scorecard 
diplomacy would offer strong support for the influence of reputation. 
 What else matters for determining TIP scores? The following policy and trafficking 
characteristics increase the likelihood of worse scores: being a source country, government 
sponsorship of child soldiers, government complicity in TIP, government hostility to civil society 
working in TIP, problematic migration policy (though significant only at p=0.055), and the 
collapse of intersectoral coordinating bodies. Child sex tourism and problematic sex trade policy 
tend to depress scores, but not consistently at all tier levels. Countries which want to improve 
scores can also cooperate with civil society on TIP or join inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration policy, but only if they are emigrant-sending nations. Countries which 
receive US military aid are less likely to be ranked at tier 3 or tier 2 watch list, but also less likely 
to be ranked at tier 1. Democracies are more likely to have higher scores. The Trump 
administration was harsher in its scoring than either the Bush or Obama administrations. Among 
the development levels, it is upper middle-income countries which are consistently more likely 
to have worse TIP rankings than high-income countries, while poor countries are less likely to be 
found at tier 1. Lower-middle income countries are not statistically distinguishable from high-
income countries. The greater the distance in UN voting ideal points, the more likely a country 
would not be ranked tier 1, but otherwise, this does not seem to have influenced their tier rank. 
 Overall, we have a picture of a ranking system which has much to commend it yet may 
be vulnerable to political considerations as well as criticism over its opacity. Country policies do 
seem to matter—countries that protect victims and work with civil society are ranked higher. 
Countries that sponsor child soldiers or have problematic migration policy are ranked lower. But 
there are glaring blind spots—the demerit for institutionalization mentioned above is obvious, 
but the role international cooperation is also understated. The fact that countries which receive 
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military aid are less likely to be under threat of sanctions, but also less likely to be ranked at tier 
1 also suggests the possibility of political concerns which gives some military partners a pass.  
SCORECARD DIPLOMACY AND TIP POLICY DIFFUSION 
 The effectiveness of scorecard diplomacy may be explained by various theories of policy 
diffusion. For constructivism or learning, scorecard diplomacy may promote certain ideas about 
trafficking that prompt policy diffusion. Alternatively, coercive pressure from sanctions or 
reputational pressure may be encouraging policy diffusion. Can we discern among these 
competing mechanisms? 
 As discussed in chapter 3, the threat of sanctions is dependent upon a country being 
scored at tier 2 watch list or tier 3. As I explored various models, I found that variables for 
sanctions credibility and low TIP scores (tier 2 watch list or tier 3) were substitutable, showing 
essentially the same effect. It seems best to assume that low TIP scores represent the coercive 
threat of sanctions. 
 Following the qualitative findings of Kelley (2017), I use whether a neighbor receives a 
better score to operationalize reputational pressure. While it is the case that countries which 
receive low scores are more likely to have neighbors with better scores, if it is primarily the 
embarrassment of receiving a low score that motivates action in TIP, then countries which 
receive tier 2 scores will also be motivated to improve policy if their neighbors are perceived to 
be doing better. It is possible that other mechanisms are also at play—perhaps a better-
performing neighbor is pressuring the country to improve its TIP performance, but that can be 
controlled for by the measures for regional policy cooperation and for the number of road 
connections to neighbors where the policy in question is extant.  
 Two other variables are also relevant—whether a country is scored in the report and 
whether the US has made a specific recommendation for policy action. These variables could 
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represent any of the constructivist, learning, or reputational theories, but they are not likely to 
measure coercion. As the TIP reports engage elite networks, the information and 
recommendations in the reports may influence changing norms and ideas about appropriate 
policy solutions—patterns I expect from the constructivist and learning theories. Being scored in 
the report or drawing attention to a specific policy recommendation also puts a country on 
notice that its action on TIP is being observed, which may motivate action, either to guard the 
reputations of elites or of the country as a whole. The US recommendations for policy action are 
not necessarily independent but frequently depend on domestic or regional actors. For example, 
the US often echoed the GRETA reports regarding NRMs or encouraged certain legal changes 
that anti-trafficking civil society organizations desired. Here again is the confluence of pressure 
from various actors: the domestic networks channeling transnational policy solutions along with 
the attention drawn to these solutions by the United States. The constructivist, learning, and 
reputation theories are not mutually exclusive. As such, it is best to see these variables as 
measuring pressures that cannot be neatly categorized under a single theory of policy diffusion 
but are not likely to represent coercion. However, if countries are responding to these 
mechanisms by implementing policies which are most likely to improve scores, we have grounds 
to favor reputation as offering the most explanatory power.  
 For control variables, I use the regional density of the policy to account for the influence 
of regional policy communities and the extent that the policy was taken for granted, except for 
reflection periods, where I use membership in the European regional regime complex (and 
interact it with poor TIP scores). I also include road counts to neighbors with the policy extant 
and the standard set of control variables described in chapter 2. Each specific policy includes 
several other relevant variables, such as Protocol accession or the existence of other TIP policies 
(such as criminalization or institutionalization). Because relatively few countries have adopted 
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reflection periods, some control variables are collinear with the dependent variable (i.e., 
inclusion entirely predicts a negative outcome), so these variables are excluded from the 
models. All models have standard errors adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically 
defined regions. 
 In addition to the base model, I include two models which interact the measure for 
reputational pressure with government accountability and CSO cooperation, respectively. The 
interaction with government accountability tests for the possibility that democratic 
governments, which turnover more frequently than autocratic governments, are more sensitive 
to reputational pressure, as Başer (2020) argued. The interaction with CSO cooperation tests for 
the generalizability of Perry's (2016) finding in his qualitative study that for US pressure to be 
successful it needed to be combined with pressure from civil society.  
Criminalization 
 Table 4-2 shows the results for testing scorecard diplomacy for time to criminalization. 
Like Kelley (2017), I find that having a low score in the reports promotes criminalization, as does 
an explicit recommendation to criminalize. However, I find no statistical support that a neighbor 
with a better score or simply being scored in the report encourages diffusion. For 
criminalization, US scorecard diplomacy is most effective when sanctions are threatened or 
when the US specifically recommends criminalization. Criminalization (with prosecutions) does 
improve TIP scores; thus the importance of the US recommendation does show support for 
hypothesis 3. Interacting reputational pressure with either government accountability or CSO 
cooperation is not statistically significant. These findings are robust to the variant models which 
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World Bank income classification (base = high income) 




















Subjects 165 165 165 
Observations 1,349 1,349 1,349 
Number of failures 146 146 146 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible 
correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Other relevant variables are the regional density of criminalization, protocol accession, 
and women's political empowerment. These results are generally consistent with the findings of 
Kelley (2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018).  
Cox proportional hazard models assume that ratio of the hazards for any two cases is 
constant over time, however this assumption can sometimes be violated. Tests for the violations 
of the assumptions do indicate that being scored in the report, a neighbor with a better score, 
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and receiving a low score may violate the assumptions. Graphical representations of the time-
variant hazard ratios for these key variables of interest in the base model are shown in figure 4-
1. A closer look at these time varying hazard ratios suggests that being scored in the report has a 
magnifying effect: the longer a country is scored in the TIP report, the more likely it is to 
criminalize. This effect is statistically significant after 9 years. The other two variables show a 
decaying effect. A neighbor receiving a better score seems to vacillate between having a positive 
influence and having a negative influence, though it is only statistically significant in later years. 
Receiving a low score is statistically significant and a positive influence on time to criminalization 
in years nine to thirteen after treatment. 
Figure 4-1. Scorecard Diplomacy and Criminalization: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios 
 
 Overall, I do find support for hypothesis 3. The non-coercive aspects of US scorecard 
diplomacy—explicit recommendations and being scored in the report—do promote 
criminalization. I do not find support for hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure, as measured by a 
neighbor having a better score, does not seem to influence time to criminalization. 
Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime 
 One of the limitations in the literature has been the focus on criminalization. I turn now 
to see how scorecard diplomacy has influenced the diffusion of other TIP policies, beginning 
with any revision to the TIP legal regime. Results are shown in table 4-3. As noted in the 
discussion earlier in the chapter, TIP scores do not seem substantially influenced by these 
revisions, so I do not expect scorecard diplomacy to have influence.  
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 Contrary to these expectations, the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy do 
have influence in promoting changes in the law. An explicit recommendation for a revision to 
the TIP legal regime is consistently statistically significant. While the tests of the proportional 
odds assumptions for the other key variables of interest are not especially problematic, a closer 
look at their time-varying hazard ratios, shown in figure 4-2, does reveal some interesting 
findings. Like criminalization, being scored in the report seems to have a magnifying effect, and 
one that is statistically significant after ten years. Though its influence vacillates, the 
reputational embarrassment of a neighbor with a better score is also positive and statistically 
significant in years 6 to 11 after treatment. Receiving a low score in the TIP report—and thus 
being under threat for sanctions—has both a positive influence in the middling years and a 
negative influence in later years, suggesting that some countries do respond to the threat of 
sanctions by revising their laws, but difficult cases do not.  
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 X Neighbor had a better score   0.427 
***0.002 
World Bank income classification (base = high income) 




















Subjects 171 171 171 
Observations 2,828 2,828 2,828 
Number of failures 648 648 648 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible 
correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
 Model 4-3-3 shows the results when the variable for a neighbor having a better score is 
interacted with CSO cooperation. The effect of interacting the two variables is illustrated in 
figure 4-3. Countries with neither reputational pressure nor CSO cooperation are much less likely 
to revise their TIP legal regime. While this does not duplicate Perry's (2016) finding that the 
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efficacy of US pressure depended upon domestic CSO pressure, it does suggest that having 
either foreign or domestic pressure does help promote legal change. 
Figure 4-3. Reputation and CSO Interactions for Legal Revisions 
 
Overall, I do find support that non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy 
encourage revisions to the legal regime, even though I did not expect it as revising laws does not 
improve scores. The support is especially strong for US recommendations but being scored in 
the report and reputational pressure from having a neighbor with a better score also have 
positive and statistically significant hazard ratios for some periods of time after treatment. 
Moreover, the model which interacts reputational pressure with CSO cooperation also offers 
evidence for the positive influence of having a neighbor with a better score on time to legal 
revision. 
Institutionalization 
 As noted in the discussion of the TIP scores above, I do not expect US scorecard 
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Countries which had these institutions tended to receive lower scores, and, while the US did 
from time to time encourage countries to create these institutions, this recommendation was 
not as common as were recommendations for criminalization, legal revisions, or NRMs. It seems 
that US scorecard diplomacy has not been emphasized the creation of these coordinating 
bodies. Contrary to these expectations, however, I do find some evidence that non-coercive 
aspects of US scorecard diplomacy have motivated institutionalization. Results are shown in 
table 4-4.  
 Being scored in the TIP report is positively associated with first institutionalization, as is 
the coercive threat of sanctions as measured by receiving a low TIP score. Neither US 
recommendations nor having neighbors with a better TIP score have any statistically significant 
effect in the base model 4-4-1. Tests of the proportional hazard assumptions for the key 
variables of interest do indicate caution for being scored in the report and for a neighbor 
receiving a better score. Time-varying hazard ratios for these variables are shown in figure 4-4. 
Being scored in the report shows some vacillation in influence, with a statistically significant 
positive effect from years ten to thirteen following treatment. The time-varying hazard ratio for 
a neighbor receiving a better score does not appear especially problematic graphically and is 
never statistically significant. Being scored at tier 2 watch list or tier 3 is generally positive and 
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1.557 
**0.046  



















 X Neighbor had a better score   2.245 
**0.025 
World Bank income classification (base = high income) 




















Subjects 166 166 166 
Observations 1,002 1,002 1,002 
Number of failures 154 154 154 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible 
correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This interaction models a decay in the 
variable's influence over time. 




Interacting the variable for neighbor with better score with both government 
accountability and CSO cooperation on TIP has a statistically significant effect, graphically 
demonstrated in figure 4-5. Perry (2016) argued that US pressure depended upon the pressure 
from domestic civil society organizations. I do not see evidence for this confluence of pressure 
for first institutionalization. For government accountability, reputational pressure had little 
impact on countries in the 75th percentile (e.g., Czechia in 2018), but countries in the 25th 
percentile were more likely to institutionalize if they did not have reputational pressure. This 
finding runs counter to expectations. 
Figure 4-5. Influence of Interactions for Institutionalization 
   
Figure 4-5 also shows that a country which has neither reputational pressure nor CSO 
cooperation has the highest likelihood of first institutionalization of an intersectoral 
coordinating body. Despite the counter-intuitive nature of this finding, it is not especially 
surprising because creating an intersectoral coordinating body was often the first TIP policy 
action for many countries, especially those countries with the highest commitment to 
combatting TIP. It seems that in some cases, the chain of causality moves from 
institutionalization to cooperation with CSOs.  
Nonetheless, the non-coercive influence of scorecard diplomacy most clearly derives 
from the transparency of being scored. Since having an intersectoral coordinating body does not 
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improve TIP scores, the finding offers some support for the constructivist and learning 
mechanisms as having explanatory power. The widespread implementation of intersectoral 
coordinating bodies became the thing to do—once countries were on notice that their anti-
trafficking efforts were being observed, they took action to form such bodies. It may be that 
these bodies are also a relatively low-cost policy option. Low-income countries were more than 
twice as likely to form one than upper income countries.  
Other variables that promote institutionalization include density of regional 
institutionalization, criminalization, and government accountability (i.e., democracy).  
Overall, I find support for the influence of non-coercive scorecard diplomacy through 
being scored in the TIP reports and the coercive pressure of receiving a low score. I do not find 
support that a neighbor receiving a better score or making an explicit recommendation 
promoted institutionalization. 
National Action Plans 
 The models for TIP scoring suggested that NAPs will be initiated to avoid sanctions but 
not to improve scores more generally. The results support this picture. As I found in chapter 2, 
low TIP scores do encourage NAP initiation, but neither being scored in the report nor 
reputational pressure from having a better score is statistically significant in its influence on NAP 
initiation. (I did not collect data on US recommendations regarding NAPs.) Interactions between 
reputation and government accountability or CSO cooperation are not statistically significant. 
Results are shown in table 4-5.  
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 X Neighbor had a better score  1.032 
0.680 
 



















 X Neighbor had a better score   1.098 
0.695 
World Bank income classification (base = high income) 




















Subjects 172 172 172 
Observations 2,898 2,898 2,898 
Number of failures 396 396 396 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible 
correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Tests of the proportional odds assumption for the key variables of interest warrant 
caution only for low TIP scores, though a graphical representation of time-varying hazard ratios, 
shown in figure 4-6, do reveal that being scored in the report seems to follow a magnifying 




Figure 4-6. Scorecard Diplomacy and National Action Plans: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios 
 What matters most for NAP initiation is having an extant NAP. Countries with NAPs tend 
to renew them. Having an intersectoral coordinating body encourages the first NAP initiation. In 
the models, I interacted extant NAP with extant intersectoral coordinating committee because 
the influence of both is not multiplicative: having an extant intersectoral coordinating body 
helps launch the first NAP, after which the NAP is likely to be renewed.  
The only aspect of scorecard diplomacy which seems to promote initiation of NAPs is 
the coercive pressure of receiving a low score in the report. I did not expect, nor do I have 
evidence that the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy promote NAPs. 
National Referral Mechanisms 
 As discussed above, having a NRM will improve a country's US TIP tier ranking. If 
countries are motivated to improve their scores in US TIP reports, then I should expect to see 
them formalize NRMs. This hypothesis stands in contrast to the claims made by constructivists 
that law enforcement policies ought to diffuse more rapidly than victim protection policies. 
Results are shown in table 4-6.  
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 X Neighbor had a better score   6.980 
***0.003 
World Bank income classification (base = high income) 




















Subjects 171 171 171 
Observations 2,461 2,461 2,461 
Number of failures 87 87 87 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible 
correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This interaction models a decay in the 
variable's influence over time. ‡ The interaction between the square of government accountability and a neighbor 
having a better score is not statistically significant and not shown. 
 Regarding the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy, US recommendations for 
NRMs do promote their establishment, supporting hypothesis 3. The influence of reputational 
pressure is more ambiguous and conditional. As found in chapter 3, the coercive threat of 
sanctions does not influence NRMs.  
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Tests for violations of the proportional odds assumptions did not reveal any problems 
for the key variables of interest, though it did reveal a sharp decay function for the influence of 
the regional density of extant NRMs. (As noted in table 4-6, I included a decay function in the 
model for this control variable so as to improve the overall model specification.) Figure 4-7 
shows the time-varying hazard ratios for a neighbor with a better score and receiving a low 
score. These graphs reinforce the results shown in table 4-6. However, receiving a low score is 
statistically significant and positive at treatment, after which it rapidly decays into a statistically 
significant and negative influence on formalization of NRMs. Thus, if threat of sanctions is going 
to work, it does so very quickly. As noted in chapter 3, I can point to the case of Bolivia which 
formalized its NRM in the same year that it was scored at tier 3 and sanctioned as a potential 
outlying example where coercion promoted formalization of an NRM. 
Figure 4-7. Scorecard Diplomacy and NRMs: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios 
 
Results from the base model 4-6-1 show that having a neighbor with a better score is 
not statistically significant, thus I do not find support for hypothesis 2 where I most expected to 
find it. The interactions between the variable for a neighbor with a better score and both 
government accountability and CSO cooperation are also statistically significant, but as can be 
seen in the graphical representation of the interaction (figure 4-8), these results are ambiguous. 
In the interaction with government accountability, reputational pressure increases the hazard 
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for both countries with lower and higher accountability. Interestingly, countries with lower 
government accountability are more likely to institute NRMs than countries with higher 
accountability, while controlling for all other factors. But, in both cases, reputational pressure 
encourages establishment of NRMs. 
Figure 4-8. Influence of Interactions for NRMs 
 
The interaction between reputational pressure and CSO cooperation is particularly 
ambiguous. Cases with neither reputational pressure nor CSO cooperation formalize NRMs with 
approximately the same hazard function as countries with both. Countries with both 
reputational pressure and CSO cooperation do formalize NRMs more rapidly than countries with 
only one of these factors. Unlike with intersectoral coordinating bodies where we might expect 
to see institutionalization promoting CSO cooperation, NRMs were not a policy response 
adopted early nor does it seem to be a low-cost option for countries. Thus, I have some 
evidence that the conjunction of reputational and domestic CSO pressure may promote NRMs, 
as Perry (2016) argued, but I have no explanation for the equivalence in hazard ratios for 
countries that have both reputational pressure with those that have neither. 
If countries are seeking to improve their relative standing in response to the 
reputational pressure generated by the TIP scores, then they should be especially eager to 
implement NRMs. A specific US recommendation for an NRM does promote their formalization, 
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supporting hypothesis 3. The role of reputational pressure for promoting NRMs is ambiguous. 
Given that having an NRM substantially improves TIP scores, countries feeling reputational 
pressure ought to implement them. The strongest evidence in favor of this reputational 
pressure comes from model 4-6-2 where the interaction between reputational pressure and 
government accountability shows that reputational pressure promotes NRMs for countries with 
low and high levels of government accountability. The interaction with CSO cooperation is more 
ambiguous since countries with neither reputational pressure nor CSO cooperation establish 
NRMs with the same hazard ratio as countries with both. Thus, results for hypothesis 2 are 
ambiguous. What support exists in its favor is not robust. 
Other variables that promote NRMs include regional density of NRMs, having an extant 
NAP, and government accountability (though this effect is not linear). GRETA in Europe has 
emphasized NRMs and many of the first movers are located in Europe, so the importance of 
regional influence comes as no surprise.  
Overall, hypothesis 3 is supported; the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy do 
promote NRMs, as evidence by the positive contribution of explicit recommendations. The 
results for hypothesis 2 are less clear, as the findings for reputational pressure are ambiguous 
and depend on which model is used. 
Reflection Periods 
 The analysis of TIP scores generated suggested that scorecard diplomacy should 
motivate countries which receive low scores to implement reflection periods for victims to avoid 
sanctions. However, I do not expect countries to implement reflection periods to improve their 
scores beyond what is needed to avoid sanctions. The results offer some qualified support for 
the expectations and are shown in table 4-7. Paralleling the results of the models in chapter 3, 
countries which receive low scores are less likely to implement reflection periods, except for 
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countries in the European regime complex which are more likely to do so. Thus, it seems that US 
scorecard diplomacy may be reinforcing the work of the European policy community to promote 
the diffusion of reflection periods among its members, but this support comes from its coercive 
dimension. Having a neighbor with a better score has no statistically significant influence on the 
diffusion of reflection periods in the base model, though it encourages establishment of 
reflection periods when interacting the variable with CSO cooperation. 
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Subjects 157 157 157 
Observations 2,321 2,321 2,321 
Number of failures 41 41 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible 
correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.  
 While statistical tests for the proportional hazards assumptions do not reveal any 
concerns for the key variables of interest, graphs of the time-varying hazard ratios, shown in 
figure 4-9, do reveal some vacillating influence, especially for the interaction between the 
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European regional policy community and low TIP scores. Threat of sanctions is especially likely 
to promote reflection periods in the European policy community shortly after treatment.  
Figure 4-9. Scorecard Diplomacy and Reflection Periods: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios 
 
A neighbor having a better score has not statistically influence in models 4-7-1 and 4-
7-2. However, the results for model 4-7-3 which interacts the variable with CSO cooperation do 
show that reputational influence and the interaction are statistically significant. The results are 
difficult to interpret in the chart, but figure 4-10 graphically shows its impact. Here we see that 
no country has implemented a reflection period without either reputational pressure or CSO 
cooperation, or both. Reputational pressure makes no difference when countries cooperate 
with CSOs, but it does matter for countries which do not cooperate with CSOs. Indeed, it 
appears that, in the case of reflection periods, reputational pressure can act as a substitute for 
CSO cooperation. 




Figure 4-10 graphically represents that interaction between TIP scores and membership 
in the European policy community. Overall, members of the European RPC are much more likely 
to implement a reflection period. Indeed, reflection periods have been a special emphasis of 
GRETA, while few countries outside of Europe have them. Within Europe, countries under threat 
of US sanctions are more likely to implement reflection periods than countries which are scored 
at tier 1 or 2. As noted in chapter 3, this finding suggests that the congruence of pressure from 
both within Europe and from the United States has worked to promote the diffusion of 
reflection periods. 
The paucity of cases which have instituted reflection periods makes it challenging to test 
for all aspects of scorecard diplomacy. While we did not expect reputational pressure to 
promote diffusion of reflection periods, I have found conditional support that it does matter for 
those countries which do not cooperate with CSOs on TIP.  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
These findings are robust to variant models which are shown in Appendix C. To test the 
robustness, I include three alternative base models. In the first model, I adjust standard errors 
for political-cultural regions rather than geographic regions to see if results are robust to an 
alternative conception of region. In the second model, I substitute the measure for sanctions 
credibility I used in chapter 3 for low TIP scores to determine if results are robust to an 
alternative operationalization of coercive pressure. In the third models, I interact the variable 
for a neighbor with a better score with CSO cooperation with a measure for freedom of 
expression (which replaces Government Accountability). For institutionalization, the model 
which interacted reputation and freedom of expression found that interaction to be statistically 
significant, supporting the finding shown in model 4-4-3 interacting reputation and CSO 
cooperation. For NRMs, interacting reputational pressure and freedom of expression produces 
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results similar to those shown herein for interacting reputational pressure with CSO cooperation 
of model 4-6-3. The results of all robustness tests are found in Appendix C.  
DISCUSSION 
 In this chapter, I test the efficacy of reputational pressure and the non-coercive aspects 
of scorecard diplomacy for the promotion of TIP policies. Hypotheses 2 and 3 hold that the non-
coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy ought to influence policy diffusion when the policies 
improve TIP scores. The TIP scoring model showed that criminalization (with prosecutions) and 
NRMs consistently improved TIP scores while NAPs and reflection periods helped countries 
avoid the threat of sanctions from having poor TIP scores. Table 4-8 presents the overall 
findings.  
Table 4-8. Hypotheses 2 and 3 Findings Summary 












(with prosecutions) Yes Not supported Supported Supported 
Legal revisions No Supported Supported Not supported 
Institutionalization No Not supported Supported Supported 
NAP To avoid tier 3 Not supported Not supported Supported 
NRM Yes Ambiguous Supported Not supported 
Reflection period 
To avoid tier 2 
watch list / tier 3 
Conditional 
support Not tested 
Conditional 
support 
 I find evidence that non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy in general and 
reputational pressure specifically do help promote TIP policy diffusion. However, these effects 
are not closely tied to policies which help improve scores. Thus, while we can say with some 
confidence that non-coercive diplomacy is useful in promoting TIP policy, we cannot say with 
confidence that scorecard diplomacy is helpful. 
 The strongest support for the influence of a neighbor having a better score in promoting 
TIP policy diffusion comes from its role in encouraging revisions to the TIP legal regime. 
However, these revisions do not seem to matter for improving TIP scores. Similarly, I expected 
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that reputational pressure to motivate establishment of NRMs since it has such a strong effect 
on improving scores. But the finding here was much more ambiguous. Only in the model 
interacting reputational pressure with government accountability did it promote NRMs.  
 The influence of the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy—explicit 
recommendations and being scored in the report—were more consistently supported than the 
measure for a neighbor having a better score. Indeed, some non-coercive aspect was influential 
in all models where it was tested except for NAPs. Thus, these non-coercive aspects were 
influential for both policies which improved TIP scores and those that did not.  
 It may be that diplomats and policymakers have no clear idea what policies improve TIP 
scores, and their efforts in response to the non-coercive aspects of US diplomacy are intended 
to improve their scores, even when the evidence suggests that their policy choices will not have 
an impact. Another possibility is that the reputational concerns of scorecard diplomacy does not 
offer as much explanatory value as its advocates hold. Perhaps it is simply sustained US 
diplomatic attention that is activating reputational concerns rather than scorecards. 
 According to the scoring model, the US values both law enforcement and victim 
protection policies. In chapter 3, I found that the US seems reluctant to sanction a country for its 
lack of specific victim protection policies, but victim protection policies do improve scores. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the US seems to undervalue building institutional capacity. Having a 
functional intersectoral coordinating body does not improve scores and National Action Plans 
only do so inasmuch as they can keep a country from being scored at tier 3. Moreover, US 
recommendations regarding intersectoral coordinating bodies are not only made less frequently 
than other policies but are the only recommendations that have no statistically discernible 
impact on policy diffusion. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the only non-coercive aspect of the TIP 
reports that has any impact on the diffusion on either of the capacity-building policies is that of 
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being scored in the report which promotes institutionalization. (The threat of sanctions, 
however, still promotes diffusion of these policies.) Given that the scoring in the US TIP reports 
does credit victim protection policy and that, to some extent, US diplomacy is promoting the 
diffusion of victim protection policies, differences in diffusion by policy type cannot be explained 
by simple appeals to US policy preferences. US diplomacy has underemphasized capacity-
building policies, but both intersectoral coordinating bodies and NAPs are more widespread 
than either NRMs or reflection periods. Thus, it does not seem that non-coercive US diplomacy 
is the primary cause of differential diffusion rates for different policies. 
 US diplomacy cannot explain regional differentiation in policy diffusion. While US 
diplomacy may interact with the work of regional organizations, the explanation for regional 
differentiation is likely to come from differences in regional contexts, such as variations in 
regional policy coordination. I will explore regional differentiation in the next chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
 In Scorecard Diplomacy, Kelley (2017) offered substantial qualitative and quantitative 
evidence that reputational concerns do matter in the conduct for diplomacy. The statistical 
evidence presented here is less sanguine, however. Alternative measures for reputation and 
clearer distinctions between reputation and other theories and mechanisms have not 
demonstrated the power of GPIs for promoting TIP policy diffusion, except inasmuch as they 
signal a country may be sanctioned. While I find evidence that being scored in the TIP report or 
receiving a specific US recommendation has some influence on promoting TIP policy, this 
influence is not limited to those policies which improve scores, thus these variables may also be 
measuring the influence of mechanisms associated with constructivist or learning theories. The 
constructivist, learning and reputation mechanisms overlap, so it is possible that reputation 
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matters, but it is less apparent that the reputational influence of GPIs matter to the extent 
hypothesized by Kelley.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY NORMALIZATION AND REGIONAL POLICY COMMUNITIES 
OVERVIEW 
 The purpose of this chapter is to test hypothesis 4 that TIP policy diffusion increases as 
the regional density of countries which have the policy increases. To test this constructivist 
hypothesis, I control for characteristics of regional policy communities to see to what extent the 
work of these communities can be explained by constructivism and what yet needs to be 
explained. In the process, this chapter offers the most thorough analysis of regional 
differentiation in policy diffusion available in the literature on TIP policy diffusion. 
TESTING COMPETING THEORIES 
Regional Policy Communities and Tipping Points 
 Constructivism holds that once policy acceptance reaches a "tipping point," its adoption 
will accelerate. Given that I have no a priori expectation as to what the tipping point threshold 
is, I use the regional density of policy implementation to measure the concept of policy 
normalization, that is, how much the policy is taken-for-granted. But how do policies become 
taken-for-granted? 
 One likely candidate for constructivist mechanisms associated with policy normalization 
is the international TIP policy regime in that it creates a network of institutions and individuals 
through which ideas may diffuse. A literature on "regime complexes" understands international 
institutions as actors in the international system. Building on an earlier literature on 
"international regimes"—the "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner 1983, 186)—scholars began 
noting the rapidly increasing complexity of interrelationships among international institutions 
since the end of the Cold War. Henning (2017) defined a regime complex as "a set of 
international institutions that operate in a common issue area and the informal mechanisms 
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that coordinate them" (19). This definition has the advantage over other earlier definitions by 
allowing inter-institutional relations to vary along a continuum of hierarchy. 
 For TIP policy, the international regime complex includes such institutions as the 
Protocol, the International Organization for Migration, the International Labor Organization, and 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as many regional organizations that coordinate 
TIP policy among various subsets of the international community. These regional 
organizations—or regional policy communities—are one potential source of policy 
normalization that could explain regional variation in TIP policy diffusion.  
Scholars of regime complexes have examined how the institutional contexts shape state 
strategies for pursuing their interests (Alter and Meunier 2009; Biermann et al. 2009; Gehring 
and Faude 2014; Gómez-Mera 2016; Hafner-Burton 2009; Henning and Pratt 2021; Keohane and 
Victor 2011; Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013). In contexts of contestation, more is not necessarily 
better for policy adjustment. Thus, rather than trying to capture the influence of specific 
regional organizations, I use variables for regional policy communities to capture any 
overlapping, reinforcing, or diminishing effect of membership in multiple regional organizations. 
As Gómez-Mera (2016) argued, the neighboring domain of migration policy may be less 
cooperative and have different effects for TIP policy than the generalized regional organizations, 
so I use separate variables for the emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving members of inter-
regional organizations coordinating migration. I also include measurements for the number of 
memberships in regional organizations coordinating TIP policy, the number of those 
memberships which have institutionalized coordination on TIP policy, and the number of those 
that have critical and external TIP policy evaluation. Together, these variables help measure how 
regime complexity may influence TIP policy diffusion. A list of all regional and inter-regional 
organizations that address TIP policy can be found in Appendix D. 
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To weigh the various explanatory power of policy density and regional policy 
communities, I use four models. The first model includes variables for participation in each of 
the regional policy communities, but it does not include the variable for regional policy density. 
The second model adds the regional policy density variable. By comparing the first and second 
models, we should be able to see whether policy normalization or regional policy communities 
carry more explanatory power for TIP policy diffusion. 
In the third and fourth models for each policy, I include more variables related to 
regional policy coordination that may influence policy diffusion to control for other mechanisms 
and offer more vigorous tests of the policy density variable. In these models I add variables for 
emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving members of interregional organizations coordinating 
migration policy. In the third model, I also add a variable for the number of memberships in 
regional organizations combatting TIP, while in the fourth model, I add the number of 
memberships in those regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation and the number 
of memberships in regional organization with external policy evaluation (all of which are in 
Europe).  
Selection Problems and Causal Inference 
 States do not enter into international agreements randomly; they self-select into them. 
This selection bias can undermine causal inference. As Von Stein (2005) argued, whatever leads 
states to self-select into treaties will also influence their cooperation with those treaties. 
However, in the case of TIP, all the existing regional regime complexes existed prior to initiation 
of policy coordination. Thus, while countries do self-select into these regional organizations, 
they did so for reasons independent of TIP policy cooperation. In only two cases did states 
create regional organizations to coordinate TIP policy: The Convention on Action against Human 
Trafficking in Human Beings, fruit of the Council of Europe, and the Coordinated Mekong 
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Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking, a UN initiative. By using regional policy community as 
the independent variable rather than specific regional organizations, I aim to minimize the 
potential self-selection problem, as in both Europe and Southeast Asia policy coordination 
began in the extant regional organizations before or concurrent with participation in the 
trafficking-specific institutions. 
 While self-selection into TIP policy cooperation is not a major concern for regional 
regime complexes, it may nonetheless exist for participation in inter-regional organizations 
promoting cooperation on migration policy. While the Budapest Process and the Regional 
Conference on Migration were established prior to the UN Trafficking Protocol, the other inter-
regional migration organizations came later, and some, such as the Bali Process, explicitly 
included trafficking issues in its purview from their founding. Thus, causal inference may be 
undermined as any effect from participating in inter-regional migration organizations might not 
be attributed to the influence of the organization itself, but the underlying causes that 
motivated a country to participate in the organization. I have tried to account for this possibility 
by including a robustness check with variables that might explain participation in inter-regional 
migration organizations. Moreover, the fact that states coordinate migration policy for reasons 
other than to coordinate trafficking policy also partially mitigates concerns that the influence of 
these organizations of trafficking policy diffusion is contaminated by self-selection.  
Time-Varying Hazard Ratios and Hypothesis Testing 
 I have included graphs of time-varying hazard ratios to help with hypothesis testing. The 
Cox model assumes that the hazards are proportional over time, but this assumption can 
sometimes be violated. Not only do graphs of time-varying hazard ratios help reveal potential 
problems in the model specification, but they also permit a more fluid assessment of the 
influence of a variable over time.  
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To improve model specification, I have also introduced interactions to model decay 
functions in the hazard, so that the influence of the hazard decreases over time. When decay 
functions are modelled, the odds ratio begins as a very high number at time zero (this is the 
number reported in the table), but the reader should understand that the decay function results 
in a rapid decrease in the influence of the variable over time. 
Notes on the Models 
In some cases, statistical results show that the dependent variable is collinear with an 
explanatory variable. For example, no low-income country has instituted a reflection period, so 
were I to include a categorical income variable in the model (i.e., by World Bank income 
classification), the resulting statistical result for low-income countries would show an extremely 
low number, and it would not be possible to calculate z or confidence intervals. (In this case, I 
use GDP per capita rather than income categories.) Collinearity problems arise more frequently 
for NRMs and reflection periods where the number of events is lower. Where collinearity exists, 
I simply report it on the tables which follow. 
For control variables, I use the standard controls for domestic characteristics used for all 
models. For the influence of US scorecard diplomacy and threat of sanctions, I use the variables 
found to be statistically significant in chapter 4. I also include the variable for count of roads to 
neighbors with the policy extant. 
Finally, a note about the North American regional policy community: As this comprises 
only two countries—the United States and Canada—its statistical influence is highly susceptible 





 Table 5-1 shows the results of the four models testing the influence of policy density 
and regional policy communities on time to criminalization. In the base model 5-1-1 which does 
not include the regional density of criminalization, both the European and Southeast Asian 
regional policy communities promote criminalization. But when the density of criminalization is 
added in model 5-1-2, the influence of these policy communities is no longer statistically 
significant. The density of criminalization is statistically significant and highly influential, 
providing support for hypothesis 4. 
 Model 5-1-3 adds in memberships in the inter-regional migration organizations and the 
number of memberships in regional organizations that coordinate trafficking policy. Here, I find 
that membership in the inter-regional migration organizations promotes criminalization for both 
emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving countries. The number of memberships in regional 
organizations is not significant and its sign is negative, suggesting that multiplying regional 
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Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization 





Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization 





Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations   0.863 0.329 
 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with institutionalized cooperation  
  0.640 
**0.036 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with external evaluations of policy  
  2.219 
***0.002 






































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 165 165 165 165 
Observations 1,349 1,349 1,349 1,349 
Number of failures 146 146 146 146 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
 The full model 5-1-4 replaces the number of memberships in regional organizations with 
two variables, one for the number of memberships in regional organizations with 
institutionalized coordination and one for the number of memberships in regional organizations 
that offer external policy evaluations. For the latter, all these organizations are in Europe (and 
for the OSCE, North America). Here I find that external evaluation of policy is statistically 
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significant and more than doubles the hazard, while membership in institutionalized regional 
organizations reduces the hazard ratio. Participation in inter-regional migration organizations 
remains significant and influential, while, interestingly, membership in the African regional 
policy community is now statistically significant and more than doubles the hazard ratio, 
suggesting that African policy coordination is relatively effective.  
 For criminalization, hypothesis 4 is supported. The regional density of criminalization 
promotes policy diffusion. When this variable is added to the model, the variables for specific 
regional policy communities are no longer statistically significant. This suggests that 
constructivist mechanisms are operational in regional policy communities. The full model adds 
variables for the inter-regional organizations coordinating migration and various levels of 
institutionalization. These variables could be measuring mechanisms associated with either the 
reputation or constructivist theories, or both. As it stands, participation in inter-regional 
cooperation does seem to promote criminalization, as does external policy evaluation. 
Institutionalized coordination, however, tends to delay diffusion. This may be because 
increasing regime complexity undermines policy adjustment by giving actors more options to 
protect their reputations without needing to take concrete action. The results also show that 
regional policy communities are not equally effective. Without the policy density variable, 
members of the European and Southeast Asian policy communities are more likely to 
criminalize, while in the full model the African policy community is relatively effective at 
promoting criminalization when taking the other variables into account. 
Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime 
 Table 5-2 shows the results for the four models testing the influence of policy 
normalization and regional policy communities on time to any revision to the TIP legal regime. 
The results offer no support for hypothesis 4. In the full model 5-2-4, no policy community has 
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any statistically robust influence on time to legal change except for the North American regional 
policy community. Neither does participation in inter-regional organizations coordinating 
migration policy or the number of memberships in regional organizations in their varying levels 
of institutionalization or the density of criminalization. 
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Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization 





Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization 





Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations   0.974 0.662 
 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with institutionalized cooperation  
  0.966 
0.642 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with external evaluations of policy  
  1.108 
0.186 




















































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 171 171 171 171 
Observations 2,828 2,828 2,828 2,828 
Number of failures 648 648 648 648 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
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The policy density variable I use in these models is for criminalization. It is not 
statistically significant, but it is not perfect representation of the concept of policy normalization 
because density of criminalization is only one kind of change to the TIP legal regime. In models 
5-2-1 and 5-2-2, the European and American regional policy communities are statistically 
significant, though the influence on TIP policy diffusion of the American community is negative. 
These variables are no longer statistically significant once membership in inter-regional 
organizations is included in models 5-2-3 and 5-2-4. 
 Figure 5-1 shows select time varying hazard ratios for the key variables of interest from 
model 5-2-4. The time varying hazard ratios complicate the picture only slightly. The South Asian 
regional policy community shows some positive influence on time to legal change, but this 
influence decays rapidly. The Southeast Asian regional policy community shows a negative 
influence that eventually becomes positive at the end of the time period. Otherwise, the time-
variant hazard ratios are not statistically significant.  
Figure 5-1. Time-Variant Hazard Ratios from Model 5-2-4 
 
 For any change to the TIP legal regime, hypothesis 4 is not supported, but neither do we 
find much evidence that regional policy communities or inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration encourage TIP policy diffusion. While the USA and Canada are more 
likely to revise their TIP legal regimes, these two nations are also highly developed countries 
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with intricate and complicated legal infrastructures. As such, I am reluctant to consider the 
finding that they are more likely to revise their TIP legal regime as offering support for the 
influence of the regional policy community in North America.  
Institutionalization 
 Table 5-3 shows the results of four models testing the influence of tipping points and 
regional policy communities on time to first institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating 
body. The results support hypothesis 4. The density of institutionalization is robustly statistically 
significant in the models in which it is included. No regional policy community is robustly 
influential in the model though membership in the former Soviet Union is negatively collinear 
with the institutionalization and the Southeast Asian regional policy community is statistically 
significant but of negative influence in some models. Membership in inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration policy is not statistically significant, nor is the number of memberships in 
regional organizations, whether or not they are institutionalized or offer external policy 
accountability, though when these variables approach conventional levels of statistical 
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Former USSR RPC Collinear (-) Collinear (-) Collinear (-) Collinear (-) 



















Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization 





Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization 





Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations   0.750 *0.060 
 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with institutionalized cooperation  
  0.721 
*0.073 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with external evaluations of policy  
  1.107 
0.475 






































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 166 166 166 166 
Observations 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 
Number of failures 154 154 154 154 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
 A look at select time varying hazard ratios for model 5-3-4, shown in figure 5-2, only 
complicates the picture slightly. The African regional policy community does show a statistically 
significant and positive influence on first institutionalization until year 3 after treatment, while 
the Southeast Asian policy community has a negative influence when it is statistically significant. 
Number of memberships in regional organizations which offer external policy evaluations is also 
statistically significant and positive until year 8 after treatment. 
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Figure 5-2. Time-Variant Hazard Ratios for Model 5-3-4 
 
 Institutionalization offers strong support for hypothesis 4. The regional density of extant 
intersectoral coordinating bodies promotes their diffusion. Interestingly, this effect does not 
seem to be interchangeable with the role regional policy communities may play. Indeed, except 
in Europe where some regional organizations offer external evaluation of TIP policy and possibly 
Africa, these communities do not seem to play a significant role in the diffusion of intersectoral 
bodies. In general, constructivism, as measured by the taken-for-granted nature of 
institutionalization, offers a better explanation of regional differentiation than that offered by 
regional policy communities.  
National Action Plans 
 Table 5-4 presents the results of the four models testing the influence of tipping points 
and regional policy communities on initiation of a National Action Plan. Hypothesis 4 is not 
supported. These results diverge from the findings of previous policies in that the policy density 
variable is not statistically significant, while the influence of four of the regional policy 
communities are significant in all four models. The African, American, and European regional 
policy communities all have a positive effect, increasing the likelihood that members will 
institute a National Action Plan. The Middle Eastern regional policy community, however, has a 
negative influence, indicating policy divergence. Inter-regional migration organizations also had 
a positive influence on time to NAP initiation, but this finding was statistically significant only for 
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emigrant-sending countries. The number of memberships in regional organizations of any level 
of institutionalization was not statistically significant.  
 Examination of select time varying hazard ratios, shown in figure 5-3, only complicates 
the above findings slightly. The South Asian and Southeast Asian regional policy communities 
show a bifurcated influence on policy diffusion. In earlier years following treatment, these 
communities are associated with a lower likelihood of NAP initiation, but in later years they 
become more likely to promote the initiation of NAPs. Findings like these suggest that the 
prioritization of policies within regional policy communities may influence their diffusion. 
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Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization 





Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization 





Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations   1.001 0.987 
 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with institutionalized cooperation  
  0.977 
0.787 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with external evaluations of policy  
  1.083 
0.410 




















































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 172 172 172 172 
Observations 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898 
Number of failures 396 396 396 396 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
 The results for NAPs are the mirror-image of our results for institutionalization. For 
institutionalization, the regional density of intersectoral coordinating bodies was highly 
influential in promoting their diffusion, while the role of regional policy communities seemed 
minimal. Here, the regional density of NAPs offers no explanatory value for their diffusion while 
134 
 
regional differentiation in the diffusion of NAPs can be explained by the variation in 
effectiveness of regional policy communities in promoting them. Also of interest is the finding 
that emigrant-sending members—and only these members—of inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration were also more likely to initiate NAPs.  
National Referral Mechanisms 
 Table 5-5 shows the results of the four models for testing the influence of tipping points 
and regional policy communities on the diffusion of National Referral Mechanisms. Hypothesis 4 
is supported. The results show that both the regional density of NRMs and some of the regional 
policy communities do promote their diffusion. Without the policy density variable, only the 
European regional policy community has a positive effect on the implementation of NRMs 
(while South Asia has a negative effect). The influence of the European policy community is not 
eclipsed by the regional density of NRMs in the full model (5-5-4), and the African policy 
community is also statistically significant, while the influence of two other policy communities 
hover just outside of conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus, while the taken-for-
granted nature of the NRMs offers good explanatory value, regional policy communities also 
offer independent explanatory value as well. 
 The influence of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration and the number of 
memberships in regional organizations with external policy evaluations is not statistically 
significant in the model, but a look at the time-variant hazard ratios in figure 5-4 complicates the 
picture. For both emigrant-sending members of inter-regional migration organizations and 
number of memberships in regional organizations with external policy evaluations, I find 
positive and statistically significant time-varying hazard ratios in the early years after treatment, 
but decay into statistical insignificance in later years. Interestingly, immigrant-receiving 
participants in inter-regional migration organizations are not more likely to implement NRMs, 
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perhaps because protecting immigrants is more politically problematic in immigrant-receiving 
countries.  
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Regional density of National Referral Mechanisms 







Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization 





Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization 





Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations   0.761 0.131 
 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with institutionalized cooperation  
  0.724 
0.202 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with external evaluations of policy  
  0.996 
0.990 













































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 171 171 171 171 
Observations 2,461 2,461 2,461 2,461 
Number of failures 87 87 87 87 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 








Figure 5-4. Time-Variant Hazard Ratios from Model 5-5-4 
 
 For NRMs, the policy density measure goes part way in explaining regional 
differentiation but is not sufficient alone. Regional policy communities and inter-regional 
organizations coordinating migration also offer independent explanatory value. Like with NAPs, 
emigrant-sending members of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy—and 
only these members—are more likely to establish NRMs.  
Reflection Periods 
 Of the six policies under consideration, reflection periods are the least common and 
geographically concentrated in Europe. The results of the four models testing for the influence 
of policy normalization and regional policy communities are shown in table 5-6. Hypothesis 4 is 
supported. Only the European regional policy community has a statistically significant positive 
influence on the diffusion of reflection periods, but this influence is eclipsed once the regional 
density of reflection periods is included in the model. Membership in inter-regional 
organizations coordinating migration policy do not have a statistically significant effect, and 
neither does the number memberships in regional organizations with institutionalized 
cooperation or external evaluation of TIP policy. 
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Middle East/North African RPC Collinear (-) Collinear (-) Collinear (-) Collinear (-) 














Southeast Asian RPC Collinear (-) Collinear (-) Collinear (-) Collinear (-) 
Regional density of Reflection Periods 







Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization 





Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization 





Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations   0.731 *0.070 
 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with institutionalized cooperation  
  0.695 
0.403 
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 
with external evaluations of policy  
  1.100 
0.881 































































Subjects 157 157 157 157 
Observations 2,321 2,321 2,321 2,321 
Number of failures 41 41 41 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.2t) to model a decay function and improve model specification. 
 In the case of reflection periods, their regional policy density offers better explanatory 
value for their diffusion than membership in any regional policy community, inter-regional 
organizations coordinating migration, or generalized characteristics of regional organizations. As 
such, these organizations seem to coincide with constructivist diffusion mechanisms. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 I checked the robustness of the results with four models, the results of which can be 
found in Appendix C. The first model adjusted standard errors by political-cultural regions rather 
than geographical regions. The second model interacted the number of memberships in regional 
138 
 
organizations with the primary regional policy community. The third interacted cooperation 
with civil society with the primary regional policy community. The final model added three 
variables which might potentially explain membership in inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration: emigrant-sending countries, countries perceived to be sources of 
transnational victims, and the ratio of trade with advanced economies. All robustness checks 
included variables for regional density of the policy, membership in inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration, and number of memberships in regional organizations with 
institutionalized cooperation and with external evaluations of policy. In general, the main 
findings were robust to these alternative model specifications. 
 When adjusting standard errors by political-cultural regions, the influence of the African 
regional policy community was no longer significant for criminalization, though it remained 
significant for NAPs and NRMs. Cooperation with civil society was also statistically significant 
and positive for changes in the TIP legal regime and the establishment of reflection periods, but 
negative for NAPs.  
Interacting primary regional policy communities with number of regional organizations 
tended to produce results which indicated that increasing the number of memberships in 
regional organizations combating TIP resulted in lower likelihood of policy implementation, but 
this result was not consistent. In two cases, that for NAPs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, 
increasing memberships enhanced policy diffusion. But for criminalization, legal revisions, and 
first institutionalization, when the interaction variable was statistically significant, it meant a 
lower likelihood of policy implementation. 
 Interacting the primary regional policy community with cooperation with civil society on 
TIP also produced inconsistent results. Most interactions were not statistically significant. Civil 
society cooperation promoted criminalization in the Middle Eastern policy community, but 
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discouraged legal change in Africa, institutionalization in Southeast Asia, and NAPs in South Asia. 
Only four countries instituted reflection periods without noted cooperation with civil society 
(Andorra, Cyprus, Romania, and Finland), resulting in lots of collinearity in the model for 
reflection periods.  
 Including additional variables to model for selection into inter-regional organizations 
coordinating migration, especially emigrant-sending nations, did not alter the findings of 
influence for emigrant-sending members of these organizations. In no case were the additional 
variables statistically significant, and neither did their inclusion change the statistical significance 
or magnitude of influence for those cases where the variable had been found to be influential. 
DISCUSSION 
 The foregoing results show some complexity in the role of policy density and regional 
policy communities in promoting the transnational diffusion of TIP policy. Hypothesis 4 was 
supported for criminalization, institutionalization, NRMs, and reflection periods, indicating that 
the policy normalization offers substantial explanatory value. However, no clear relation 
emerged between the influence of regional policy density and that of the regional policy 
communities. A summary of the findings is shown in table 5-7. 
Table 5-7. Hypothesis 4 Summary. 
 Hypothesis 4: 
Regional density of policy 
 
Relation to regional policy communities: 
Criminalization Supported Policy density eclipses influence of RPCs when 
included in the model. 
Legal revisions Not supported Policy density eclipses influence of RPCs, but 
neither offers much explanatory value. 
Institutionalization Supported Policy density offers explanatory value; RPCs do 
not offer explanatory value, even when policy 
density is not included in the model. 
NAPs Not supported RPCs offer explanatory power; policy density 
does not. 
NRMs Supported Both policy density and RPCs offer independent 
explanatory power. 
Reflection periods Supported Policy density eclipses influence of RPCs when 
included in the model. 
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 In the case of criminalization and reflection periods, policy density offers a better 
explanation of policy diffusion than participation in regional policy communities. When policy 
density is included in these models, the influence of regional policy communities disappears. In 
the case of NAPs, however, regional policy communities offer more explanatory power; regional 
policy density is not statistically significant when both are included in the model. And in the case 
of institutionalization, regional policy communities had no influence for policy density to eclipse, 
but regional policy density does offer explanatory value. For NRMs, both policy density and 
regional policy communities help explain policy diffusion. And finally, in the case of legal 
revisions, neither regional policy communities nor policy density offer much explanatory value, 
though, to be fair, the density of criminalization is an imperfect measure of the taken-for-
granted nature of policy change. 
 Given that policies which become more taken-for-granted are more likely to diffuse and 
that, in some cases, this effect replaces the influence of regional policy communities, the 
findings support the constructivist proposition that ideas diffuse through elite social networks, 
such as those created in regional policy communities. However, policy density alone is 
insufficient to explain policy differentiation. Other findings which relate to regional policy 
differentiation are shown in table 5-8. 
Table 5-8. Other Influences on Regional Policy Differentiation 














Criminalization Africa Positive Negative Positive 
Legal revisions N. America None None None 
Institutionalization Africa None None Positive 










Reflection periods None None None None 
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 Some regional policy communities promote TIP policy diffusion, even when controlling 
for the influence of regional policy density. For four of the TIP policies, membership in the 
African regional policy community promotes policy diffusion. Other policy communities (not 
listed in table 5-8) underperform. It seems that some regional policy communities are doing 
more (or less) than what can be captured from the policy density measure.  
 Specific characteristics of regional organizations also influence policy diffusion. This is 
strongest with mechanisms for external policy evaluation, which currently exist only in Europe. 
This policy accountability has promoted policy diffusion of criminalization, institutionalization, 
and NRMs. The number of memberships in organizations with institutionalized cooperation is 
negatively associated with criminalization, but otherwise does not offer much explanatory 
power.  
 Inter-regional cooperation on migration policy also promotes some TIP policy, but this 
effect is much larger for emigrant-sending members than immigrant-receiving members. 
Indeed, emigrant-sending members are more likely to adopt NRMs, a victim protection policy 
which helps immigrants, perhaps because helping immigrants is unpopular politically while 
emigrant-sending countries have fewer immigrants to help. 
 Some of these variables seem, at least superficially, to be well-explained by reputation 
mechanisms. External policy evaluation without threat of sanctions ought to generate 
reputational pressure for policy change, and the finding that, in some cases, emigrant-sending 
countries cooperating on migration are more likely to implement TIP policies could also be 
explained by reputational pressure, as emigrant-sending countries have weaker economies than 
immigrant-receiving countries. Yet even when controlling for specific characteristics of regional 
organizations, such as policy evaluation, some regional organizations do better at promoting 
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policy diffusion than others. While constructivist mechanisms help explain regional variation, 
much yet remains to be explained.  
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has shown that a taken-for-granted attitude toward TIP policy helps 
promote its diffusion, as constructivists argue. Moreover, the influence of regional policy 
communities can be partly explained by this mechanism, suggesting that their social networks 
are vehicles for policy normalization, as constructivists propose. Yet, policy normalization alone 
is insufficient for explaining regional variation in policy diffusion. Some aspects of regional or 
inter-regional cooperation matter beyond what can be explained by policy density, and even 
when taking these into account, some regional policy communities over- or underperform. 
These findings are useful for supporting the explanatory power of constructivism as well as 




CHAPTER SIX: NEIGHBORS AND COMPETITION THEORY 
OVERVIEW 
 In this chapter I test the hypothesis derived from competition theory. Simmons, Lloyd, 
and Stewart (2018) argued that a fear that TIP would be diverted from better-performing 
neighbors into one's own country motivated policymakers to criminalize TIP. They found 
empirical support that the number of road connections to neighbors with criminalization extant 
promoted its diffusion. As I described in chapter 1, I found fault with some of their claims and 
measurements, and so this chapter seeks a better test of competition theory. Simmons, Lloyd, 
and Stewart argued that improved action against TIP in one's neighbors would promote TIP 
policy diffusion because trafficking had been socially constructed as a transnational threat 
requiring law enforcement solutions. As described in chapter 2, I collected data on reports of 
increased or diverted transnational trafficking from the US TIP reports. I believe this to be a 
better measure for the concept that Simmons Lloyd, and Stewart were seeking to measure with 
counts of roads to neighbors. If fear of TIP is indeed driving TIP policy, then we ought to see 
reports of increasing or diverted transnational TIP motivating policy initiation for those policies 
which disrupt trafficking networks (i.e., criminalization), as hypothesis 5 proposes. 
THE MODELS 
 In all models, I include the variable I collected on reports of increased or diverted 
transnational trafficking. For those convinced that the number of road connections to neighbors 
with the TIP policy extant is a good measure for the fear of trafficking diversion, I include this 
variable in one of the models. I also use three alternative measures to road counts: the ratio of 
road connections to neighbors with the policy extant, the ratio of migrant partners with policy 
extant weighted by shared migrant stock, and the ratio of trading partners weighted by shared 
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total trade. For controls, I use variables developed from the results of earlier chapters, as well as 
the standard set of control variables for each policy. 
RESULTS 
 Overall, the results do not support hypothesis 5. In no model, including those for 
criminalization, are reports of increased or diverted TIP statistically significant. When the 
variables for road, migration, or trade connections are statistically significant, they delay 
implementation of the TIP policy rather than promote it. 
Criminalization 
 The results for criminalization are shown in table 6-1. Reported increases or diversion of 
transnational TIP is not statistically significant. The number of roads to neighbors with 
criminalization is also not statistically significant. The other three variables: ratio of roads to 
neighbor with criminalization, ratio of migrant partners with criminalization and ratio of trading 
partners with criminalization are statistically significant, but their effect is negative, contrary to 
expectations. I thus find no support for hypothesis 5.  
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Table 6-1. Competition and Criminalization 
 
Model 6-1-1 
With number of 
roads 
Model 6-1-2 
With ratio of roads 
 
Model 6-1-3 
 With migration 
partners 
Model 6-1-4 




P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  







Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 1.000 0.980 
   
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization  0.389 ***0.004 
  
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by 




Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total 
trade  
  0.244 
**0.026 



























Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 








































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 165 165 164 163 
Observations 1,349 1,349 1,339 1,321 
Number of failures 146 146 145 144 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
 According to Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018), criminalization is where we ought to 
expect the fear of transnational trafficking to be most evident. Criminalization directly threatens 
criminal networks by increasing law enforcement attention and legal options against traffickers. 
If governments are competing to make their countries unattractive to trafficking networks, then 
criminalization is the principal trafficking policy necessary to disrupt their networks. Here, 
however, we find no evidence that fear of transnational trafficking is motivating criminalization, 
whether measured by explicit reports of transnational trafficking threats or by road, migration, 
or trade connections. 
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Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime 
 Results for the any legal revision to the TIP legal regime are shown in table 6-2. It is not 
as clear that legal revisions are as directly related to disrupting trafficking networks as 
criminalization, but, as with criminalization, I find no evidence that fear of transnational 
trafficking is motivating these changes. Reports of increased or diverted trafficking are not 
statistically significant. The number or ratio of roads to neighbors with criminalization are not 
statistically significant, nor is the ratio of migration partners. The only variable that is statistically 
significant is the ratio of trade partners weighted by trade, but, contrary to expectations, legal 




Table 6-2. Competition and Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime 
 
Model 6-2-1 
With number of 
roads 
Model 6-2-2 
With ratio of roads 
 
Model 6-2-3 
 With migration 
partners 
Model 6-2-4 




P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  







Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 1.001 0.483 
   
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization  0.790 0.185 
  
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by 




Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total 
trade  
  0.581 
**0.047 



























Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 






















































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 171 171 169 169 
Observations 2,828 2,828 2,804 2,788 
Number of failures 648 648 639 638 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.1t) to model a decay function and improve model specification. 
Institutionalization 
 The results for the establishment of an intersectoral coordinating body are shown in 
table 6-3. As with criminalization and legal change, I do not find evidence that fear of 
transnational trafficking is motivating the establishment of intersectoral coordinating bodies. 
Reports of increased or diverted trafficking are not statistically significant. The number of roads 
to neighbors with extant coordinating bodies is statistically significant, but it has a negative 
influence on institutionalization. The ratio of roads and trading partners are also negative 
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though just outside conventional levels of statistical significance. Migration partners have no 
statistically significant relation with the establishment of intersectoral coordinating bodies. 
Table 6-3. Competition and Institutionalization 
 
Model 6-3-1 
With number of 
roads 
Model 6-3-2 
With ratio of roads 
 
Model 6-3-3 
 With migration 
partners 
Model 6-3-4 




P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  







Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 0.980 ***0.003 
   
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization  0.564 *0.055 
  
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by 




Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total 
trade  
  0.378 
*0.083 



























Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 








































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 166 166 165 164 
Observations 1,002 1,002 994 975 
Number of failures 154 154 153 152 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.1t) to model a decay function and improve model specification. 
National Action Plans 
 The results for National Action Plans are shown in table 6-4. While reports of increased 
or diverted trafficking have a positive coefficient for the first time, it is not statistically 
significant. The number of road connections is negative but just outside conventional levels of 
statistical significance, while the ratio of roads is negative and statistically significant, delaying 
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NAP initiation rather than promoting it. Migrant and trade partners have no statistically 
discernible relationship with time to NAP initiation. 
Table 6-4. Competition and National Action Plans 
 
Model 6-4-1 
With number of 
roads 
Model 6-4-2 
With ratio of roads 
 
Model 6-4-3 
 With migration 
partners 
Model 6-4-4 




P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  







Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 0.995 *0.073 
   
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization  0.734 **0.049 
  
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by 




Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total 
trade  
  0.803 
0.646 



























Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 






















































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 172 172 170 170 
Observations 2,898 2,898 2,874 2,858 
Number of failures 396 396 393 391 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.1t) to model a decay function and improve model specification. 
National Referral Mechanisms 
 The results for NRMs are shown in table 6-5. The results do not support hypothesis 5. 
No variable of interest has a statistically significant relationship to the formalization of NRMs, 
and the coefficients are negative. 
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Table 6-5. Competition and National Referral Mechanisms 
 
Model 6-5-1 
With number of 
roads 
Model 6-5-2 
With ratio of roads 
 
Model 6-5-3 
 With migration 
partners 
Model 6-5-4 




P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  







Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 0.986 0.161 
   
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization  0.685 0.483 
  
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by 




Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total 
trade  
  0.223 
0.141 





























Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 















































































World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 171 171 170 169 
Observations 2,461 2,461 2,454 2,437 
Number of failures 87 87 86 85 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.2t) to model a decay function and improve model specification. 
Reflection Periods 
 Finally, the results for the establishment of reflection periods are shown in table 6-6. 
Reports of increased or diverted trafficking have no statistically significant effect on reflection 
periods. The number of roads to neighbors with reflection periods is statistically significant but 
has a negative influence. Trade partners with reflection periods also have a negative influence 
on the establishment of a reflection period. The ratio of roads is not statistically significant, nor 
do migration partners have any influence on the establishment of reflection periods. 
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Table 6-6. Competition and Reflection Periods 
 
Model 6-6-1 
With number of 
roads 
Model 6-6-2 
With ratio of roads 
 
Model 6-6-3 
 With migration 
partners 
Model 6-6-4 




P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  







Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization 0.965 **0.022 
   
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization  0.369 0.407 
  
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by 




Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total 
trade  
  0.002 
***0.008 





























Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations 


























































Subjects 157 157 156 156 
Observations 2,321 2,321 2,319 2,300 
Number of failures 41 41 40 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.2t) to model a decay function and improve model specification. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 I tested the robustness of these results with five models which can be found in Appendix 
C. First, I adjusted standard errors by political-cultural regions rather than geographically 
defined regions. The results are essentially the same as those presented here. The only 
exception is that reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking has a statistically 
significant but negative influence on time to criminalization, which is contrary to the 
expectations. 
 In the second model, I included road connections, and migration and trade partners in 
the same model. The results are consistent with the results shown in the chapter. However, for 
changes to the TIP legal regime, migration partners did promote legal change, although this 
finding depends on modeling the variable with a decay function, as suggested by an examination 
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of time-variant hazard ratios. This is the only positive and statistically significant variable of 
interest in any model in this chapter. While we might generate explanations as to why migration 
partners may encourage each other to improve their TIP policies, it is difficult to explain why this 
would only matter for changes in the TIP legal regime and not for any other TIP policy. 
 In the third model, I used only the variable for reports of increased or diverted 
transnational trafficking, while dropping the variables the road and migration or trade partner 
variables. Reports of increased or diverted trafficking were never statistically significant in these 
models. 
 In the fourth model, I weighted each road connection by UN voting affinity to magnify 
the influence of friendly neighbors and reduce the influence of hostile neighbors. The results did 
not change. 
 In the final model, I removed all regional control variables. In this model, I was able to 
duplicate Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart's (2018) findings that road connections to neighbors with 
criminalization extant promote the diffusion of criminalization, as well as any legal change, but 
they do not promote capacity-building or victim protection policies. However, the reports of 
increased or diverted transnational trafficking were not statistically significant in any model. The 
results of this model show that inclusion of control variables for regional influence are better 
explanations than the number of road connections since when they are included the influence 
of road connections is reduced to statistical insignificance, and, in some cases, becomes 
negative. 
DISCUSSION 
 I find no support for hypothesis 5 which proposes that reports of increased or diverted 
trafficking should promote diffusion of TIP policies which disrupt trafficking networks, such as 
criminalization. Reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking is never statistically 
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significant, or, when it is significant in one of the robustness checks, it has a negative influence 
on policy diffusion. Variables measuring number of road connections to neighbors with the 
policy extant that Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued proxied fear of trafficking 
diversion are either not statistically significant or negative in influence. So are alternative 
measures such as ratio of road connections and ratio of migrant or trading partners with the 
policy extant. Granted, we did not expect fear of transnational trafficking to have an impact on 
victim protection policies since these do not disrupt trafficking networks, but we have no 
evidence that it matters for any TIP policy. 
 What should we make of the findings of Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart? As the 
robustness check shows, their variable for measuring neighborly connectedness also includes 
everything that comes with regional efforts to promote TIP policy. When variables capturing 
regional influence are included in the models, the measure for road connections is no longer 
influential or significant. Of course, Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart may be right that fear of 
trafficking motivates policy diffusion—in their essay, they combine constructivist and 
competition theory, and regardless of the specific rationale, I have found strong evidence that 
constructivism helps explain TIP policy diffusion. Moreover, regional policy communities may 
promote TIP policy among their members because they construct trafficking as something to 
fear—and a problem that cooperation will help solve. But, as for countries acting independently, 
motivated by fear of better policies in their neighbors, or by widely-disseminated reports of 
increased or diverted transnational trafficking in their own country, I simply do not find any 
evidence that this matters. 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has not offered any evidence for the relevance of competition for TIP policy 
diffusion. While this neither means that competition is irrelevant when considering other 
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threats to national security from crime, nor that fear of trafficking is irrelevant in promoting 
policy diffusion, it does undermine the idea that states are acting independently as policy 
competitors with their neighbors and that the number of roads to neighboring countries with 
extant policies is a useful measure for understanding TIP policy diffusion. I find the results of 
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) to be better explained by regional policy coordination, 
rather than states acting in isolation. This chapter ought to be seen as a corrective in their 




CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 In this final chapter, I summarize the findings for each hypothesis, describe key findings, 
discuss directions for future research, make recommendations for diplomats and policy 
advocates, and close with a few remarks on how this dissertation has added to our knowledge. 
HOW THE HYPOTHESES FARED 
Hypothesis 1 
Under coercion theory, conditionality in the form of sanctions ought to promote policy 
diffusion. While, in the past, scholars have used variables to proxy vulnerability to US pressure, 
no one had yet tested whether the threat of US sanctions promoted policy diffusion. Hypothesis 
1 held that credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. As discussed in 
chapter 3, I found qualified support for this hypothesis for criminalization, institutionalization, 
NAP initiation, and conditionally for the establishment of reflection periods in Europe. Threats of 
sanctions do not seem to motivate policy diffusion for any legal revision, NRMs, or reflection 
periods generally, likely because these policies are not seen as policy "minimums." However, the 
support for hypothesis 1 is qualified because I found that it was not the credible threats of 
sanctions that promoted policy diffusion, but rather the cases where sanctions were unlikely to 
be imposed. Thus, threats of sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion, but these threats do not 
need to be credible. This finding is puzzling. 
The findings for hypothesis 1 do offer support for the explanatory value of coercion for 
policy diffusion. While coercion cannot explain TIP policy diffusion alone, it is nonetheless an 
important factor that must be included in any holistic explanation. Differences in the influence 
of coercion for various policy types can be explained by US preferences for using the threat of 
sanctions for some policy types and not others, as well as the cost of the policy involved. In the 
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case of TIP, coercion is less successful in explaining regional differentiation, though for reflection 
periods, the possibility exists that US preferences vary by region. 
Hypothesis 2 
 Reputation theory holds that countries seek to improve their global performance 
indicators (GPIs), such as their tier rank in the US TIP reports. Kelley (2017) found in the conduct 
of US diplomacy surrounding the TIP report that the diplomatic staff of other countries wanted 
to improve their standing relative to their neighbors or peers. Thus, hypothesis 2 held that 
reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score promotes TIP policy diffusion for 
those policies which are most likely to improve scores. To test this hypothesis, I first developed a 
model predicting how each policy affected the TIP tier score. Countries which are eager to 
improve their scores ought to enact those policies which are most likely to do so. I found that 
criminalization (with prosecutions) and NRMs consistently helped improve scores, while other 
legal changes and intersectoral coordinating bodies did not improve scores. NAPs and reflection 
periods were helpful in avoiding the threat of sanctions, but not achieving a high rank of tier 1. 
 The results for hypothesis 2 are ambiguous and are shown in table 7-1. I expected to 
find reputational concerns to matter for criminalization and the establishment of NRMs, but 
they had no influence on criminalization and the findings for NRMs were ambiguous. In one 
model for NRMs, reputational pressure interacted with government accountability to promote 
diffusion of NRMs, but not in another model interacting reputational pressure and CSO 
cooperation. The importance of reputational pressure for NRMs is sensitive to model 
specification; findings are not robust. Only with legal change did we find support for the 
influence of reputational pressure. Here, reputational pressure was especially important for 
those countries which lacked CSO cooperation. But given that changes to the TIP legal regime do 
not change TIP scores, it is not clear why reputational influence would be most evident here. As 
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with change in the TIP legal regime, a neighbor having a better score helped compensate for the 
lack of CSO cooperation in the promotion of reflection periods.  










(with prosecutions) Yes Not supported Supported 
Legal revisions No Supported Supported 
Institutionalization No Not supported Supported 
NAP To avoid tier 3 Not supported Not supported 
NRM Yes Ambiguous Supported 
Reflection period 
To avoid tier 2 
watch list / tier 3 
Conditional 
support Not tested 
 Thus, for hypothesis 2, we seldom see a direct impact of a neighbor having a better 
score on TIP policy diffusion, and where we do find it, it is not for those policies that matter 
most for improving scores. The results also suggest that the influence of this reputational 
pressure is interacting with domestic conditions, and, at least in some cases, helping to 
compensate for the lack of CSO cooperation. Perry (2016) found that the efficacy of US 
diplomatic pressure depended upon the presence of domestic civil society pressure. The results 
here suggest something a little different: that, for some TIP policies, reputational pressure can 
promote policy diffusion when CSO cooperation is absent. Kelley (2017) argued that 
reputational pressure depended on a country's sensitivity to pressure, its exposure of policy 
shortfalls, and its capacity to implement policy. The evidence we have for interactions with 
reputational pressure and CSO cooperation also offer some support for her theorization. 
 The main finding is that reputational pressure, at least as measured by having a 
neighbor with a better score, is far less influential than expected. Variables for coercive pressure 
or other non-coercive aspects of US diplomacy are more consistently supported and have a 
more substantial impact on policy diffusion. The scores in scorecard diplomacy do not add much 
explanatory power, especially where we most expect to find it. It is not self-evidently clear why 
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reputational concerns matter for some policies but not those for which we expected it, nor does 
it help to explain regional differentiation.  
Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 held that non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote TIP 
policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores. Unlike with the 
reputational pressure from having a neighbor with a better score, we cannot discern whether 
these aspects are best considered expressions of reputation or constructivist theories. We do 
know, however, that they do not appeal to the coercive threat of sanctions. If these aspects had 
favored those policies which improve TIP scores, we would have had more support for the 
reputation approach, at least inasmuch as improving reputations can be equated with improving 
scores. However, as shown above in table 7-1, non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy are 
active in all dimensions of TIP policy under investigation, except that for NAPs. They matter for 
TIP policies which improve scores and those that do not. 
 I tested (to the extent possible) being scored in the report and specific 
recommendations for TIP policies. Specific recommendations promoted the diffusion of 
criminalization, legal revisions, and NRMs, but not the establishment of intersectoral 
coordinating bodies. However, being scored in the TIP report did promote institutionalization. (I 
was unable to test either variable on reflection periods.) Specific recommendations were 
sometimes made to reinforce recommendations from regional or domestic actors, so it is 
difficult to untangle their influence from that of other parts of the international TIP regime 
complex. These components of US diplomacy help explain TIP policy diffusion, but they do not 
help explain differentiation by policy type or region. 
 Hypothesis 3 shows us that US diplomacy influences TIP policy diffusion beyond the 
coercive function of sanctions. Since this influence was not limited to those policies which help 
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improve scores, plausibly either or both reputation and constructivist theories could claim these 
as relevant mechanisms. These theories are compatible, and the mechanisms are not unique to 
either one. Coercion alone is insufficient to explain the influence of US diplomacy for promoting 
TIP policy diffusion. 
Hypothesis 4 
Constructivists propose that as an idea becomes normalized after passing a "tipping 
point," policy diffusion accelerates. Hypothesis 4 held that TIP policy diffusion increases as the 
regional density of the policy increases. For all policies except any change to the TIP legal regime 
and NAP initiation, the regional density of the policy motivated policy diffusion. This offers 
strong evidence for constructivism. 
Chapter 5 also considered the role of regional policy communities. As the literature on 
regime complexes suggest, these communities offer one mechanism to explain regional 
differentiation in policy diffusion. To determine whether they are vehicles for constructivism, I 
included variables for these communities together with the variable for policy density. I found 
that, for some policies, policy density fully eclipsed the role of regional policy communities, 
while for others, regional policy communities had some effect independent of that of policy 
density. Moreover, regional organizations that had external policy review and inter-regional 
organizations coordinating migration policy also helped promote the diffusion of some TIP 
policies.  
Thus, I find that constructivism has explanatory power, that its influence is at least 
partly expressed through the role of regional policy communities, and that, for some policies, 
regional policy communities and other components of the international TIP regime complex also 




Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued that fear of transnational trafficking 
motivated criminalization as countries competed to discourage criminal networks from activity 
within a country. While they had used road counts to neighbors with criminalization extant as a 
proxy for this fear, I preferred to use actual reports of increased or diverted transnational 
trafficking as a better measure. Hypothesis 5 held that reports of increased transnational 
trafficking or diversion of trafficking flows promote TIP policy diffusion for those policies which 
disrupt transnational trafficking networks. As discussed in chapter 6, this hypothesis was not 
supported. I have no evidence that reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking 
matters in any way for the diffusion of TIP policy. The role of road networks in promoting policy 
diffusion appears to be wholly explained by the influence of regional policy communities which 
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) did not include in their study. 
Summary 
 An overall summary of the hypotheses and whether they were supported is found in 
table 7-2. When considering the various theories to policy diffusion, coercion and constructivism 
had the most explanatory power for TIP policy. Reputation theory offered some explanatory 
power, but not as much as one might expect from Kelley's Scorecard Diplomacy (2017). 
Competition theory did not help explain the diffusion of TIP policy. The international TIP policy 
regime—represented by US diplomacy under the TVPA, regional policy communities, and inter-
regional organizations coordinating migration policy—were all relevant actors for the 
transnational promotion of TIP policy. 
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Table 7-2. Summary of Results 
Hypothesis Theory Results 
Hypothesis 1. Credible threats of costly US 
sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. 
Coercion Qualified support. 
Threats with low 
credibility promote 
diffusion. 
Hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure from 
neighbors having a better score promotes TIP 
policy diffusion for those policies which are 
most likely to improve scores. 
Reputation Conditional support 
but not for policies 
which improve 
scores. 
Hypothesis 3. Non-coercive aspects of US 
scorecard diplomacy promote TIP policy 
diffusion for those policies which are most likely 
to improve scores. 
Reputation or 
Constructivism 
Supported but for 
both policies which 
improve scores and 
those that do not. 
Hypothesis 4. TIP policy diffusion increases as 
the regional density of the policy increases. 
Constructivism Supported. 
Hypothesis 5. Reports of increased 
transnational trafficking or diversion of 
trafficking flows promote TIP policy diffusion for 
policies which disrupt transnational networks. 
Competition Not supported. 
 More broadly, the findings support the claims that both power and ideas matter for 
policy diffusion. The findings for hypotheses 2 and 3 which showed that non-coercive US 
diplomacy promotes TIP policy diffusion are congruent with an understanding of the world 
where weaker actors respond to the desires of more powerful actors in the international 
system. Other evidence for this dynamic can be seen in the greater influence of inter-regional 
organizations coordinating migration for policy diffusion on emigrant-sending members than on 
immigrant-receiving members. Moreover, for many policies, low-income and lower-middle 
income countries are more likely to implement TIP policies than upper-middle income countries. 
Weaker countries seem to be adjusting policy to accord with the desires of more powerful 
countries. But ideas also matter, as is evidenced by the strong support for the influence of policy 
normalization, a constructivist mechanism. As such, the findings here are congruent with a 




 The findings have also produced surprises. Where I expected that highly credible threats 
of sanctions to promote policy diffusion, I found rather that it was threats of low credibility that 
promoted policy diffusion. Where I expected that reputational pressure would encourage the 
adoption of TIP policies which improved scores, I found rather that reputational pressure was 
disconnected from scores. I also found a complicated relationship between regional policy 
communities and policy normalization. These findings raise further questions for future 
research. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
For the Literature on Policy Diffusion 
 Mechanisms associated with the coercion, reputation, and constructivist theories help 
promote TIP policy diffusion. Indeed, none of these theories claim to be comprehensive 
explanations of policy diffusion, and, in some cases, mechanisms of diffusion are claimed by 
multiple theories. This dissertation considered four principal diffusion mechanisms—the threat 
of sanctions, US scorecard diplomacy, regional policy communities, and competition with 
neighbors—and found that the first three mattered. However, each mechanism did not matter 
in the way it was expected to matter. For sanctions, it was threats of low credibility that 
promoted diffusion. For scorecard diplomacy, the role of scores seemed to matter less than US 
diplomatic engagement. And, while regional policy communities do seem to be a constructivist 
vehicle in helping policy solutions achieve a taken-for-granted status, they also seem to matter 
in ways that are not well explored and could be claimed by various theories. For TIP policy, the 
learning theory did not seem to apply, and I did not find any evidence that competition 
mattered.  
One way forward toward a more comprehensive theoretical approach to policy diffusion 
may be to consider how variations in a policy domain matter for which diffusion mechanisms 
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apply. Because success against TIP is not easily measurable, it is not a good candidate for 
learning theory. This lack of transparent measurability also makes it a difficult issue over which 
to compete. Issues like foreign direct investment or refugee resettlement are easier to measure 
than underground criminal activity like transnational trafficking. Without clear comparative 
measures, it is difficult to compete with neighbors to become less attractive to criminal 
networks, just as it is difficult to learn from policy successes. One dimension, then, that shapes 
which mechanisms matter for policy diffusion is the extent to which both the problem and 
policy solutions can be measured and compared.  
Another dimension on which policy domains vary is the extent to which they are 
perceived as a public good that creates collective action problems. Combating TIP is typically 
described as a public good, but it is not clear that disruption of transnational trafficking 
networks and protection of victims are transnational public goods in the same degree. 
Moreover, the extent to which a public good may be seen as global, regional, or neighborly may 
also influence policy diffusion. TIP seems to be considered both a global and regional public 
good—global by the US which expends significant diplomatic effort on it, and regional by most 
other actors. I did not find evidence that neighbors influence policy diffusion except inasmuch as 
they belong to the same regional policy communities. The horizon for any policy domain—
global, regional, or bilateral—will influence which mechanisms matter for policy diffusion, as 
well as help explain regional variation or divergence in policy diffusion.  
Public goods also vary in how they are supplied. Generally, the provision of a public 
good is assumed to depend on the sum of contributions from all individual members. But some 
public goods are supplied to the extent their best- or worst-performing member provides the 
good. "Best shot" public goods—like asteroid deflection—do not need much cooperation; the 
best performing member will provide the good. "Weakest link" public goods depend on the 
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weakest performing member; security of nuclear materials or smallpox eradication are 
examples (Hirshleifer 1983). The mechanisms associated with policy diffusion may vary 
depending on the cooperation dynamics. For example, conditionality may be more conflictual in 
the context of summation public goods than for weakest-link public goods. In the former, costs 
of policy adjustment fall more heavily on some members of the community than others, while in 
the latter, better-performing members will be more likely to aid the weaker-performing 
members to improve their performance. To some extent, TIP policy resembles a weakest-link 
public good. Powerful countries and regional policy communities offer aid to help weaker 
members improve their TIP policy performance. For example, I found that, in some cases, 
emigrant-sending members of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration were more 
likely to implement some TIP policies than immigrant-receiving members or nonmembers. Such 
a finding could be explained by the efforts of the wealthier, immigrant-receiving members to 
encourage the weaker members to improve policy performance. 
Together, the measurability of the problem and policy solutions, the extent to which an 
issue is viewed as a public good with a global, regional, or neighborly horizon, and the function 
of public good provision may help us understand the constraints confronting various diffusion 
mechanisms. And while some mechanisms may be claimed by multiple theories, it is the 
mechanisms that activate diffusion. Thus, the context of public goods provision and the 
measurability of policy performance can temper our expectations and help us refine our 
theories. 
Another recommendation for scholars of policy diffusion is to better integrate the 
literature of regime complexes. The variation in diffusion of TIP policy by region is not stochastic, 
and the evidence offered in this study is that regional policy communities influence diffusion 
rates. Explaining regional variation in policy diffusion, especially of TIP policy, has not received 
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the attention it deserves. This study goes part way in helping offer explanations by showing that, 
to some extent, regional policy communities help policies achieve a taken-for-granted status. 
But we do not yet know why some policy communities are better at this than others. 
The findings also raise other questions: Why is the European policy community the most 
successful in promoting the diffusion of TIP victim protection policies? Why is the African policy 
community relatively better at promoting diffusion than most other policy communities? Why 
do some regional policy communities seem to undermine policy diffusion? Why do inter-
regional organizations coordinating migration policy promote diffusion of some policies among 
emigrant-sending members but not immigrant-receiving members? What characteristics of 
regional policy communities are the most important for policy diffusion? These are all questions 
worthy of further investigation. Integrating the literature on policy diffusion with that on regime 
complexes may help answer them. 
Another question tangentially raised herein is why do regional organizations choose to 
coordinate TIP policy? That is, why do policy choices diffuse in regional organizations? In this 
analysis, I used the regional policy community as an independent variable. But the choices of 
international and intergovernmental organizations may also be studied as the dependent 
variable. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued that the fear of increased or diverted 
trafficking motivated policy diffusion. Perhaps this fear motivated regional policy coordination, 
rather than the mechanisms of competition, as they argued. Or perhaps the regional 
organizations are vehicles for the will of the most powerful countries in each region. 
Understanding how and why regional organizations choose to coordinate some policies but not 
others is an area for future research that will clarify how policies diffuse.  
 In addition to the theoretical suggestions above, additional empirical work may also 
prove valuable for testing or refining theories. Three ways in which it may do so are 
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investigating tipping point thresholds, considering how policy options may compete with each 
other, and examining subnational policy diffusion for transnational policies such as TIP. 
Constructivists argue that after acceptance of an idea passes a "tipping point," diffusion 
accelerates. I found that policy diffuses as an idea becomes taken-for-granted, as measured by 
policy density. However, a distinction can be made between tipping points and the taken-for-
granted nature of an idea. More empirical work on the existence of specific tipping points for 
TIP policy diffusion may help demonstrate this idea. 
 The approach to TIP policy diffusion taken herein did not seriously consider whether 
various TIP policies compete with each other or with other policy choices in neighboring 
domains. While empirical evidence shows that, for the most part, adoption of one policy further 
increases the adoption of other TIP policies, this is not necessarily always the case. One possible 
explanation for regional differentiation in policy adoption is policy divergence. The TIP policies I 
selected for study show regional differentiation in adoption rates, and, for some policies, 
divergence. This finding may be an artifact of data collection which relied primarily on US and 
European sources but, in so doing, assumes that North American and European policy choices 
are normative and worthy of adoption globally. This may not be the case. The study of TIP policy 
diffusion could benefit by a broader selection of policy options with special attention given to 
policy choices made by actors outside of North America and Europe. Moreover, identifying 
which policy choices are not diffused could be important for understanding policy diffusion. 
 Finally, a natural extension of this research is to consider how much explanatory power 
each theory offers for subnational TIP policy diffusion. Many countries, like the US, Mexico, and 
Brazil, have federal systems. For TIP policy to be effectively diffused, the subnational governing 
units must also change their policies. The various theories of policy diffusion—conditionality, 
constructivism, reputation, and competition—could all play a role in the diffusion of TIP policy at 
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the subnational level. Understanding the multi-level dimensions of TIP policy diffusion may be of 
interest to both scholars of policy diffusion and policy advocates. 
For the Literature on Sanctions 
 This dissertation also has implications for the literature on sanctions, as the findings in 
chapter 3 both reinforce and challenge the existing literature on sanctions. Consistent with the 
findings of this literature, the US selects which countries to threaten with sanctions, and 
countries which are more difficult cases—that is, have higher costs of compliance—are more 
likely to be threatened with sanctions and have sanctions imposed. Moreover, I found that the 
threat of sanctions does promote policy diffusion while imposing sanctions does not. 
Inconsistent with the literature, I found that having a low threat credibility was more efficacious 
in promoting policy diffusion than a high threat credibility. This puzzle presents opportunities to 
further refine sanctions theory. 
 The literature on sanctions relies heavily on game theory, but in doing so tends to 
assume conflictual theoretic models. It is not clear that the US sanctioning threats related to TIP 
are as conflictual as the models assume. The TVPA requires the US to evaluate other countries' 
TIP performance and to sanction poor performers. And while the President and the US 
diplomatic corps have some freedom to score and sanction countries, this freedom is not 
absolute. Some countries really do underperform on TIP, and while diplomatic concerns 
influence both the scoring and the sanctioning, it is also clear that perceived performance on TIP 
also matters. Indeed, for the US to achieve its goals, its TIP evaluations must have some 
grounding in reality. Thus, poor TIP policy performance can create a point of contention 
between the US and the target that neither country really wants. In this sense, even threatening 
sanctions creates costs and uncertainty for both the sender and target country that, in many 
cases, both countries may wish to avoid. Under such circumstances, perhaps countries with a 
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low threat credibility would nonetheless rather avoid conflict and reduce uncertainty, especially 
if it could be done relatively cheaply or if it generates benefits for domestic or regional actors. 
The repeat-play of US TIP sanctions may also matter here. Every year, countries are reevaluated 
for their TIP performance, and so countries may be considering time horizons in their evaluation 
of costs and benefits. Game theoretic models for sanctioning threat and decisions already 
include both the costs of target compliance and sender credibility, but these models might be 
improved by (1) incorporating the cost of diplomatic conflict, (2) short- and long-term costs 
associated with annual repeat-play sanctioning decisions and (3) more recognition of the 
relative power of those domestic actors who stand to gain from compliance. If diplomatic 
conflict has costs, even when sanctions are not likely to be imposed, then removing diplomatic 
conflict may motivate actors to policy action even when the threat of sanctions is not credible, 
especially when at least some domestic actors stand to gain from the policy. 
 Another area for further research is that of policy choice in the face of sanctions threat. 
Unlike some other sanctioning threats, in the case of TIP, the targets have multiple policy 
options with which they may improve TIP performance and avoid sanctions or diplomatic 
conflict over TIP altogether. I found that NAPs, a relatively low-cost policy option, were used by 
targets with both low and high threat credibility, while more costly (or at least more time-
consuming) policy options—criminalization and establishment of intersectoral coordinating 
bodies—were used by targets only with low threat credibility. NRMs, a relatively high-cost policy 
option requiring extensive coordination and capacity—were not used to avoid sanctions (with 
the possible exception of the singular case of Bolivia in 2018). This policy choice is likely a result 
of the interplay between US policy preferences and target policy preferences. Why or how the 
actors reach the policy decisions they do is an area ripe for more theoretical development which 
could improve our understanding of the use of coercive conditionality in international relations. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DIPLOMATS AND POLICY ADVOCATES 
 The findings of this research have implications for diplomats, policy makers, and TIP 
policy advocates, both in government and transnational civil society. I encourage these actors to 
(1) focus on good policy, (2) build institutional capacity, and (3) promote transparency and 
external evaluation of policy. I also have specific recommendations for US diplomacy in its 
coercive and reputational capacities. 
 First, focus on good policy. Key actors in TIP policy diffusion, such as the US State 
Department, pay relatively little attention to changing conditions that directly empower people 
to free themselves, though this is likely to have the greatest long-term impact on TIP (e.g., see 
Choi-Fitzpatrick 2017). Many scholars have criticized global efforts against TIP as focusing too 
much on law enforcement solutions that do little to reduce overall suffering (e.g., see Chapkis 
2005; Chuang 2014; Shih 2016). Bernstein (2010; 2012) holds that "carceral feminism" with its 
punitive model of social justice, while popular with both feminist and religious constituencies, is 
not the most effective way to reduce harm to marginalized people. Indeed, the law enforcement 
approach can further victimize the very people it is trying to help (e.g., Perry 2016). As Charnysh, 
Lloyd, and Simmons (2014) argued, law enforcement frames are also popular with government 
officials because it increases the power of the state. In my own conversations with those who 
work with trafficking victims, I have heard criticisms of how much the law enforcement frame 
dominates intersectoral cooperation. In my own experience participating on the Kentucky 
human trafficking task force, I can attest that law enforcement solutions are generally 
unquestioned and prioritized.  
 While I am sympathetic to these criticisms of the transnational TIP policy regime, one 
advantage of relying on multiple frames is that it motivates action on TIP from diverse actors, 
including actors with significant power, and brings them together in conversation. Given the 
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transnational TIP policy regime that we have, we can and ought to shape it by promoting good 
policies that help empower people to avoid or escape trafficking. While intersectoral 
cooperation may be dominated by law enforcement frames, it also provides opportunities to 
raise issues with law enforcement and policymakers that go beyond punitive strategies to 
reduce TIP. Since the findings of this dissertation show that ideas about the value of TIP policies 
diffuse across borders, diplomats and advocates ought to promote the policies believed to have 
the most positive impact. 
 Second, build institutional capacity. In my research, I was surprised at how undervalued 
intersectoral coordinating bodies were in the US TIP reports. Not only did US diplomats make 
relatively few recommendations to form or reinstate these bodies but having a functioning 
intersectoral coordinating body was associated with worse TIP scores. Moreover, in many parts 
of the world, the transnational institutional capacity of regional organizations is either lacking or 
focused on law enforcement or migration coordination. While African and European regional 
efforts to promote transnational cooperation have born some fruit, improving the regional 
coordinating capacity in the Americas, the Middle East, or much of Asia ought to be a focus of 
regional organizations coordinating TIP policy in those regions.  
 Third, outside of Europe and the US TIP reports, transparency and external evaluation of 
TIP policy is lacking. Results show that policy transparency and accountability—both from the US 
TIP reports and regional organizations that offer external evaluations—do help promote policy 
diffusion. But the US TIP reports alone are vulnerable to being dismissed as politically motivated 
or hypocritical. As such, most regional organizations could do much more to offer their 
members opportunities for policy transparency and accountability.  
 Finally, US diplomacy under the TVPA could be improved in various ways. As noted 
above, much more attention ought to be given to institutional capacity. Indeed, this should be 
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moved out from under the "Prevention" subheading and placed under its own subheading 
which should come earlier in the report. And of course, countries should not have their scores 
punished for having functional institutions. Moreover, the TIP reports could do more to highlight 
international coordination and cooperation than it currently does. By highlighting efforts of each 
regional organization that promotes TIP policy coordination, US diplomacy may perhaps 
encourage more vigorous regional cooperation. 
 This study has shown that the threat of US sanctions has been effective at promoting 
some TIP policies—especially those deemed necessary to meet certain minimum standards. 
However, in the case of TIP, it is not clear that credibly threatening or imposing sanctions is as 
important as sustained diplomatic engagement which is created by a country receiving a low TIP 
score. While generating some uncertainty in the sanctioning decision is likely to continue, the 
evidence does not indicate that the US must consistently sanction underperforming countries to 
achieve its aims to promote policy diffusion. The US may also wish to consider differentiating 
minimum standards by development level so that it expects more from wealthy countries like 
itself than it does from poorer ones. For example, tier ranks could be explicitly tied to the World 
Bank income classifications, so that an upper income country would need to do more to earn a 
tier 1 rank than a lower income country. The US could also add an "exemplary" tier rank for 
countries going beyond the minimums and thereby highlight policy options that might be 
worthy of emulation elsewhere.  
CONCLUSION 
 The primary contribution of this dissertation is empirical. I created a unique dataset of 
TIP policy on which to adjudicate theoretical claims by testing the explanatory power of the 
existing theories of policy diffusion. Unlike previous studies, I was able to test these theories 
with advanced statistical models on a broader range of TIP policies than criminalization. 
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Moreover, in my dataset, I was able to include more variables related to the conduct of US 
diplomacy and regional organizations. As such, this dissertation offers the best test of the 
explanatory value of the various theories of policy diffusion for TIP policy to date. Understanding 
how much is explained by each theory and what gaps remain offers a foundation for further 
study. 
 The findings not only help demonstrate the explanatory value of each theory, but also 
reveal data useful for understanding differences in diffusion by policy type and region. Such 
information raises new questions and puzzles and is therefore useful for the further theoretical 
refinement or development.  
Finally, my research has practical implications for diplomatic and policy practitioners 
who wish to promote the best policies for reducing TIP and helping those harmed by it. Human 
trafficking scholars have criticized the heavy emphasis on law enforcement policies, but I found 
that diffusion mechanisms also promote capacity-building and victim protection policies. As 
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLES 
LIST OF VARIABLES 
Indicator Concept Operationalization Source Chapters 
Child sex tourism 
CST 
TIP tier scoring 
model: Trafficking 
characteristics 
Reports of child sex 
tourism with a country. 
Dichotomous. 








Whether a country fully 
criminalized human 
trafficking in a given year. 
Full criminalization 
includes both sex and 
labor trafficking, both 
domestic and 
transnational trafficking, 
and trafficking of men, 
women, and children. 
Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 








TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether a country has 
fully criminalized human 
trafficking. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 
3, 4, 5, 6 
Criminalization 
recommended, 





Whether the US 
recommended that a 
country fully criminalize 
TIP in the current or 
previous year. 
Dichotomous. 





TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP 
performance 
Whether a country's 
previously instituted inter-
ministerial or intersectoral 
TIP coordinating institution 
ceased to operate in a 
given year. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 








Whether a country is 




US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports 
3, 4, 5, 6 
Emigrant-sending 








TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Countries for which the 
ratio of emigrants to 
immigrant is more than 
1.05 and which are also 
members of one of the 7 
inter-regional 
organizations coordinating 





4, 5, 6 
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The extent to which the 
government respects press 
and media freedom, the 
freedom of ordinary 
people to discuss politics in 
the public sphere, and the 










GDP in constant 2010 
international dollars per 
capita, in thousands. 
Continuous. 
World Bank 3, 4, 5, 6 
Government abuse 







model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether a country is 
reported to have violated 
TIP victims' physical 
integrity rights. 
Dichotomous. 












TIP tier scoring 
model: Government 
accountability 
The extent to which the 
ideal of government 




3, 4, 5, 6 
Government 
complicity with TIP 
 GIHT 
Sanctioning decision 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Reported government 
complicity with TIP. 
Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports 3 
Government 
cooperation with 






TIP tier scoring 




cooperation with CSOs on 
TIP. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports 
3, 4, 5, 6 
Government 




model: TIP policy 
performance 
 
TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Reported government 
hostility toward CSOs on 
TIP. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports 3, 4 
Immigrant-receiving 








TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Countries for which the 
ratio of immigrants to 
emigrants is more than 
1.05 and which are also 
members of one of the 7 
inter-regional 
organizations coordinating 





4, 5, 6 
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Whether a country 
instituted an inter-
ministerial or intersectoral 
TIP coordinating institution 
in a given year. 
Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 







TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP 
performance 





US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 
3, 4, 5, 6 
Institutionalization 
recommendation, 





Whether the US 
recommended 
institutionalization (or re-
institutionalization) of an 
inter-ministerial or 
intersectoral coordinating 
body in the current or 
previous year. 
Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports 3, 4, 5, 6 
Legal revision event, 
previous year. 
LREV_PY 
TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP 
performance  
Whether a country revised 
its legal regime on TIP in a 
way that is believed to 
improve TIP policy in the 
previous year. For 
neighboring policy 
domains, the legal revision 
must be partly motivated 
to address TIP. 
Dichotomous.  
US TIP reports, GRETA 










Whether the US 
recommended that a 
country revise its TIP legal 
regime in the current or 
previous year. This variable 










The extent to which 
members of the legislature 
abuse their position for 
financial gain. Continuous. 
Varieties of 
Democracy 
3, 4, 5, 6 
Low scores in the US 
TIP report, current 




Whether a country 
received a score of "tier 2 
watch list" or "tier 3" in 
the US TIP report in the 
current or previous year. 
Dichotomous. 





Whether the country is in 
the midst of a major 
foreign or civil war (more 











TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
 
Whether a country's 
migration policy as 
practiced is perceived to 
further endanger TIP 
victims. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports 4 






TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether a country has an 
operational National 
Action Plan extant. Plans 
without definite 
timeframes are excluded. 
Dichotomous 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 
3, 4, 5, 6 





Whether a country 
initiated a National Action 
Plan or Strategy for TIP in a 
given year. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 




TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether a country has a 
national rapporteur for TIP 
to evaluate policy 
performance. 
Dichotomous.  
US TIP reports, GRETA 











Whether the US made a 
recommendation for 
instituting or improving a 
National Referral 
Mechanism in the current 
or previous year. 
Dichotomous. 







Whether a country 
formally adopted an 
operational National 
Referral Mechanism in a 
given year. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 





TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether a country has an 
operational (even if 
flawed) National Referral 
Mechanism. Dichotomous.  
US TIP reports, GRETA 










Whether a country had a 
neighbor or peer country 
receive a better score in 
the US TIP report in the 
current or previous year. 
Dichotomous. For detailed 
criteria, see note 1. 









weighted by the 







The total number of road 
connections with 
neighbors that had extant 
(criminalization, 
institutionalization, 
National Action Plans, 
National Referral 
Mechanisms, or reflection 
periods). Missing data was 
considered to mean the 
specified policy was not 
extant. Road connections 
were counted from 2019 
maps. Count. See note 2. 
Google Maps 3, 4, 5, 6 
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weighted by the 







The total ratio of road 
connections with 
neighbors that had extant 
(criminalization, 
institutionalization, 
National Action Plans, 
National Referral 
Mechanisms, or reflection 
periods). Missing data was 
considered to mean the 
specified policy was not 
extant. Road connections 
were counted from 2019 
maps. Ratio. See note 2. 










weighted by the 
number of roads and 










The total number of road 
connections with 
neighbors that had extant 
(criminalization, 
institutionalization, 
National Action Plans, 
National Referral 
Mechanisms, or reflection 
periods) multiplied by the 
natural log of the UN ideal 
point distance centered at 
the median ideal point. 
The sign is reversed so that 
friendlier countries had 
positive scores. Missing 
data was considered to 
mean the specified policy 
was not extant. Road 
connections were counted 
from 2019 maps. See note 
2. 
Google Maps 












Country is not a member 












Whether a country is 
sanctioned by the US for 
other non-TIP reasons in a 
given year. Dichotomous. 
US Treasury Sanctions 













Fear of transnational 
trafficking 
Whether the country has 
reports of trafficking 
diversion or increased 
transnational trafficking in 
the current or previous 
year. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports 6 
Pompeo, US 
Secretary of State 
POMPEO 
Sanctioning decision 
model: US country 
characteristics 
The US Secretary of State 












Whether a country is a 
member of one of 7 
regional TIP policy 
communities. For this 
variable, a country can 
only be a member of one 
regional policy community, 
so the North American 
community is folded into 
the American community, 
and otherwise when a 
country is in more than 
one, the community which 
receives more of its total 













The extent to which public 
sector employees grant 
favors in exchange for 
bribes and how often they 
steal public funds for 
personal use. Continuous. 
Varieties of 
Democracy 
3, 4, 5, 6 
Ratio of total 
















The ratio of each country's 
total migrant stock 
(emigrant and immigrant) 
shared with migration 
partners that had extant 
(criminalization, 
institutionalization, 
National Action Plans, 
National Referral 
Mechanisms, or reflection 
periods). Missing data was 
considered to mean the 
specified policy was not 
extant. When migrant 
stock data was not 
available, the most recent 




Ratio of total trade 
with trading 














The ratio of each country's 
total trade (imports and 
exports) with trading 
partners that had extant 
(criminalization, 
institutionalization, 
National Action Plans, 
National Referral 
Mechanisms, or reflection 
periods). Missing data was 
considered to mean the 
specified policy was not 
extant. Ratio. 
IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics 
6 







The ratio of the country's 
trade with the US over its 
total trade. Ratio. 





Indicator Concept Operationalization Source Chapters 
Ratio of trade with a 






The ratio of US trade with 
a country over US total 
trade. Ratio. 
IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics 
3 






The ratio of a country's 
trade with advanced 
economies, defined as 
countries in the Euro area, 
and Australia, Canada, 
Czechia, Denmark, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Japan, South 
Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore, 
Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
Ratio. 






TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether a country has a 
reflection period for 
victims. Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 









Whether a country 
institutionalized a 
reflection period for 
victims in a given year. 
Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 
3, 4, 5, 6 




















The regional density of 
countries with the 
referenced policy extant. 
Countries for which data 
on the policy was missing 
were considered to not 
have the policy extant. 
Two interpretations of 
region are used: a 
geographic and political-
cultural. Ratio. 
US TIP reports, GRETA 
reports, various other 
sources 













Whether a country is a 
member in each of the 8 
regional regime TIP policy 
communities. 
Dichotomous. See note 3. 
Regional organization 
websites 
3, 4, 5, 6 
Sanction credibility, 






Predicted credibility of US 
TIP sanctions. Ratio and 
ordinal. 
Prediction of the 
sanctioning decision 




Indicator Concept Operationalization Source Chapters 
Sanctioned for TIP 





Whether a country that 
received a tier 3 score in 
the TIP report was 




relating to TVPA 
sanctions 
3 
Sanctioned for TIP, 





Whether a country that 
received a tier 3 score in 
the TIP report was 
sanctioned, either full or 





relating to TVPA 
sanctions 
3 
Scored in the US TIP 





Whether a country was 
scored in the US TIP report 
in the current or previous 
year. This excludes "special 
cases." Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports 3, 4, 5, 6 
Sex trade policy 
harms victims 
STV 
TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
 
Whether a country's sex 
trade policy as practiced is 
perceived to further 
endanger TIP victims. 
Dichotomous. 
US TIP reports 4 
Source 
SOURCE 
TIP tier scoring 
model: Trafficking 
characteristics  
Whether a country is 
perceived to be a source 
for transnational 
trafficking. Dichotomous. 












The sum of the number of 
regional organizations 
taking action on TIP (but 
excluding organizations 
focused on inter-regional 
migration) in which the 










combatting TIP with 






The sum of the number of 
regional organizations in 
which the country is a 
member which are taking 
action on TIP (but 
excluding organizations 
focused on inter-regional 


















The sum of the number of 
regional organizations in 
which the country is a 
member which are taking 
action on TIP (but 
excluding organizations 
focused on inter-regional 
migration) that have an 
external evaluation of a 










The total population, 
natural log. Continuous. 
World Bank 3* 
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TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether the target 
country had any trafficking 
convictions in a given year. 
Dichotomous. 





model: TIP policy 
performance 
 
TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
Whether the target 
country initiated any 
trafficking prosecutions in 
a given year. Dichotomous. 






Whether a country has 
acceded to the UN 
Trafficking Protocol. 
Dichotomous. 














UN ideal point 
distance with US, 







TIP tier scoring 
model: Relationship 
with US 
The absolute distance 
between the voting ideal 
points of the target and 
the US centered on the 
mean. The ideal points are 
calculated per Bailey et alii 
2017. Continuous. 
Voeten et al. 2009; 











Country is classified as 
either an upper-middle- or 
high-income country 
according to the World 
Bank. Dichotomous. 
World Bank 3 







TIP tier scoring 
model: Relationship 
with US 
Country receives US 
military aid in any amount. 
Dichotomous. 
US AID Foreign Aid 
Explorer, World Bank 
3, 4 
US TIP tier score 
TT 
TIP tier scoring 
model: Dependent 
variable 
Whether a country was 
scored at tier 1, tier 2, tier 
2 watch list, or tier 3 in the 
US TIP report in a given 
year. Ordinal. 






model: TIP policy 
performance 
 
TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 




US TIP reports 3, 4 
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Indicator Concept Operationalization Source Chapters 





TIP tier scoring 
model: TIP policy 
performance 
 
Whether a country hosted 
an evaluative visit from the 
UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Trafficking in a 
given year. Dichotomous. 
United Nations Office 











The extent to which 
women are participate in 












The capacity for women's 
agency and social 
participation, along the 
dimensions of 
fundamental civil liberties, 
women's open discussion 
of political issues and 
participation in civil society 
organizations, and the 
descriptive representation 





3, 4, 5, 6 






TIP tier scoring 
model: State 
capacity 
Whether a country is 
considered low-income, 
lower-middle income, 
upper-middle, or high 
income. Ordinal. 
World Bank 3, 4, 5, 6 
* The variable is used only in robustness checks for the chapter (see Appendix C). 
"Various other sources" are listed in Appendix A. 
The variable codes used in my Stata do files are listed in ALL CAPS in the "Indicator" column. 
 
Note 1. Neighbor-peers for the application of reputational pressure 
Neighbor-peers: For determining whether a country was a "neighbor" to another for 
reputational pressure to apply, the following rules were applied in order to take into account a 
country's peer group: 
In general, all direct neighbors (by land and within 150 miles via sea) are considered 
neighbors, except: 
• Canada and the USA are neighbors, but they are not neighbors with any other countries. 
• Spain and Morocco are not neighbors, but Turkey is neighbors with Greece and Bulgaria, 
as well as Syria, Iraq, Armenia and Georgia. 
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• Russia is only considered a neighbor to Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan & China. 
• The micro nations in the Pacific are neighbors with each other. 
• The island nations of the eastern Caribbean are neighbors with each other. 
• All seven nations of Central America are neighbors with each other. 
• All five countries of Scandinavia (including Iceland) are neighbors with each other, but 
not Russia. 
• All three Baltic States are neighbors of each other but not Russia. 
• Bosnia is a neighbor to Albania and Kosovo. 
• Greece & Cyprus are neighbors. 
• Cabo Verde is neighbors with Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. 
• Algeria is not neighbors across the Sahara, but Libya is neighbor with Chad, and Egypt 
with Sudan. 
• Lesotho and Eswatini are neighbors with each other. 
• Bhutan and Nepal are neighbors with each other (and India) but not with China. 
Note 2. Method for counting road connections. 
I used Google Maps and Google Earth (2019) to count road connections according to the 
following rules: 
• A major road (color yellow) crossed the border  
• A minor road (color white) crossed the border but was within a short distance of major 
roads on both sides of the border 
• An urban area existed on both sides of the border 
• A ferry route connecting major roads 
• In some cases in developing countries, Google Earth was consulted to determine if roads 
existed or seemed the equivalent size on both sides of the border 
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• Two countries with no major road connections but at least one minor road connection 
counted for one connection 
• A sea route of 150 miles or less existed between the two countries 
o However, this is not additive if an existing ferry route exists 
o A sea route was not counted between Russia and the United States  
For counting roads, I considered French Guinea a part of France. 
Note 3. Regional regime TIP policy complexes. 
The regional regime complexes are defined as follows: 
Africa: Any member of the African Union, East African Community, ECOWAS, ECCAS, 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or the Southern African Development 
Community once these organizations begin coordination on TIP policy. 
Americas: Any member of the Organization of American States once it begins coordination on 
TIP policy. 
Europe: Any member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the 
European Union once these organizations begin coordination on TIP policy. Countries must be 
located in Europe (i.e., have Correlates of War country codes between 200 and 399). Aspirants 
to the European Union are also included. 
Middle East and North Africa: Any member of the League of Arab States once it begins 
coordination on TIP policy. 
North America: Any member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
located in North America (i.e., Canada and the United States). 
Russia & Central Asia: Any member of the Commonwealth of Independent States once it begins 
coordination on TIP policy. 
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Southeast Asia: Any member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations once it begins 
coordination on TIP policy. 
South Asia: Any member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation once it begins 
coordination on TIP policy. 
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APPENDIX C: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR CHAPTER 3 
 To test the robustness of the results in chapter 3, I applied five tests: (1) using a 
clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions 
rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) dropping the US policy recommendation variable 
from the four models that included it, (3) substituting regional policy communities in the model 
for regional density of the dependent variable, (4) substituting control variables for women's 
participation in civil society and freedom of expression for women's political power and 
government accountability, respectively, and (5) adding control variables for major war and 




Table AC-3-1. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions 
 Criminalization 
Legal 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 
















































Sanctioned, current or previous year Collinear (-) 0.536 0.214 
0.490 
0.664 Collinear (-) 
0.762 
0.832 Collinear (-) 



























European RPC      7.591 **0.018 
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe      8.748 *0.080 











Protocol accession 1.813 ***0.000 
1.055 
0.627 
    
Criminalization extant   2.082 ***0.001 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.112 **0.046 
 3.370 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.517 ***0.000 
3.083 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.279 ***0.001   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.615 **0.018  



























GDP per capita, in thousands      1.012 ***0.000 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 160 
Observations 1,347 2,829 1,002 2,899 2,463 2,777 
Number of failures 146 648 153 396 87 42 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable 
is interacted with exp(-0.15t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. 
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Table AC-3-2. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 2: Drop US Recommendation from Models 
 Criminalization Legal Revision Institution NRM 
Variables 
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 

































































Criminalization extant   2.269 ***0.000  
Institutionalization extant  1.094 0.303 
  
NAP extant    2.930 ***0.000 
Legislative corruption or 























 X Government accountability    0.701 *0.065 





















World Bank income classification (base = high income) 





















Subjects 165 171 166 171 
Observations 1,347 2,829 1,000 2,463 
Number of failures 146 648 153 87 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This 





Table AC-3-3. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 3: Include All Regional Policy Communities 
 Criminalization 
Legal 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 
















































Sanctioned, current or previous year Collinear (-) 0.514 0.140 
0.580 
0.709 Collinear (-) 
0.609 
0.628 Collinear (-) 


















RPC for TIP, member       









































0.539 Collinear (-) 







 Former USSR 1.237 0.662 
1.012 


























0.524 Collinear (-) 
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe      5.042 0.167 











Protocol accession 1.939 ***0.000 
1.172 
0.165 
    
Criminalization extant   2.313 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.102 0.265 
 3.484 
***0.000   
NAP extant    26.186 ***0.000 
3.522 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.272 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.600 ***0.002  



























GDP per capital, in thousands      1.014 **0.010 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 160 
Observations 1,347 2,829 1,000 2,899 2,463 2,777 
Number of failures 146 648 153 396 87 42 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** 





Table AC-3-4. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 4: Substitute Women's Civil Society Participation 









P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 
















































Sanctioned, current or previous year Collinear (-) 0.559 0.187 
0.480 
0.630 Collinear (-) 
0.878 
0.885 Collinear (-) 



























European RPC       7.611 ***0.000 
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe      8.694 *0.087 











Protocol accession 1.876 ***0.001 
1.092 
0.438 
    
Criminalization extant   2.121 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.116 0.240 
 3.263 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.011 ***0.000 
3.037 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.289 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 






























































GDP per capita, in thousands      1.012 **0.049 
World Bank income classification (base = high)       



























Subjects 166 171 168 172 171 160 
Observations 1,359 2,850 1,011 2,920 2,478 2,810 
Number of failures 147 654 155 400 87 42 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 
interacted with exp(-0.15t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. 
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Table AC-3-5. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 5: Add Major War and Total Population 
 Criminalization 
Legal 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 














































Sanctioned, current or previous year Collinear (-) 0.730 0.898 
0.581 
0.733 Collinear (-) 
0.961 
0.966 Collinear (-) 



























European RPC      8.099 ***0.000 
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe      9.055 *0.079 











Protocol accession 1.888 ***0.001 
1.110 
0.346 
    
Criminalization extant   2.467 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant    3.125 ***0.000   
NAP extant    23.388 ***0.000 
3.075 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.314 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.755 0.181  



































0.774 Collinear (-) 











GDP per capita, in thousands      1.012 **0.033 
World Bank income classification (base = high)       



























Subjects 157 163 158 164 163 160 
Observations 1,251 2,702 921 2,759 2,344 2,777 
Number of failures 142 631 149 386 84 42 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 






ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR CHAPTER 4 
To test the robustness of the results in chapter 4, I applied three tests: (1) using a 
clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions 
rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) substituting the sanction credibility measure I 
developed in chapter 3 for low TIP scores, and (3) interacting the measure for reputational 
pressure with freedom of expression, which was substituted for government accountability. 
These results are shown in the tables that follow. 
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Table AC-4-1. Chapter 4 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  






0.709   






































European Regional Policy Community member      6.688 **0.028 
Low TIP score X RPC Europe      11.401 *0.051 











Protocol accession 1.863 ***0.000 
1.055 
0.630 
    
Criminalization extant   2.008 ***0.002 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.128 **0.017 
 3.379 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.827 ***0.000 
2.890 
***0.001  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.274 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.640 **0.014  































GDP per capita      1.012 ***0.000 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 1,002 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 154 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 






Table AC-4-2. Chapter 4 Robustness Check 2: Substitute Sanction Credibility for Low TIP Score 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  






0.756   


















Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none) 



















0.127 Collinear (-) 








0.521 Collinear (-) 








0.296 Collinear (-) 








0.580 Collinear (-) 
Sanctioned in current or previous year Collinear (-) 0.543 0.159 
0.477 
0.618 Collinear (-) 
0.798 
0.812 Collinear (-) 









European Regional Policy Community member      6.583 ***0.000 
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe      10.218 *0.056 











Protocol accession 1.872 ***0.000 
1.094 
0.419 
    
Criminalization extant   2.326 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.091 0.360 
 3.308 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.754 ***0.000 
2.962 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.285 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.694 *0.053  































GDP per capita      1.011 **0.044 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,347 2,826 1,000 2,896 2,461 2,320 
Number of failures 146 647 153 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 






Table AC-4-3. Chapter 4 Robustness Check 3: Interact Neighbor with Better Score with 
Freedom of Expression 
 Criminalization Legal Revision
 Institution NAP NRM Reflection Period 
Variables 
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  






0.765   




































 ‡ 1.06x1061 
***0.000  
European Regional Policy Community member      6.104 ***0.000 
Low TIP score X RPC Europe      10.694 *0.055 











Protocol accession 1.919 ***0.000 
1.094 
0.422 
    
Criminalization extant   2.230 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.127 0.210 
 3.384 
***0.000   
NAP extant    25.607 ***0.000 
3.017 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.272 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 











































































GDP per capita      1.013 ***0.006 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 1,002 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 154 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. 2 See Figure AC-4-3 
for a graphical interpretation of the interaction. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is 



























10 12 14 16 18
analysis time
No reputational pressure / Limited free expression (Pakistan)
No reputational pressure / Generally free expression (Greece)
Neighbor has better score / Limited free expression (Pakistan)
Neighbor has better score / Generally free expression (Greece)
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR CHAPTER 5 
To test the robustness of the results in chapter 5, I applied four tests: (1) using a 
clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions 
rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) interacting the number of memberships in regional 
organizations with the primary regional policy community, (3) interacting CSO cooperation with 
the primary regional policy community, and (4) including additional variables which might 
explain participation in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy. These results 




Table AC-5-1. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  









































0.640 Collinear (-) 




0.749   
Former USSR RPC 0.884 0.754 
0.998 


























*0.057 Collinear (-) 

























Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Scored in US TIP report   2.854 **0.035 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  †2.831 0.102 
 0.885 
*0.062   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 2.189 ***0.000 
1.472 
***0.000 
  1.512 
**0.047  











 X RPC Europe      7.632 *0.084 











Protocol accession 1.923 ***0.000 
1.126 
0.295 
    
Criminalization extant   2.260 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.090 0.117 
 3.476 
***0.000   
NAP extant    25.172 ***0.000 
2.776 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.270 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.632 **0.010  































GDP per capita      1.006 0.281 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 1,002 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 154 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 





Table AC-5-2. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 2: Interact Memberships with Regional 
Organizations with Primary Regional Policy Community 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  




























0.257 Collinear (+) 
0.003 
***0.003 

















































Former USSR Primary RPC 0.237 *0.086 
4.484 























 X Number of memberships in regional organizations Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 











































Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 
















Table AC-5-2. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 2: Interact Memberships in Regional Organizations 
with Primary Regional Policy Community, continued 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Scored in US TIP report   2.469 **0.035 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  †2.453 **0.023 
 0.877 
**0.020   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 1.849 **0.022 
1.465 
***0.000 
  1.400 
0.240  






















Protocol accession 2.013 ***0.001 
1.173 
0.166 
    
Criminalization extant   2.791 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.066 0.500 
 3.437 
***0.000   
NAP extant    25.936 ***0.000 
2.726 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.266 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.799 0.224  































GDP per capita      1.005 0.598 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 1,002 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 154 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 





Table AC-5-3. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 3: Interact CSO Cooperation with Primary Regional 
Policy Community 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
















































0.811 Collinear (+) 








0.184 Collinear (-) 








0.881 Collinear (-) 








0.798 Collinear (-) 
Former USSR Primary RPC 1.002 0.997 
1.838 
0.198 Collinear (-) 
2.229 
**0.012 Collinear (-) Collinear (-) 




0.161 Collinear (+) Collinear (-) 


























0.186 Collinear (-) Collinear (-) 






0.242 Collinear (+) Collinear (-) 

























Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 
















Table AC-5-3. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 3: Interact CSO Cooperation with Primary Regional 
Policy Community, continued 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Scored in US TIP report   2.305 **0.048 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  †2.592 **0.012 
 0.896 
**0.036   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 1.862 **0.018 
1.431 
***0.000 
  1.521 
0.118  






















Protocol accession 1.978 ***0.002 
1.138 
0.256 
    
Criminalization extant   2.758 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.090 0.298 
 3.276 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.279 ***0.000 
2.664 
***0.001  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.280 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.701 *0.058  




























0.454 Collinear (+) 
GDP per capita      1.006 0.506 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 1,002 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 154 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 






Table AC-5-4 Chapter 5 Robustness Check 4: Include Additional Variables for Explaining Inter-
regional Migration Organizations 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  









































0.229 Collinear (-) 




0.475   
Former USSR RPC 1.065 0.910 
0.954 


























0.123 Collinear (-) 

























Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 














































Scored in US TIP report   2.402 *0.053 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  † 2.785 **0.011 
 0.863 
**0.014   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 1.766 **0.023 
1.446 
***0.000 
  1.466 
0.184  











 X RPC Europe      9.875 *0.058 











Protocol accession 1.988 ***0.001 
1.222 
*0.099 
    
Criminalization extant   2.529 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.063 0.473 
 3.424 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.766 ***0.000 
2.646 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.280 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.654 **0.022  































       
218 
 
Table AC-5-4. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 4: Include Additional Variables for Explaining Inter-
regional Migration Organizations, continued 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
GDP per capita      1.004 0.687 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 163 168 164 169 169 155 
Observations 1,321 2,783 975 2,853 2,437 2,296 
Number of failures 144 635 152 390 85 40 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 






ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR CHAPTER 6 
To test the robustness of the results in chapter 6, I applied four tests: (1) using a 
clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions 
rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) including road networks, migration partners, and 
trade partners in the same model, (3) including only reports of increased or diverted trafficking 
as the only variable of interest, (4) using road counts weighted by UN voting affinity, and (5) 




Table AC-6-1. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions  





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  















































Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Protocol accession 1.951 ***0.000 
1.123 
0.296 
    
Scored in US TIP report   3.022 **0.019 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  † 2.228 0.215 
 0.899 
0.163   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 2.185 ***0.000 
1.464 
***0.000 
  1.561 
**0.009  











Criminalization extant   2.234 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.089 *0.070 
 3.472 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.793 ***0.000 
2.933 
***0.002  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.267 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.641 **0.030  































GDP per capita (in thousands)      1.006 0.123 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 1,002 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 154 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 





Table AC-6-2. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 2: Include Both Migration and Trade Partners in 
the Same Model 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  






















Ratio of migration partners with extant policy, weighted 




















































Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Protocol accession 2.159 ***0.000 
1.230 
*0.094 
    
Scored in US TIP report   2.583 **0.018 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  † 2.217 *0.077 
 0.886 
*0.067   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 1.808 **0.013 
1.447 
***0.000 
  1.561 
0.101  











Criminalization extant   2.380 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.056 0.534 
 3.440 
***0.000   
NAP extant    24.982 ***0.000 
2.928 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.267 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.693 **0.041  































GDP per capita (in thousands)      1.015 *0.070 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 163 169 164 170 169 155 
Observations 1,321 2,783 975 2,853 2,437 2,299 
Number of failures 144 638 152 391 85 40 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 





Table AC-6-3. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 3: Only Reports of Increased Trafficking 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  




































Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Protocol accession 1.950 ***0.000 
1.145 
0.280 
    
Scored in US TIP report   2.447 **0.026 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  † 2.116 *0.069 
 0.912 
0.145   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 1.879 **0.011 
1.451 
***0.000 
  1.518 
*0.099  











Criminalization extant   2.296 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.077 0.399 
 3.495 
***0.000   
NAP extant    26.177 ***0.000 
2.911 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.260 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.731 *0.075  































GDP per capita (in thousands)      1.007 0.375 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 166 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 1,002 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 154 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 






Table AC-6-4. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 4: With Road Counts Weighted by UN Voting 
Affinity 





P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  
Hazard ratio 
P > |z|  











Number of roads to neighbors with extant policy, 






































Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional 













Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional 













Protocol accession 1.983 ***0.000 
1.222 
0.100 
    
Scored in US TIP report   2.491 **0.020 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  † 2.116 *0.065 
 0.904 
0.119   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 1.898 ***0.008 
1.457 
***0.000 
  1.543 
*0.093  











Criminalization extant   2.469 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.063 0.485 
 3.451 
***0.000   
NAP extant    25.449 ***0.000 
2.905 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.270 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 



































 X Government accountability     0.741 *0.099  































GDP per capita (in thousands)      1.004 0.496 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 164 169 165 170 170 156 
Observations 1,332 2,797 986 2,866 2,446 2,311 
Number of failures 145 639 153 393 86 40 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 





Table AC-6-5. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 5: Exclude All Regional Variables 
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Protocol accession 2.146 ***0.000 
1.188 
0.103 
    
Scored in US TIP report   2.962 **0.015 
   
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year  † 3.557 ***0.001 
 0.939 
0.297   
US recommended policy, current or previous year 1.465 *0.051 
1.357 
***0.000 
  1.752 
**0.012  











Criminalization extant   2.322 ***0.000 
   
Institutionalization extant  1.170 0.102 
 3.465 
***0.000   
NAP extant    26.445 ***0.000 
3.897 
***0.000  
 Institutionalization X NAP    0.268 ***0.000   
Legislative corruption or 
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GDP per capita (in thousands)      1.016 ***0.006 
World Bank income classification (base = high income)       



























Subjects 165 171 165 172 171 157 
Observations 1,349 2,828 986 2,898 2,461 2,321 
Number of failures 146 648 153 396 87 41 
Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 1 Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is 




APPENDIX D: REGIONAL AND INTER-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
BROAD REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHICH ADDRESS TIP 
Africa 
African Union (AU), established 2001, TIP first addressed in 2006. 
East African Community (EAC), established 2000, TIP first addressed in 2014 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), established 1983, TIP first addressed in 
2006. 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established 1975, TIP first addressed in 
2001. 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), established 1996, TIP first addressed in 
2008. 
South African Developmental Community (SADC), established 1980, TIP first addressed in 2009. 
Americas 
Organization of American States (OAS), established 1948, TIP first addressed in 2004. 
Europe 
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), established 1992, TIP first addressed in 2003. 
European Union (EU), established 1958, TIP first addressed in 1995. 
Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), established 1971, TIP first addressed in 2001. 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), established 1973, TIP first 
addressed in 1999. 
Former Soviet Union 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established 1991, TIP first addressed in 2005. 
Middle East and North Africa 




South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established 1985, TIP first addressed 
in 1997. 
Southeast Asia 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established 1967, TIP first addressed in 2004. 
REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS DEDICATED TO TIP 
Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CATHB), 2008. 
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), 2004. 
INTER-REGIONAL FORUMS ON MIGRATION 
Abu-Dhabi Dialogue, established 2008. 
Budapest Process, established 1991. 
Bali Process, established 2002. 
Colombo Process, established 2003. 
Khartoum Process, established 2014. 
Rabat Process, established 2006. 
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